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PREFACE
Hungarian philosophers and historians of sci­
ence have already published contributions to IUHPS 
and other conferences in numbers 2, 3 and 6 of DOXA. 
This volume contains papers presented to the 8th 
International Congress of Logic, Methodology and 
the Philosophy of Science (Moscow, 17-22 August, 
1987), as well as longer studies written by some 
participants, which serve as a background to their 
papers. Editing was done by members of the Depart­
ment for Epistemology and Methodology of Science 
at the Budapest Institute of Philosophy, who owe 
thanks to András Benedek and Balázs Dajka for their 
assistance.
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HEURISTICS OR FOUNDATION OF MATHEMATICS?
Wittgenstein and Lakatos Reconsidered* 
by
András Benedek
"...every rational theory, no matter 
whether scientific or philosophical, is 
rational insofar as it tries to solve 
certain problems. A theory is comprehen­
sible and reasonable only in its rela­
tion to a given problem situation, and 
it can be rationally discussed only by 
discussing this relation."
Karl Popper
1 At first glance Popper's normative critérium sounds per­
suasive as a scientific observation. But what about as an em­
pirical statement? Couldn't it be false? Couldn't a theory be 
expressed and discussed independently of the problem situation? 
Take, for example, mathematical explication. At first, it can­
not be described in Popper's words.* As Lakatos writes, "...it 
starts with a painstakingly stated list of axioms, lemmas, 
and/or definitions... they frequently look artificial and mys- 
tifyingly complicated. One is never told how these complica­
tions arose. The list of axioms and definitions is followed by 
carefully worded theorems. These are loaded with heavy-going
conditions, it seems impossible that anyone should ever have2guessed them. The theorem is followed by the proof."
The standard view of mathematics is that it is a deductive 
system. However, nobody would say that in mathematics we don't 
solve mathematical problems. In the final analysis mathemati-
*Earlier draft of this paper delivered at the Eleventh Interna­
tional Wittgenstein Symposium, August 4 - August 13, 1986 
Kirchberg/Wechsel, Austria.
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dans go into university lecture halls where, after a couple 
years, those who file out are mathematicians. They appear to 
have mastered and comprehended mathematic theories from the 
presentation. —  In today's classroom the discussion, if it can 
be termed as such - the style of presentation — in Lakatos's 
words, continues to be deductivist. Such a style does not take 
into account the problem situation, and when it is possible to 
discuss the problem at all,in terms of the constitution of the 
subject, at very most it could be spoken about 'heuristically'. 
Deductivist mathematic heuristic - if it exists at all - is ei­
ther rational and deductiveat the same time,  ^or "based on the 
idea that heuristics is not deductive, but is also not ration­
al".^ It is either impossible or doesn't make sense to discuss.
2 At the same time we have traditional mathematic philo- 
sophies-Platonism, Formalism, Empricism, Logicism, Construc­
tivism, etc. which identify and widely discuss - albeit on a 
meta-level - what the subject of mathematics is and what it 
concerns, how we are supposed to solve its problems. So now,we 
are confronted with another problem and this was one of Laka­
tos's points of contention with Popper - namely, that the prob­
lem situation is usually not given, it must be constructed or 
reconstructed.
/ This implies two different assertions on different levels:
(1) That the problem-situation is not given as a matter- 
of course - neither in advance nor afterwards (on 
the meta-level), nor is it presented analytically
or historically for the re/construction.
(2) That problems themselves usually are not given - 
they are assumed as "eo ipso" given rather than 
described as "coming to be" and "passing away", their 
entire history being "ab ovo" omitted.5/
We are forced to ask where the boundaries of the problem 
situation ought to be drawn and where they should extend. A 
strict internalist taking full advantage of the versatility of 
the term might well argue that the axiomatic foundation of geo­
metry or the set theoretical foundation of arithmetics is ex­
ternal precisely from the point of view of the problem situa­
8
tion; external postulates, methods, and definitions determine 
both the explication and mode of presentation. He might then 
go on the define the 'tradition of foundational studies' as 
though it were a trend in philosophy of mathematics which at­
tempts to base knowledge on external grounds, whereas - in the 
usual sense of the word - the foundation of a mathematical 
theory is an internal part of the subject (if not constituting 
the subject itself).6
2.1 Lakatos, who was a rationalist, worked with the explicit 
normative critérium that the reconstruction of the problem sitr 
uation is all the more better when it is able to salvage, to re­
construct a greater part of the history of thought as rational, 
and "the rational aspect of scientific growth is fully ac­
counted for by one's logic of scientific discovery".7 He could 
not ascribe to the post festum view that a theory is given with 
the very same list of statements, definitions, and postulates 
which can be identified in books, journals, and documents be­
cause internal reconstruction must account for the growth of 
knowledge and creation of the problem situation!
“A catastrophical consequence of a narrow methodology is 
that, as well as impoverishing actual problem situations, 
it invokes external - psychological, sociological - ex­
planations because its internal framework fails too soon." 
This is the point of his criticism on Popperian historiography.
"Heuristic style ... emphasises the problem-situation: 
it emphasises the 'logic' which gave birth to the new 
concept." - he writes elsewhere.8
Lakatos attempted to extend Polya's heuristic vocabulary so 
that it could be applied in describing the process wherein 
mathematics and mathematical problems come to exist, both his­
torically and analytically
"W'hatever problem the historian of science wishes to 
solve, he has first to reconstruct the relevant section 
of the growth of objective scientific knowledge, that 
is, the relevant section of 'internal history'" - he 
continues.1°
Consequently, Lakatos did not shift the demarcation line 
horizontally - that is to say, toward sociology, economics, 
psychology, or even history - but moved it vertically, ranging
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history in the internal problem situation, that is, including 
the history of the problem into the problem situation itself.
"Demarcationist historiography recognizes that all 
histories of science are inevitably methodology­
laden and that one cannot avoid 'rational recon­
structions'. Each different type of demarcationism 
leads to a different 'internal reconstruction', with 
correspondingly different anomalies and different "ex­
ternal' problems. These 'rational reconstructions', 
however, can be compared according to well-defined 
standards and the history of demarcationism...itself 
constitutes a progressive research programme."11
To paraphrase his reply to his critics: 'There is no con-
12structuon without reconstruction'.
It is instructive to compare this with Wittgenstein's words:
"It is often useful, in order to help clarify a philosoph­
ical problem, to imagine the historical development, e.g. 
in mathematics, as quite different from what it actually 
was. If it had been different no one would have had the 
idea of saying what is actually said."
"Our task is, not to discover calculi, but to describe 
the present situation".13
2.2 While Lakatos's way of understanding problems was to re­
construct their history, Wittgenstein stood in the distance 
removed from this argument as though to say: 'the problem sit­
uation is the explication itself'. As early as in the Tractatus 
he suggested:
"The existence of an internal relation between possible 
situations expresses itself in language by means of an 
internal relation between the propositions representing 
them."14 (Italics mine A.B.)
Nevertheless Wittgenstein and Lakatos raised the same 
question: How are problems expressed in mathematics if they are 
not given?^5 If they are, as the two "preparators" (the 'inter­
preter' and the 'reconstructor') treated them, "fossilized"?
How are they expressed if what we have are only the "impres­
sions"*: theorems, proofs, and definitions
*Wittgenstein in the Tractatus went even further:
"What expresses itself in language we cannot express by means 
of language" (£S 4.121.)
"A proposition of mathematics doesn't express a thought" ÍTR
6.21)
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2.3 There are texts which are good because of how they are 
written and others which are good because of what is written 
in them. The former you cannot rewrite, the latter you can - 
but in either case the text stays the same. In spite of the 
differences in their styles, Lakatos's dialogues have much in 
common with Wittgenstein's "monologues". In these proofs and 
refutations, one can never know if they are masking themselves 
in the how or the what, just as the best theorems in mathemat­
ics do - theorems which are not good simply because of what 
they propose, but because of how they are proved.-Both Witt­
genstein and Lakatos became representatives of the view that 
the way problems are expressed is creative in and of itself. 
Altough Wittgenstein appears to contradict Lakatos when he 
states, "to say it is the proof which gives sense to the ques­
tion is absurd because it misuses the word 'question'",17 and
they only "give us a sort of hint as to what we are to do, but
18the proof provides them with content" - the basic thought
here is still the same: "The proposition proved by means of a
19proof ... shows us what is makes SENSE to say". "The proof
20creates new concept... A proof is a new paradigm." "Could 
we say: 'mathematics creates new expressions, not new proposi­
tions'?"21
"Proof-generated, concepts are neither 'specifications' 
nor 'generalizations' of naive concepts. The impact of 
proofs and refutations on naive concepts is much more 
revolutionary than that: they erase the crucial naive 
concepts completely and replace them by proof-generated 
concepts . *...After Columbus one should not be surprised 
if one does not solve the problem one has set out to < 
solve."22
If and only if mathematics cannot be described in terms
used by Popper and Lakatos, Wittgenstein and the so-called 
23inadequacy ' of his Remarks won't escape criticism either, 
since this criticism starts by repeating the (original) ques­
*This"theory of concept-formation (italics mine A.B.) weds 
concept formation to proofs and refutations*notes Lakatos 
himself.
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tion: 'Well-defined terms express something, so what is ex­
pressed then?' The hermeneutic circle of interpretation neg­
lects the problem (of "what it makes SENSE to say") eventhough
24its origin is what imbuses the question with meaning when 
being 'well-defined' is the (internal) problem. "As knowledge 
grows, languages change. 'Every period of creation is at the 
same time a period in which the language changes.'* The growth 
of knowledge cannot be modelled in any given language.*
"That is right. Heuristics is concerned with 
language-dynamics, while logic is concerned with 
language-statics,"
remarks one of Lakatos's characters while he notes:
"Science teaches us not to respect any given conceptual- 
linguistic framework lest it should turn into a con­
ceptual prison - language analysts have a vested interest 
in at least slowing down this process, in order to jus­
tify their linguistic therapeutics, that is, to show 
that they have an all important feedback to, and value 
for, science, that they are not degenerating into 'fair­
ly dried up petty-foggery.'**"25
3 Lakatos and Wittgenstein both appeared to be critics 
rather than creators of an express theory of mathematics, while 
both focused on the process of mathematic creation. Their po­
sition can be better described in terms of their opposition to 
traditional philosophies of mathematics than paraphrased in 
quotations. They accepted that each of these views contains a 
certain amount of truth about mathematics, but they generally 
attacked the external grounds of all the traditional philo­
sophies of mathematics and the "what" questions of ontological 
foundations. This was also the drive of their critique of the 
language of mathematics and its foundations. For both of them
the "problem was to provide a theory of objectivity without a
27representational theory of truth" and referential concept of
*Félix, L. C1957D, The Modern Aspect of Mathematics, New York: 
Basic Books, 1960. p. 10.
**Einstein, A. C19533, Letter to P.A. Schlipp“, Kant Studies, 
51, pp. 430-1, 1959-1960.
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meaning. According to I. Hacking, this "is'a point that re­
quires elaboration". "Hence in English philosophy knowledge is
to be characterized externally, in terms of how well it repre- 
28sents reality".
In this sense we may call Lakatos's and Wittgenstein's
approaches - which stand in opposition to this tradition - an
2 9internalist philosophical strategy". Neither ascribed to the
view that the "foundation of the solution" and the "methods of 
investigation" lie outside the problem situation. This places 
Lakatos's words - ordinarily interpreted as merely a criticism 
of normative methodologies and, more generally, of pre-critical 
normative philosophy of science - in new light:
"There are several methodologies afloat in contemporary 
philosophy of science; but they are all very different 
from what used to be understood by 'methodology' in the 
seventeenth or even eighteenth century. Then it was 
hoped that methodology would provide scientists with 
a mechanical book of rules for solving problems. This 
hope has now been given up: modern methodologies or 
'logics of discovery' consist merely of a set of possibly 
not even tightly knit, let alone mechanical rules for 
the appraisal of ready, articulated theories.* Of'-en 
these rules, or systems of appraisal, also serve as 
'theories of scientific rationality', 'demarcation 
criteria' or 'definitions of science'. Outside the 
legislative domain of these normative rules there is, 
of course, an empirical psychology and sociology of dis­
covery .
*This is an all-important shift in the problem of 
normative philosophy of science. The term 'normative' 
no longer means rules for arriving at solutions, but 
merely directions for the appraisal of solutions al­
ready there. Thus methodology is separated from 
heuristics, rather as value judgments from 'ought'^Q 
statements. (I owe this analogy to John Watkins.)"
Later he even stressed:33- "I should like to say here that I 
always had doubts about whether this (no doubt progressive) 
problemshift had not gone a bit too far. This shift had been 
even more pronounced in the philosophy of mathematics than in 
the philosophy of science. Following Polya, I have held that 
there might well be a limbo for a 'genuine1 heuristic which is 
rational and non-psychologistic; it was in this vein that I 
expressed some reservations concerning Tarski's novel use of
13
the term 'methodology!.. But here I cannot pursue this matter 
further."31
4 One of the objectives of this study is to outline some 
common positive prevailing themes concerning this point in 
their critical philosophy of mathematics and demonstrate how 
these are interrelated: From this point of view Wittgenstein’8 
philosophic analysis might be described and serve as meta- 
mathematical heuristic and Lakatos’s heuristic might be termed 
a kind of meta-historical analysis of producing mathematics.
In other words, Wittgenstein was concerned with how mathematic­
al activity actually operates, and Lakatos tried to respond to 
the problem of what comprises the growth of mathematics. La­
katos frequently took the opportunity to comment on Wittgen­
stein, but inspite of his sharp criticism, the similarities in 
their thought are too striking and have too many far-reaching 
consequences to ignore the impact of Wittgenstein's Remarks 
on Lakatos's Proofs and Refutations. *
4.1 Each operates from a common point of departure - for both, 
mathematics is a human activity. This simple idea is one of 
the presuppositions underlying Wittgenstein's Remarks on the 
Foundation of Mathematics and exists in conjunction with his 
philosophy of action. The same idea crops up in Lakatos's oft- 
cited words:
"Mathematical activity is a human activity. Certain 
aspects of this activity - as of any human activity - 
can be studied by psychology, others by history.
Heuristic is not primarily interested in these aspects.
But mathematical activity produces mathematics. 
Mathematics, this product of human activity, 'alienates 
itself' from the human activity which has been producing 
it becomes a living, growing organism, that acquires a 
certain autonomy from the activity which has produced 
it? it develops its own autonomous laws of growth, its
*Although any Wittgensteinian might certainly ask after having 
read Lakatos' posthumously published review, Understanding 
Toulmin, why I insist on this 'imbalanced marriage'.32 (i am 
fully aware that I neglected their dissimilarities.)
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own dialectic... heuristic is concerned with the 
autonomous dialectic of mathematics and not with its 
history, though it can study its subject only through 
the study of history and through the rational reconstruc­
tion of history."33
In consequence of this 'simple' idea, both oppose any kind of
34statement or non-statement view of mathematics, since
1. informal mathematics is one kind of complex and socialactivity; 35
2. actually existing living and growing mathematics is 
informal and the understanding of a formal system pre­
supposes informal reasoning;36
3. the reject the image of mathematics patterned after 
empirical inductivism consisting of stating (Wittgenstein) 
and justifying (Wittgenstein-Lakatos) facts or proposi­
tions ; 37
384. both reject the correspondence theory of truth and the
extensional interpretation.39
Naturally, they oppose any kind of normative or epistemological 
justificationalisra irrespective of semantic concepts - truth, 
inductive evidence, validity, etc. Consequently, they also 
reject absolutism and mathematical apriorism as the foundation 
of mathematics since mathematics is a fallible human activity
and not the ideal but the denial of certain and necessary 
40knowledge. (Note that in the traditional epistemological 
sense it is impossible to 'justify an activity' just as - for 
example - Donald Davidson's rationalizations of actions do not 
signify justifications.43)"Justification" even in the case of 
mathematics is itself a kind of formal description of informal 
practice which cannot be analytically justified. Descriptions 
can explain but cannot justify actions, and even the practice 
of formal description is nothing more than the explication of 
series of actions in the form of symbolic operations.42
4.2 Both oppose mathematic Platonism and Empiricism. Lakatos 
opposes it on his quasi-empirical grounds,43 since "he cannot 
seriously contemplate objective timeless and spaceless exist­
ence in the world of all the entities contained in modern set 
44theory" or ancient geometry, let alone in future theories
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yet to be revealed or in a/the world perceivable to none but 
devoted mathematicians. Wittgenstein writes, "There is no sys­
tem of irrational numbers - but also no super-system, no 'set 
of irrational numbers' of higher order infinity." "If you talk 
about essence, you are merely noting a convention... the depth
that we see in the essence... corresponds to the deep need for 
4 5the convention." Although Lakatos in many ways gets involved 
in Popper's 'third world problem'and uses the oft-criticized 
expression "the Platonic world of objective spirit" in con­
nection with it, I go along again with Hacking that this has4 g"little to do with Plato or Platonism". His Hegelian version
of the history of ideas is what is "independent of the human
47mind which creates it or understands it". Wittgenstein is 
considerably more explicit about social interactions in the 
mathematical community than Lakatos, but less clear about their 
role and that of history and tradition: "It could be said: a 
proof helps communication. An experiment presupposes it. Or 
even 'a mathematical proof moulds our language' . "In a dem­
onstration we get agreement with someone. If we do not, then 
we've parted ways before even starting to communicate in this 
language. It is not essential that one should talk the other
over by means of the demonstration. Both might see it send it, 
49and accept it."
4.3 It will suffice to refer to Lakatos's well-known arguments 
against Formalism that informal mathematics is mathematics.^0 
Pure formalization is only an abstract possibility "introduced 
by logicians for their own purposes which no one would be at 
all able or would want to carry out'and "it is a pity that it 
is not quite certain - although it is approximately certain - 
what it is reliable about.Wittgenstein uses similar wording 
and his arguments here, too, are concerned with the human use 
of symbols versus meaningless procedures. He writes, "Let's 
look at what happens... There is a transition from one proposi­
tion to another via other propositions... There is nothing oc­
cult about this process; it is a derivation of one sentence 
from another according to a rule; it is a comparison of both
16
with some paradigm or other, which represents the schema of
52the transition; or something of the kind." This is the idea 
that he contrasts with "primitive alchemy", "arithmetic as the 
natural history (minerology) of numbers".53
"The application of the calculation must take care of it­
self. And that is what is correct about 'formalism'.
The reduction of arithmetic to symbolic logic is 
supposed to shew the point of application of arithmetic, 
as it were the attachment by means of which it is plugged 
in to its application. As if someone were shewn, first 
a trumpet without the mouthpiece - and the mouthpiece, 
which shows how a trumpet is used, brought into contact 
with the human body. But the attachement which Russell 
gives us is on the one hand too narrow, on the other hand 
too wide; too general and too special. The calculation 
takes care of its own applications."54
4.4 In the area of Conventionalism, all this might seem to 
point to the fact both thinkers emphasize the creative charac­
ter of mathematics which produces new examples and counter­
examples, generates or breaks rules, and creates meaning. They 
refute the argument that mathematics is a deductive system 
based on conventionally accepted definitions and axioms which 
can be neatly channeled into the conduits of analytic defini­
tions.55 It is we who construct meaning - the extension of 
mathematical definitions cannot be analytically determined in 
advance on the basis of convention. Proof constructs concept - 
or changes it.56 Wittgenstein writes,
"The agreement of humans that is a presupposition of 
logic is not an agreement in opinions, much less in 
opinions on questions of logic."57
While Lakatos suggests in his dialogue,
"GAMMA:...There are no minus 1-dimensional polytopes!
EPSILON:...there is one: the empty set.
GAMMA: You are mad!
ALPHA: He may not be mad. He is introducing a convention
EPSILON: I do not use conventions, and my concepts are not 
"tools"."55
It is precisely this fact which opens the way for counter­
examples "potential falsifiers" in mathematics, as Lakatos puts, 
it, so that we can create sentences where we don’t know the
17
bordera of their extension and we can't supply their analytical 
meaning in advance.
"What if someone were to reply to a question: 'So far 
there is no such thing as an answer to this ques­
tion'?’^
4.4 Opposed to Instrumentation! Lakatos and Wittgenstein agree 
that mathematics is a dialogue, it is interactive, intersub­
jective, and "the game has a point" as well.®0 'If definitions 
are abbreviations, then they cannot be false,' - but they can­
not be true either.
"You can scarcely deny that my language, which is 
the natural language reflecting the essence (of poly- 
hedra) shows for the first time the deeply rooted es­
sential identity of formerly disconnected, isolated, 
ad hoc criteria!"
- declares EPSILON later in the Proofs and Refutations trying 
to convince GAMMA that his "linguistic instrumentum" is an in­
tuitively "closer translation" of the "true foundation".
"I like this reformulation which really showed the 
nature of your simple tools” - comments the TEACHER,
for "how can one refute a language?"- Lakatos queries, if this
instrumentalism will mean that we can't criticize, appreciate
6 2or change a definition.
Since they gave up absolutism the ambiguity in articulation 
doesn't imply for either of them that absolutely precise and 
clear-cut inner intuition must exist or if this intuition does 
not exist, that it is the logician's job to "reincarnate" it. 
Instead of citing the Browerian introspective constructions 
which take shape in the mind of each person who deals with math­
ematics, it is more plausible (and public) to speak about the 
practice of social agreement.
"Let us remember that in mathematics we are con­
vinced of grammatical propositions; so the expres­
sion, the result, of our being convinced is that we 
aocept a rule.”...
"The proof places this decision in a system of deci­
sions. ”63
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4.6 Wittgenstein s major arguments against Intuitioniem spring
64from the conversion of intuitionist arguments and from his 
rejection of the existence of a private language. Just as he 
did in the case of Platonism and Empiricism, he questions any 
private reality of mathematical objects which can only be pen­
etrated by help of the intuition. Familiarity with everyday 
language which is public, informal, paradigmatic, and adheres 
to certain rules is the medium of mathematics. Linguistic 
techniques insure a communicative interpretation of mathemati­
cal symbols and procedures, techniques, and inferences. They 
proceed from everyday existence, supplied with the patterns by 
pre-existing routine of mathematic practice. "Perhaps the fact 
is that human intellect engages in every game which opens up, 
but only those games endure which common sense deems practi­
cable" , opines one of Lakatos's native colleagues.
"Do the figures (drawings) in trigonometry belong to 
pure mathematics, or are they only examples of possible 
appliaations."66
Nevertheless, common sense and practicability could by no 
means be considered concepts of either linguistics or logic, 
which doesn't mean we can't use the tools of logic (or lin­
guistics) to examine them. In Lakatos's terms "rational (his­
torical) reconstructions" supply the "paradigms of common 
sense" (or common non-sense). Whenever Wittgenstein speaks of 
mental images he usually emphasizes that familiarity with the 
way a language is used and with its illocutionary actions or 
speech acts does not lie in comprehension as a consequence of 
the mental state; nor can it be termed the discovery of prop­
erties of an internal entity. Instead, this familiarity estab­
lishes inferential reception and the mental state of comprehen­
sion.
Mathematicians create linguistic expressions and symbols 
under the guise of lemmas and definitions, and connect these 
sentences according to rules in the living language. They 
create meaning direction and heuristic meaning based on some
19
sort of procedural technique of expression and explication ac­
cording to previously accepted rules and, in part, to the mean­
ing of previously accepted expressions.6^
"When we derive the correctness of one statement from 
another and put it down in our symbolic way of writing, 
we have simply shifted from one succession of fixed signs 
to a different series.”
Here, surprisingly enough, it is not Wittgenstein I cite, but 
the work of Rózsa Péter C1943], the mathematician in her anal­
ogy of deductibility and equation-solvings
"From this, then, we deduced a rule that was purely 
formal - and henceforward, we applied it without a second 
thought. We got a mechanical 'rule of the game' which 
had been deliberately considered, and considered from 
the point of view of content (italics mine): 'Open, 
fixed signs shifted in a given way from one place to 
another'. They resemble the rules of chess; the king can 
be moved one step in whatever direction desired."®®
That is to say, mathematicians make guesses - they create 
sentences and/or usages of sentences, and not propositions.
The heuristic thinker integrates meaning with accepted sen­
tences and meanings; these create and secure connections with 
the rest of the meanings. This activity is, in part, consti­
tuted by the application of old meanings to new: it might be 
possible to apply them to the old rules, but a rule may even 
generate the new meaning of old expressions. "The method of 
proof is similar to that of the 'contradiction-exemption' Ccon- 
sisteney proof] of Bolyai's geometry: Gödel constructed a model
in set theory in which the axioms of set theory and the con-
69tinuum hypothesis exist side-by-side in perfect harmony."
That such a construction proves something at all - in the first 
case - was not yet expressible in the rules of logic. It wasn't 
a proof. It wasn't even (a) geometry.^0
Wittgenstein concludes in the Remarks:
"However queer it sounds, my task as far as concerns 
Gödel's proof seems merely to consist in making clear 
what such a proposition as: 'Suppose this could be proved' 
means in mathematics,
20
4.7 The fixing and prohibiting of concrete meantag and rules 
of exception is apparently complicated and might even seem 
like an Irrational game to the outside observer. To use a self­
contradictory metaphors It is an interpretational game among 
"contra-factual mathematical facts" - or in Lakatos' terms - 
among "quasi-empirical factsV.
All this is closely related to what Lakatos variously re­
fers to in the Proof and Refutations as the logic or "dialec­
tic” of discovery or heuristics. For him history is present in 
'counter-factuals' (sic) - "fossilised examples” or forgotten 
counterexamples which are not easy to either construct or re­
construct. But by no means are they given at the outset of en­
tities in "possible worlds” even if 'post festum' it's easier 
to hit upon the generative rules than the counterexamples. The 
"game" goes on in a problem situation where those sentences 
are selected which are supposed to be accepted as propositions 
(or 'quasi-propositions') - that is to say, those sentences 
which are permissible: "You can say this sentence: "This is 
right”, "You can't say this", "There is no point to this". 
Wittgenstein uses these imperatives or commands like a math 
teacher or Lakatos's imaginary pupils would, but they could 
have been used by the first devoted interpreters or critics as 
well. For example - 'the sum of the angles of this triangle is 
greater than two right angles', or there is no greatest prime 
number 'the set of all sets', or 'every set can be well-ordered'.
Let me note here that from this point of view mathemati­
cians make their way (the SENSE) through a jungle of non-ref" 
erential expressions and/or descriptions. Wittgenstein says: 
"...the mathematical general does not stand in the same rela­
tion to the mathematical particular as elsewhere the general to 
72the particular". "In one case we make a move in an existent
73game, in i:h«j other we establish a rule of the game." When 
Alice Ambrose demonstrates that if a statement has a counter­
example in mathematics then there is no proposition to which 
it is a counter-example, and that the acceptance of certain
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sentences depends on our decision or, summing up Wittgenstein's
words, mathematicians "sometimes... justify acceptance of a
74new rule and define or redefine a term", then she has shown 
something which is contentually described by Lakatos in various 
ways under the titles, "piecemeal exclusions", "the method of 
monster-adjustment", "lemma-incorporations" or "proof-analysis".
4.8 The idea Lakatos and Wittgenstein are talking about here 
isn't simply the one that knowledge is language and language 
is knowledge, and mathematics is language created as a usage
of language within our human experience. - To paraphrase Imre
75Tóth : 'Mathematical logos is speech which - bespeaks itself'. 
What Lakatos says in the "dialectical chorus" is that mathe­
matics speaks in the language of history, not God, and is ar­
ticulated by "fallible mathematicians". While Wittgenstein states 
that : as long as mathematics formulates propositions, in an 
empirical-referential paradigm he refers to as 
"extensional interpretation of mathematical statements", this 
results in the false appearance that something is being claimed 
about something - as unchangeable Forms or Objects.
Without this interpretation the game looks very sophis­
ticated. But in the majority of cases it goes on in a relative­
ly narrow domain where in 'normal mathematics' as in the case 
of Kuhn's normal science the standard interpretation is given 
and accepted. To destroy or to change it usually presents 
greater difficulty than finding or rejecting counter-examples
or propositions, but this depends on how big the problem is and 
77how new it is.
The interpretation paradigm is revised only when problems 
of consistency have been pushed to extremes. The debates be­
tween mathematicians who otherwise see eye-to-eye have here 
reached their most heated point. But this is precisely what in­
sures - as Wittgenstein might have put it - that consensus will 
emerge: "Church's proof is also thought-provoking in that he 
found it necessary to express what we should consider 'today's
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mathematics 1 reasoning' when it was this concept he was aiming 
to apply the mathematical procedures to. No sooner do we ex­
press something then we fall victim to circumscribing it. Cir­
cumscription is of necessity a narrow enterprise, since un-
78decidable problems always emerge from it. "The motto here 
is always: Take a wider look around" suggests Wittgenstein, and 
he adds :
“An undecided proposition of mathematics is something 
that is accepted neither as a rule nor as the opposite 
of a rule, and which has the form of a mathematical 
statement. - But is this form a sharply circumscribed 
concept?"^9
4.9 If décision figures here to such a great extent, then do 
Lakatos and Wittgenstein believe there are undecidable prob­
lems in mathematics? According to the standard interpretation 
of Gödel's theorems, there are - as far as consistency is re­
quired. But if problems depend on our decisions, then how can 
they be undecidable and not - at most - undecided? Lakatos and 
Wittgenstein reply: If the problem has been stated, then this - 
this itself - is also a matter of decision. "For instance, if 
we had a formal proof of Fermat's last theorem, then if our 
formalized number theory is consistent it would be impossible 
for there to be a counter-example to the theorem formalizable 
within the system." But "...if we could prove that Fermat's 
theorem is undecidable, then are we forever helpless to say 
anything about the truth of it? Not at all.* We may again call 
informal reasoning to our assistance, and try to operate in­
formally only in the intended model. A concrete example of 
this is Gödel's proof that his undecidable sentences are true 
(i.e. true in the standard model) . But such post-formal proofs 
are certainly informal and so they are subject to falsification
*Wittgenstein writes: "The problem of finding a mathematical 
decision of a theorem might with some justice be called the 
problem of giving mathematical sense to a formula."81
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82by the later cilscavery of some not-tiv ught-of possibility."
The history of the Axiom of Choice versus Continuum 
Hypothesis enables us to reinterpret Zenon Paradoxes in Non­
standard Analysis, and the Non-Archimedean models of irrational 
numbers or the history of the Parallel Postulate at very least 
makes all this plausible. These themselves, however, have be­
come problems of foundation or, if you like, problems that 
turn the problem situation into a philosophical problem as a 
consequence of the Lakatos-Wittgenstelnian internalist strategy. 
As Wittgenstein puts it:
Here we stumble on a remarkable and characteristic 
phenomenon in philosophical investigation: The difficulty 
- I might say - isn't one of finding the solution; it 
is one of recognizing something as the solution. 'We 
have already said everything. - Not anything that follows 
from this, no this itself is the solution!' This is con­
nected, I believe, with our wrongly expecting an ex­
planation, whereas a description is the solution of the 
difficulty, if we give it the right place in our con­
siderations. If we dwell upon it, and do not try to get 
beyond it. The difficulty here is to stop."83
"The question - I want to say - changes its status when 
it becomes decidable. For a connexion is made, then, 
which formerly was not there."84
"Stopping here" is the crucial factor in determining what the 
limits of the problem situation shall be. Lakatos might have 
argued that the reasons are not simply subjective but tradi­
tional, and spring from the historical problem of their rela-
85tion to each other. The demarcation here ensures for Lakatos 
the objectivity of the subjects of mathematics and history.
This demarcation also permits Wittgenstein to salvage all those 
problems from rationalization that we must "pass over in si­
lence". But I am concerned about how and what it is more dif­
ficult to apeak about:
"Etica more geometrico"
or
'■Geometria more etico" .86
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One can say that to stop here would make it impossible for La­
katos to write the "Changing Logic of Scientific Discovery" - 
a book which he always considered writing, but only existed in 
title form. Perhaps this is why he maintained a distance from
the problem of incommensurability as applied to mathematics and 
87history. His "historical paradigm of rationality" was con­
nected with the problem of demarcation between subjectivity and 
objectivity. For him both kinds of rationality - 'subjective' 
and 'objectove' - presuppose some kind of historically cumu­
lative (critically developing) continuity (i.e. growth, and 
growing) and excludes incommensurable (completely irrational i.e. 
unanderstable) local changes: 'Rational subjects produce ra­
tional history' - 'rational history produces rational subjects'. 
'It seems impossible to put forth an explicit definition of his 
demarcation without an elaborate Philosophy of History (of 
Thinking) as long as you can ask in the case of ideas and think­
ers if they are historical objects or subjects.
This is where contemporary philosophical foundations stop. 
The separation of the subject from its history is the precon­
dition and presupposition of indirect self-referential para­
doxes such as;
"We can't understand the subject without (understand­
ing) its history."
but
"We can't understand its history without (understanding) 
the subject.”89
5 Thinkers stand at the junction where traditions Intersect 
and ideas at the crossroads where thinkers meet. The point 
where the roads of Lakatos and Wittgenstein converge is where 
mathematics, language, and history intersect. Wittgenstein's 
ideas may inspire a meta-linguistic, metamathematical but non­
formalist description of mathematical problem-solving praxis. 
This description characterizes techniques for developing meth­
ods of translation (transference and conversion) between "what
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is formal and informal" - or, if you like, between formal and 
informal usage of languaae. For Wittqenstein the process of 
translation starts with the interpretation of signs and sym­
bols and entails that interpretation is itself a particular 
human usage of eigne and symbols; but this is exactly what 
opens the way for description (and for the creation of new
signs and symbols as well). Formalization is a uniquely mathe- 
90matical (particular) usage and way of creation of signs and 
symbols, but not (only) in the context of justification. Laka­
tos, however, disparaged the importance of this translation, 
asserting that in the history of thought (thinking) formaliza­
tion always assumed a secondary role - as well as in mathe-
91matical justification. He undoubtedly adopted a Hegelian
schema of "autonomous dialectics" in this conversion of the
growth of Informal mathematical proofs and theories (pre-for-
92mal, formal, post-formal stages), but he conceded that the 
trial of external (universal and eternal) formalization of the 
"growth of ideas" or "historical laws of thought" or "methodo­
logy of thinking" runs the risk of "devolving" to the "origi­
nal" seventeenth century program of methodology. Although the 
problem is not expressed in his works clearly and is far from 
having been solved, we have to admit that he made it clear:
"...the actual historical pattern may deviate slightly from...
93(the) heuristic pattern". Noteworthy here is the fact that 
in all the important contexts he uses the word "pattern" and 
seems to be very careful and conscious about avoiding the use 
or synonyms of the term "laws of thought" or "necessary devel­
opment" .
The word "pattern" seems to be a pivotal concept in 
Lakatos's mathematic (as well as historic) heuristics, 
functioning similarly to Kuhn's "paradigms" in The 
Structure of Scientific Revolutions. Both terms denote 
the "heuristic" idea of different figures or ways of 
thinking, i.e. ways of generating problemsolving methods, 
whereas in the background stands the problem of the 
'Wittgensteinian' "gestalt switch". But neither articu­
lates this idea and both fall short of describing it.
What Kuhn in fact "describes" - perhaps even asserts -
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is the existence of different structures (of normal sci­
ence) without describing the structure and mechanism of 
change: ways of creating and recognizing patterns and 
interpretations, and without explaining how we develop 
new methods for figuring out problems and solutions and 
new ways of recognizing something as problem or solution. 
If looking at what Lakatos does "through Kuhnian., 
spectacles" is a "philosophy producing examples" it is 
by no means the worstof its kind. Lakatos adopted a 
rationalist and analytic view of this dilemma providing 
methodological descriptions of the "dialectic" change of 
science, creating not only examples but describing 
cognitive patterns with the assistance of critical 
counterexamples. This locates him at the point of inter­
section of the rationalist and historicist traditions.
He might have replied as a criticism and an excuse to 
both the endeavors of the "logical" and "historical" 
descriptions with Wittgensteinian words:
"both to you and to myself I can only give examples of
the application."95
"For the point of a new technique of calculation is to 
supply us with a new picture, a new form of expression; 
and there is nothing so absurd as to try and describe 
this new schema, this new kind of scaffolding, by means 
of old expressions."96
5.1 What Wittgenstein and Lakatos both reject from the Leib- 
nizian (and also from the Hegelian) program is justification.
- We may summarize Leibnizlan tradition "unhlstorically" and
97succintly in a Lakatosian vein, as a branch of studies for 
establishing formal languages to settle disputes and justify 
truth. This idea was carried over into the post-Kantian fol­
klore of apriorism versus empiricism at the beginning of the 
century, and it is referred to today as the Frege-Camap-Quine 
tradition. It created the formal procedural idea of proof and 
separated the "empty", "neutral", "meaningless" or "meaning- 
lost" idea of truth from meanlngloaded evidence. Although the 
constitutive idea of the program was truth, what we got as a 
result is formal systems with some kind of mechanical check­
ability. The Leibnizlan program exhibited no real intuition 
for getting at what human language and reasoning is - the mod­
est alternative of the language of God an Certainity would have 
been enough if it could have been made to be calculable. Here
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as well as in the case of formal proofs language is mere met­
aphor - 'nothing more' than semantic definitions of truth which 
establish calculations based on formal rules. This image of 
formal logic as Science of Thinking through some "concept­
stretching" and "concept adjustment" was declared to be the 
Logic of Scientia. (Forawhile even linguists tried to confine 
Wittgenstein to their "syntactics versus semantic empire of 
pragmatics 'cum granulo salis'." )
5.2 On the other hand, in the Hegelian tradition - which had 
an obvious impact on Lakatos's and possibly - even if not di­
rectly - also on Wittgenstein's later works - the content of
99ideas is historically given but not linguistically produced. 
This tradition gave rise to the cumulative idea of knowledge 
and 'laws of growth’, and the point where it has obviously made 
an impact has been where twentieth century philosophy of sci­
ence has reinterpreted the Cartesian idea of methodology and 
posed the question of incommensurability and the possibility of 
paradigmatic change in logic i.e. in the 'science of thinking' 
as opposed to the 'laws of thought'. One fundamental problem of 
this school which has extended to contemporary philosophy of 
science was that of the rational understanding of change in new 
interpretation as change of ideas and thinking : the problem of 
historical change (and identification) in the case of ideas, 
concepts and the various ways of presentation (styles, para­
digms, standards) employed in thinking.
Popper - though regarded as the greatest opponent of 
Hegelian dialectics - saw this clearly: "it is only the 
history and development of scientific theories (italics 
mine - A.B.) which can with some success be described in 
terms of the dialectic method."100 But his critique 
doesn't draw the obvious conclusion that should this be 
true; then why must the development of scientific theories 
be commeasured with rules of inference in deductive 
logic?l°l On the basis of their own - critical and com­
parative - standards of rationality, Popper and Lakatos 
rightly criticize Hegel for his mono-methodological 
description of change in conceptual framework, omitting 
from consideration that in the age of post-Newtonianism 
thinking was also a "pre-determined, inevitable process" 
for the Euclidean and Inductivist programs, where individ­
ual creativity or rational criticism "played no essential
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role" either. As Popper himself says in the lines preced­
ing the above quote, "...in Hegel's time... logic was the 
theory of thinking and...the laws of logic were usually 
called the laws of thought;"!02 The work of Whewell - an 
early representative of the critical and fallibilist 
tradition - as well as of Popper and Lakatos themselves 
otherwise reflects the influence of Hegel!°3 and his his- 
toricism, which put forth an approach for describing the 
"abstract characteristics of the nature of Spirit," as 
well as the "means Spirit uses in order to realise it3 
Idea", where "the question of the means by which Freedom 
develops itself to a World conducts us to the phenomenon 
of History itself."!04
In other words the problem of interpreting human mental 
operations rationally may be identified with the Hegelian prob­
lem of "logic of philosophy vs. philosophy of logic" and the 
"philosophy of history vs. history of philosophy" with the 
rational interpretation of social actions. Both prepared the 
problem of describing processes as developments in human (man­
made) systems set up and established by thinkers. Lakatos 
didn't state this identification as "logic of history versus 
history of logic” but, similarly to Wittgenstein's interpreta­
tions, his methods of rationally (historically) reconstructing 
these processes constitute one program of internal description 
as well. One result of the program is that it proved to be a 
problem of rationality describing change in systems as change 
of systems. 6
6 Since you've caught me in the act of talking about Lakatos's 
and Wittgenstein's ideas in terms of quasi-historical and 
quasi-linguistic "foundation" of mathematics - with a somewhat 
simplified and metaphorical demarcationist strategy - a3 change 
in logic and history of thought,... I'll show you there's noth­
ing up may sleeves, just as Lakatos did in his article, What
does a mathematical proof prove?... Like him, I admit right
105away, "This, in fact, is, just what I should like to do."
To put it in Wittgenstein's words: "I would like to make a new 
connection." To outline this formal connection in greater de­
tail, I will now turn to a brief discussion of what (mathe­
matical) heuristics means and what it has to do with founda- 
d ".Mc- l found* ion.
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6.1 In condensinq what emerges from the thoughts of Wittgen­
stein and Lakatos into one question - "can heuristics serve as 
a foundation", the two words - heuristics and foundation - ap­
pear contradictory. At first sight nothing is more antinomical 
to the deductivist style than the process of creation and the 
process of foundation of ideas.'1'06
In Lakatos's view "This controversy between dogmatists - 
who claim that we
can know - and sceptics - who claim that we either cannot 
know or at least cannot know that we can know and when we 
can know - is the basic issue in epistemology. In dis­
cussing modern efforts to establish foundation for mathe­
matical knowledge one tends to forget that these are but 
a chapter (Italics mine - A.B.) in the great effort to 
overcome scepticism by establishing foundations for know­
ledge in general."107
In the history and philosophy of mathematics the question is 
raised whether it is philosophy or mathematics which is related 
to "logical foundation"? Wittgenstein wrote, "The philosopher 
must twist and turn about so as to pass by the mathematical
problems - ...which would have to be solved before he could go
108further." Lakatos took responsibility for the normative 
criteria stipulating that the deductive style of mathematics 
had to be exchanged for the language of heuristics. According 
to Wittgenstein, philosophy should have nothing to say about 
mathematics - it should leave everything even mathematics as it 
is. But these words can be interpreted as emphasizing what it 
"in fact" is. In other words (1) we have to accept mathematics 
as historical reality of human praxis, which might be described 
as working mathematics; furthermore it does not need to be 
separated from its history, that is (2) we have to describe it 
as a historical reality of human praxis. I use the term "de­
scriptive foundation" in this sense. This "foundation" paves 
the way for (solving) problems determining whether we accept it 
as we described it in its historical reality as our human 
praxis. The "empirical basis" of this description is the his­
tory of mathematics itself. The contradiction exists only as 
long as foundation and logical foundation is construed as nor­
mative (external) methodological justification.
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6.2 Heuristics - in Polya's terms - means something different. 
It may read variously as a "school of thought", a "How to Solve 
It", or citing Whewell, the "Art of Mathematical Discovery". 
Polya did not raise foundational questions nor did he propound 
philosophical problems. Instead, he attempted to describe stra­
tegies in everyday language which the mathematician - or rather 
the math teacher - can use to articulate, define, and solve 
problems in everyday praxis; he no doubt accepted the falli­
bility and the differences of human reasoning in mathematics.
He shows us how to make and improve conjectures and work out 
methods to find proofs and calculate solutions, providing as 
well as using mete historical examples to illustrate. To 
paraphrase his definition of method: "An idea once applied is
a trick, twice applied a method". And as Lakatos would have
109said, applied three times it is "applied" history. Those 
who are familiar wither well as those who dislike formalism 
usually add: 'applied four times it is still an idea, but it's 
boring - perhaps even tendentious'. - This was a misunderstand­
ing. But the situation changed, it outgrew itself and became 
a subject for reinterpretation. 7
7 With the assistance of the Popperian Philosophy of Science 
and a historicized version of Hegel's dialectics Lakatos at­
tempted to develop the internalist tradition of the school of 
Hungarian mathematics associated with names like Fejér, Neu­
mann, Rényi, and Polya in describing the rise and appraisal of mathe­
matical theories on the meta-historical level as well, but left 
behind the task of working out a systemized theory of (their) 
heuristics^® i.e. The CHANGING LOGIC of Scientific Discovery. 
Pólya had begun working on this internally in his methods of 
teaching mathematics and it remains for us to improve upon it. 
He didn't like the idea of an express ‘theory of heuristics'.
In the preface to his world-famous treatise on Problems and 
Theorems in Analysis before presenting some aphorisms in 
Wittgenstein's style he expresses his scepticism about its 
practic ibility:
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"General rules which could prescribe in detail the most 
useful discipline of thought are not known to us. Even if 
such rules could be formulated, they would not be very use­
ful. Rather then knowing the correct rules of thought 
theoretically, one must have them assimilated into one's 
flesh and blood ready for instant and instinctive use. 
Therefore, for the schooling of one's powers of thought 
only the practice of thinking is really useful. The 
independent solving and challenging problems will aid the 
reader far more than the aphorisms which follow, although 
as a start these can do him no harm. "HI
If he opposed anything at all, he contrasted description to 
prescription as a 'foundation'.
Seme may object to using the ward ' foundation' claiming that every 
foundation takes place on a meta-level and every complete 
description needs a meta-language and the framework for this 
in the case of (mathematical) heuristic as well is provided in 
contemporary logic. Such a view merely reiterates the idea of 
formal languages. But what the history of mathematics seems to 
reveal is that if there is a clear description of a problem 
defined by the history of ideas, which is interpreted and/or 
reconstructed, then certain external foundations - such as
descriptions - may eventually incorporate from meta-level to 
112the subject itself. This is a possible outcome of the in­
ternalist strategy both in mathematics and philosophy, and might 
might corroborate Lakatos's as well as Wittgenstein's stand­
point. This phenomena is observable in the case of Greek geom­
etry of proportions, seventeenth century algebraic foundation, 
analytical geometry, set theory, and - it seems to me - it's 
going on right now with logic in the artificial intelligence 
framework.
The question whether we need to have humans as "transla­
tors" or "interpreters" in order to convert informal 
mathematics into formal "languages" in a form to be sub­
mitted to a machine has turned into a problem of heuristics: 
"what is to be converted", that is a problem of the ‘how’ 
or the ‘what‘. It provided a theoretical analysis of 
mathematics to describe that activity which is common to 
the various theories in formal representations.
The job of heuristic isn't one of describing our everyday 
language, but as Wittgenstein suggested, one of providing a
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new informal theory or paradigm of what human languages are - 
how we work and think with and within them. We can't describe
the language of our historical universe because, as Wittgenstein
113said, "the limits of my language mean the limits of my world" 
(italics mine - A.B.} which changes as we do. The implication 
of Lakatos's ideas is that 'our rationality is the history of 
our thinking in this (changing) world'.
Although we may attempt to describe our changing historical 
logic of this world as the history of our rationality, even if 
we fail we can still have well-expressed problems - that is, 
we can try to describe and understand them. To draw upon the 
words of Karl Popper once again: "...every rational theory, no 
matter whether scientific or philosophical, is rational insofar 
as it tries to solve certain problems : A theory is comprehen­
sible and reasonable only in its relation to a given problem 
situation, and it can be rationally discussed only by discuss­
ing this relation.1,114
8 Heuristics presents the problem situation. If it is not 
given the question is hot! it can be represented - when ex­
plication involves the problem of discussion, when explication 
is itself the problem of the discussion. One way of representa­
tion is to describe the language of the problem; another is to 
reconstruct its history in an understandable language. When 
misunderstandings arise they can change the problem situation: 
they describe a (new) subject by adding new questions to old 
ones. This reinterpretation - relating new subjects to old 
ones - assumes a reflexive usage of language. By means of 
formalisation such language can 'bespeak itself' - can be made 
self-referential - without problems and without problems hav­
ing been given.
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Notée
1. In C19723 Popper says, "...the most important mathematical 
objects we discover - the most fertile citizens of the third 
world - are problems, and new kinds of critical arguments." 
(p. 138.) Popper C19633 doesn't speak expresses verbis 
about mathematics, but it's obvious from the context of the 
motto (pp. 197-200.) that he didn't intend to exclude it 
from the problems as related to theory and solution.
(Cf. p. 230) where he translates "a rhyme for the epistemo­
logical nursery" into English by W. Busch the German cari­
caturist and poet who also wrote such "caprices" as Hans 
Huckebein and Schein und Sein (1909, p. 28.),
"Twice two equals four: 'tis true,
But too empty and too trite.
What I look for is a clue 
To some matters not so light."
2. Lakatos, 119763, p. 142.
3. It is deductive insomuch as it explains the formal deduction, 
and rational insomuch as it explains - makes plain - what
is going on in the deductive system - and why. In the 
deductivist style, however, these explanations are alien 
to the system.
4. Ibid., p. 144.
"What we cannot speak about we must pass over in silence." 
The deductivist version of this reads:
"Whereof one cannot speak, thereof one must be silent.":
'The genuine intuition of the good mathematician is in- 
articulable.'
"The logic of discovery is not logic."
For a critique and description of this contrast see Kreisel 
C19563, C1967a3 and also his comments on Mostowski and Bar- 
Hillel C1967b-cl and cf.
Feferman C19783, Conclusion, "...much more from logic will 
have to be recognised as basic and incorporated into such 
a theory of mathematics [a more realistic one inspired by 
Lakatos' failures and successes]. It would be best to 
reserve the name "the logic of mathematical discovery" for 
what which is yet to come.“ The deductivist attitude which 
held heuristics to be rhetoric in opposition to logic is 
not left by wholly intact these arguments. They say, "Those 
who have resorted to explanation haven't understood the 
deduction in the first place."
Cf. Weil C19783 "History of Mathematics: Why and How?" vs. 
Kreisel C1967d3, "Mathematical Logic: What Has it Done for 
the Philosophy of Mathematics?"
5. Lakatos objected to the latter - that deductivists don't 
give the problems, moreover they hide them - and both
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were the focus of his critique in the case of retrospective 
historiography and formal foundations. (Cf. Berkson C19761, 
pp. 47-49., 54.)
6. The "usual sense of the word" here is not just the de- 
ductivist (formalist) sense according to which, in Laka­
tos's words, "mathematics is identical with formalised 
mathematics", but that common (sense) mathematical praxis 
where the foundation of a theory applies to the subject 
from Pythagoras' Theorem to Fermat's Last one.
7. Lakatos C1978aD, p. 118.
Feyerabend in his commemoration C1975J p. 1. says:
"He was a rationalist, for he thought that man had the duty 
of using reason in his private affairs as well as in any 
inquiry concerning the relation between himself, nature, 
and his fellow man. He was an optimist for he thought that 
reason was capable of solving most of the problems arising 
in the course of such inquiry.
8. Lakatos C1978b:, p. 202; C19763, p. 144.
9. This "both" is a "clue", if not the "solution" to the prob­
lem situation. Ideas can be (presented as being) external 
from the point of view of different kinds of subjects and 
for different kinds of subjects - from the point of view
of mathematics or history and for our present or past 
analytical or historical reasoning. Most of the critics of 
Lakatos ally with one or the other position. Berkson con­
siders Lakatos's critique of Logicism and Formalism ex­
ternal as compared to Gödel's (internal) "critique, for 
example. (See Berkson C19783,.p. 299ff.) Historians - 
criticizing Lakatos's "historical reconstructions" as cari­
catures of the 'real history' - haven't seen the point of 
this "both" in Lakatos's methodology either. In Lakatos's 
aspiration his "normative-historiographical version of the 
methodology of scientific research programmes supplies a 
general theory of how to compare rival logics of discovery 
Citalics mine - A.B.3 in which (in a sense carefully to be 
specified) history may be seen as a "test" of its rational 
reconstructions." (Lakatos C1971al, p. 123.) McMullin 
realized the methodological intention, but the noted 
historian rejected the "carefully specifiable" ideological 
implications of the second normative meta-historical com­
parative function. (Cf. McMullin C1971D.)
11. Lakatos Cl978b3, pp. 110-111.
Lakatos's 'demarcationism', a vestige of the so many "isms" 
he lived to survive, constitutes - in his own terminology - 
the protective belt of his "normative methodology" as a 
strategy for defending its "hard core": the rejection of 
the separation of the problems from their history. (He 
wasn't explicit, however, as to what kind of subject these
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demarcations are external to, when he remarked "...the 
näive school concepts of static rationality like appiori- 
aposteriori, analytic-synthetic will only hinder its 
emergence." C1965-1978bD) This separation in the case of 
the subject of mathematics is what he was challenging, in 
regard to both its history and the "formalist school" of 
its foundation.
Noteworthy here is that Wittgenstein also remarked,
"What I am saying comes to this, that mathematics is 
normative. But "norm" does not mean the same thing as 
"ideal"." (.RFM, VII. 63.)
12. See Lakatos C171bl "Replies to Critics", pp. 174-182.
Lakatos didn't word this conversion of his dictum as 
strongly as I have here, paraphrasing his replies and the 
quotation, where he speaks about a research program which 
is rather historiographical than methodological. But he 
did ask elsewhere, "...what is the 'nature' of mathematics, 
...the nature of informal theories... of the potential 
falsifiers...? Are we going to arrive, tracing back prob- 
lemshifts through informal mathematical theories to empir­
ical theories, so that mathematics will turn out in the 
end to be indirectly empirical,...7 Or is construction the 
only source of truth to be injected into a mathematical 
basic statement? Or platonistic intuition? Or convection?
The answer will scarcely be a monolithic one. Careful 
historico-critical case-studies will probably lead to a 
sophisticated and composite solution." (Lakatos C1967bl,
p. 41.) In paraphrasing Lakatos I have attempted to imply 
his answer to these questions.
13. RFM, III. 80., 81.
14. Wittgenstein C19213, (TR), 4.125 Cf. RFM, VII. 8.
"Proof must shew an internal relation not an external one.." 
"The existence of an internal property of a possible situ­
ation is not expressed by means of a proposition: rather, 
it expresses itself in the proposition representing the 
situation, by means of an internal property of that 
proposition.
It would be just as nonsensical to assert that a 
proposition had a formal property as to deny it." (TR,
4.124. )
15. But they were not explicit at all,
"ZETA: Start? Why should I start? My mind is not empty when 
I discover (or invent) a problem.
TEACHER: Do not tease Beta. Here is the problem:..."
"(The dialogue takes place in an imaginary classroom...
It is at this point - after the stages problem and con­
jecture - that we enter the classroom.)"
"BETA: And where do you get your idea from?
ZETA: It is already there in our minds when we formulate 
the problem: in fact, it is in the very formulation of the 
problem." (Lakatos C19763, p. 70. and pp. 6-7.)
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Wittgenstein's Remarks starts:
1. *We use the expression: 'the steps are determined by the
formula... 1 ... 'Is (this) a formula which determines 
(the steps)?' One might address this question to a pupil 
in order to test whether he understands the use of the 
word ‘to determine1; or it might be a mathematical prob­
lem to work out...
2. ...What is the criterion for the way the formula is 
meant" (ÄFAf, I.I., 2.)
"BETA: ...I had no problems at the beginning! And now I 
have nothing Éut problems!" (.Ibid., p. 104).
16. "Even if I think of a proof as something deposited in the 
archives of language - who says how this instrument is to 
be employed, what it is for?” (RFM, III.29.)
"How can one criticize a definition, in particular, if 
one interprets it nominalistically? A definition is then 
a mere abbreviation, a tautology. What can one criticize 
about a tautology? ... But how can a definition have 
explanatory power or afford us any new insight." (Lakatos, 
C19743, p. 144.)
17. Wittgenstein [19323, p. 200.
18. Ibid., p. 198.
19. Wittgenstein [19563, III. 28. (RFM)
20. Ibid., 41.
21. Ibid, 29.
22. Lakatos [19763, pp. 89-90
23. Cf. for example Anderson Mathematics and the "Language 
Game, or Bernays' Comments on L. Wittgenstein's Remarks on 
the Foundation of Mathematics (in Benacerraf [19643, pp. 
510-528.)'. "Wittgenstein argues as though mathematics 
existed almost solely for the purposes of housekeeping" 
saying that Wittgenstein didn't know what was going on in 
the highly mathematized Philosophy of Mathematics."
24. Cf. Stern, L. C19853, "Hermeneutics and Intellectual His­
tory", pp. 288-295.
"But are the four terms of the expression 'perfectly well- 
known terms' really all perfectly well-known terms?" (La­
katos [19623, p. 3.) "interpreted facts have two very dif­
ferent functions in the growth of science. They may serve 
as tests of already proposed theories ... they may also 
serve as a stimuli to new theories..." (Lakatos [19783, p. 
208)
25. Lakatos [19763, p. 93. and n.l.
26. See Marchi [19763 and Wang [19843 and cf. Hallett [19793 
and Machover [19833.
27. Hacking C19793, p. 384.
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28. Ibid., p. 385
29. They are internal from the point of view of philosophy, but 
argue for internal heuristics from the point of view of 
mathematics. (Cf. again Berkson [19783 p. 229.) "Lakatos's 
critique is largely in harmony with Gödel's, but is an ex­
ternal critique..."
Cf. my notes 8. and lo. See also Machover [19833 and Hallett 
[19793 as to the results of this internal critique and also 
in connection with its relation to traditional philosophies 
ot mathematics.
30. Lakatos [1971a3, p. 103, n.l.
31. Lakatos [19743, p. 140, n.3.
32. Hacking informs us, "he [.'Lakatosi read the Remarks care­
fully when writing 'Proofs and Refutations'." C19791,p.391.
33. Lakatos [19763, p. 146.
34. Cf, Niiniluoto [19843 pp. 112ff., 134-137, 201-208; Lakatos 
[19703, and C1978b3 "What does a mathematical proof prove?" 
pp. 61-69.
35. Cf. Lakatos [19673, pp. 40-42., See Berkson [19783 and 
Bloor [19843 especially chapters 5 and 6; Cf. M. Leich and 
S.H. Holtzman [19811; Communal agreement and objectivity",
pp. 20—22.
36. See Dummett [19593, pp. 324-335.; Gordon Baker, "Following 
Wittgenstein" in Holtzman and Leich [19813 pp. 52-58, 66-
69.; (Lakatos Ibid.), Berkson [19783, p. 302.
37. Lakatos [1978b3, pp. 24-35, A. Ambrose "Is Philosophy of 
Mathematics 'An Idleness in Mathematic^?" and "Mathematical 
Generalisations and Counterexamples" (in Ambrose and 
Lazerowitz [19843, pp. 192-214, 167-175.)
38. Lakatos [1978b3, pp. 3-20. "Infinite Regress and Foundation 
of Mathematics". (See also Ibid., pp. 108-9. n.2., pp. 
129-130; and Wright [19803 p. 9.; Klenk [19763 pp. 42-43, 
124; Niiniluoto [19843, p. 177.)
39. See Fine [19783, pp. 328., 339.; Lakatos Í19763, pp. 103-4 
and n.l., 2.; Ambrose L1984J pp. 167-180) and RFM V.34, 35.
40. Cf. Lakatos [1978b3, p. 43.
41. See Davidson [19683 "Action Reasons and Causes", pp.79-87.
42. For strong arguments see Davis [19723 pp. 258-263.
43. Lakatos [1978b3 II. 3. "Mathematic is Ouasi-empirical", pp. 
30-35.
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44. Hersch C19783, p. 149.
45. RFM II. 33.; I. 74.
46. Hacking C19793, p. 393.
47. Ibid. In the acknowledgements to his PhD thesis Lakatos him 
self remarked that one of his 'ideological' sources is 
Hegel's dialectic. (See the editors note in Lakatos [1978b] 
p. 70. )
48. RFM HI. 71.
49. RFM I. 66.
50. Lakatos [1976], Introduction and pp. 142-143. See also 
[1978b], p. 40. and G. Radnitzky “Progress and Rationality 
in Research", [1977], p. 58.
51. Lakatos C1978bl, p. 69.» and Hersch [1978], ibid.
52. RFM I. 6. See also III.10, 28-31.
53. RFM V.16., IV. 11., 13.
54. RFM III.4.
55. RFM III.22., 46., 47., V. 40.; Lakatos [1978b],
“The Method of Analysis-Synthesis", pp. 93-94.
56. RFM III.25., 28., 31., 41., IV. 20., V. 45.
57. RFM VI.49.
58. Lakatos C1976], pp. 114-115.
59. RFM V.9. "However queer it sounds the further expansion of 
an irrational number is a further expansion of mathematics. 
(Ibid. )
60. RFM A I. 20. Cf Lakatos C19763 p. 29., n., 38 n.l., and 
Ambrose [1959], pp. 437 ff.
61. Ibid. pp. 114., 116.
62. Lakatos C1968], p. 133., (Cf. note 16. of this paper)
63. RFM III.26., 27.
64. According to Heyting, "a linguistic accompaniment is not a 
representation of mathematics; still less is it mathematics 
itself." (Heyting, "The Intuitionist Foundation of Mathe-
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tnatics", p. 42. in: Benacerraf CI9643. Wittgenstein says, 
"To understand a sentence means to understand a language" 
(PI 199.) "that is only applying one's understanding." (PI 
146) "...but then can't an application come before my 
mind?" (PI 141) "To understand a language means to be a 
master of technique." (PI 199) "...the process may consist 
merely in our saying 'Therefore' or 'It follows from this' 
..." but "may go on paper, orally, or 'in the head'."
(RFM 1.6, cf. Klenk 119761 pp. 19-25.)
65. Peter C19433, p. 16. (in Hungarian)
66. RFM III.50.
"The geometrical illustrations of Analysis is indeed in­
essential; not, however, the geometrical application. 
Originally the geometrical illustrations were applications 
of Analysis." (RFM V. 29.)
67. See Lakatos C19763, pp. 127-128. Editors note: "In other 
words this method consists (in part) of producing a series 
of statements Pi,...,Pn such that Pi and...and Pn is 
supposed to be true of some domain of interesting objects 
and seems to imply the primitive conjecture C. This may 
turn out not to be the case - in other words we find cases 
in which C is false ('global counter-examples' ) but in 
which Pi to Pn hold. This leads to the articulation of a 
new lemma Pn+1 which is also refuted by the counter­
example ('local counter-example'). The original proof is 
replaced by a new one which can be summed up by the con­
ditional statement
P1 Pn 8 W C.
The (logical) truth of this conditional statement is no 
longer impugned by the counterexample (since the antecedent 
is now false in this case and hence the conditional state­
ment true)." This "in part" just refers to that little 
"logical" problem that "in this case" why wasn't it the 
case that we formulated the conditional statement
P1 8**-8 Pn 8 ",Pn+l-*'C'
when the conditional statement is also true (and we would 
get the 'exception - barring' method). - I.e. what does 
the WAY, the MODE of "articulation" depend on, and why 
isn't it articulated?
68. Peter C19433, p. 236.
69. Ibid. p. 242.
70. Cf. Tóth C19773, pp. 396-405.
71. RFM VII.22.
72. RFM V.25.
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I. 166.)
73. Zettel g 294.
74. Ambrose C19843, p. 180., (Cf. RFM III. 31.,
75. Cf. Tóth C19721
76. "The extensional definitions of functions, of real numbers, 
etc. pass over - although they presuppose - everything ln- 
tensional, and refer to the ever-recurring outward form." 
(RFM V. 36)
"The cut is an extensional image.” (RFM V. 34)
"Let us not forget that the division of the rational num­
bers into two classes did not originally have any meaning, 
until we drew attention to a particular thing that could 
be so described. The concept is taken over from the every­
day use of language and that is why it immediately looks 
as if it had to have a meaning for numbers, too." (Ibid.)
77. "But that everything can (also) be interpreted as following, 
doesn't mean that everything is following." (RFM VII. 47.) 
"...it is surely important that I can form the decision 
with the (general) interpretation so to speak once and for 
all, and can hold by it, and do not interpret afresh at 
every step." (Ibid. 48.)
"It might justly be asked what importance Gödel's proof 
has for our work... - The answer is that the situation, 
into which such a proof brings us, is of interest to us. 
'What are we to say now?' - That is our theme." (Ibid. 22.)
78. Peter C19433, pp. 252-253.
"Future development shall certainly broaden the framework, 
even though we may not be clear as to how it do so. (ital­
ics mine - A.B.) The moral of the lesson is that mathe­
matics is not static and closed, but alive and constantly 
in the process of developing: no matter how hard we try to 
confine it to a closed form, it bursts forth anew, with 
fresh life and vigor." (Ibid.)
79. RFM VII. 40.
80. Lakatos C1978b3, p. 67. (italics mine - A.B.)
81. RFM V. 42.
82. Lakatos C1978bl, p. 69.
Feferman(C19781, p. 317.) poses the question: "Is there no 
end to guessing?... The professional mathematician knows 
rather well what sort of thing will work for certain prob­
lems and what won't. ... the guesswork finishes with the 
mathematician's successful struggle to solve a problem or 
complete a proof. It is true that results are viewed in 
changing perspective over historical periods. ... But this 
is quite a different picture from that given by Lakatos
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of endless guesswork.”
"Interpretation comes to and end." (RFM VI. 38.) "Here it 
is of the greatest importance that all or the enormous 
majority of us agree in certain things..." (RFM VI. 39.)
83. RFM A 1.2., Cf. Zettel, 314.
'Where to stop?' - constitutes a real difficulty in con­
temporary discussions. (Cf. Feferman's and Lakatos's posi­
tion and n. 82. of this paper.) Lakatos didn't want to 
stop - for him the problem of 'where to stop' was a 
philosophical one. He wanted to stop dogmatism and make 
it plain: "There is nothing wrong with an infinite regress 
of guesses". He dwelled upon his philosophical position: 
critical fallibiliem was for him one of the leading his­
torical problems of our age. But he attempted to define 
objective progression. He posed a "new central question" 
in philosophy and methodology of science: "How do you 
improve your guesses?", which he viewed as having grave ethical and 
political implications. (Cf. Lakatos C19623, p. 10.) "In 
philosophy it is always good to put a question instead of 
an answer to a question" (RFM III. 5.)
84. RFM V. 9.
"(I once wrote: 'In mathematics process and result are 
equivalent'.)" - reiterates Wittgenstein examining his own 
position. (RFM I. 82., Cf. TR 6.1261)
"...you are incorporating the result of the transformation 
into the kind of way the transformation is done." (RFM I. 
86. )
"When we follow the laws of inference (inference rules) 
then following always involves interpretation.." (RFM I. 
114. )
85. Lakatos's demarcation between the Popperian "second world 
of feelings, beliefs, consciousness" and the "third world 
of objective knowledge" and the (parallel) one between 
history, (the set of historical events) and history2 (a 
set of historical propositions) plays a crucial role in 
Lakatos's program of philosophy and methodology of science. 
(See n. 88.of this paper and cf. Lakatos C1971a3, pp. 119- 
122 and notes.)
86. See Toth 119773 for an internal critique of this distinc­
tion.
87. As Feyerabend claimed, Lakatos was a rationalist; sometimes 
he also had "a queer temptation which expresses itself in 
my inclination to say: I cannot understand it, because the 
interpretation of the explanation is still vague" - as 
Wittgenstein said (RFM VI. 40). But whether he would admit 
- "in a carefully specifiable way" - some cognitive or 
historical universals in the explanation or in the under­
standing of revolutionary changes remains an open question.
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88. "Belief, commitment, understanding are states of the human 
mind. They are inhabitants of the 'second world'. But the 
objective, scientific value of a theory is a 'third world' 
matter... Thus demarcationists share a critical respect 
for the articulated. They appraise only what is articulated 
in human knowledge. The demarcationlst readily agrees that 
articulated knowledge is only the tip of an iceberg: but
it is exactly this small tip of the human enterprise wher­
ein rationality resides." Lakatos C1978bl, pp. 109-110.
See also Hacking's account of this point in his C1979I, 
pp. 383-386. and (cf. Lakatos C19703 p. 104., C19713 p.122.)
89. H: The following sentence is meaningless if
this sentence is meaningless.
S: The previous sentence is meaningless if this sentence 
is meaningless.
(There is nothing wrong with the formalization:
M(x) =: 'x is meaningful'
'The other sentence is meaningless iff, this sentence is 
meaningless.'
But: It is not this sentence you don't understand if this 
is the sentence you don't understand!
(m (h ) <— * M(S) + H v S)
In a lighter vein, consider the following:
HEGEL: Your theorem is true.
FERMAT: Can you prove it?
HEGEL: No, - but history will...
FERMAT: I'm glad you 're so sure, but can you prove that? 
HEGEL: That's already been done, Fermat!
Furthermore, if we convert,FERMAT to HEGEL, 'true' to 
'false' and 'prove' to 'disprove' an explanation is provid­
ed for the discussion above. If HEGEL and FERMAT are two 
contemporary mathematicians they are still looking for the 
proof. The Bieberbach Conjecture and the Riemann Hypothesis 
were proved and the Hertens Conjecture was disproved in 
1984 - if the proofs proved to be accepted after being 
examined in detail by the mathematical community at large.
90. "Thus if I say: 'it's as if this proposition expressed the 
essence of form' - I mean: it is as if this proposition 
expressed a property of the entity forrni - and one can say: 
the entity of which it asserts a property, and which I here 
call the entity 'form', is the picture which I cannot help 
having when I hear the word 'form'." (RFM I. 74.)
91. "I should like to reverse the order: We should speak of 
formal systems only if they are formalisations of estab­
lished informal mathematical theories. No further criteria 
are needed. There is indeed no respectable informal an­
cestor." (Lakatos C19783, p. 52.) "But all of them are
H:
S:
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fallible, not less fallible... than the ordinary classical 
mathematics which was so much in want of foundations." 
(Lakatos [1978b3, p. 34.) "Triviality and certainty are 
Kinderkrankheiten of knowledge." (Lakatos [19623, p. 3.)
92. See Lakatos C1978b3, p. 61.; also [19763. pp. 146-148 and n.l. where - after using the terms "Thesis - Antithesis - 
Synthesis" - he says; "The Hegelian language which X use 
here... has, however, its dangers as well as its attrac­
tions." Maintaining previously quoted ( p. 14-15.) 'Hegelian 
conception of heuristics' as the "autonomous dialectic of 
alienated human activity", he notes: "...human activity 
can always suppress or distort the autonomy of alienated 
processes and can give rise to new ones" - he can't resist 
adding: "The neglect of this interaction was a central 
weakness of Marxist dialectic." (Cf. also Lakatos [1974c- 
78aD, p. 139 and n.l.)
93. Lakatos [19763, p. 127 n.
94. Cf. Kuhn Cl970b3.
95. RFM VI. 40.
96. RFM II. 46.
97. ...i.e. with "tons of salt", as Kuhn parodizes Lakatos.
(See Kuhn [1970a3 in: Lakatos C19703, p. 256.)- "I look at 
continuity in science through 'Popperian spectacles *.
Where Kuhn sees ’paradigms', I also see rational 'research 
programmes'. (Ibid p. 177.) One aspect of the Kuhn-Lakatos 
debate is the problem of (historicizing!) rationality ,
as Kuhn himself realizes (see Kuhn [1970b3, pp. 143-144.); 
but there is yet another feature of historicizing rational­
ity: the rational - internal or external - description of 
change (in scientific thought-processing) (Cf. Ibid., p.
93. )
98. Cf. Whorf C19563 and Smith [19723, pp. 48-51. vs. Naess 
C19683, pp. 155-157.
99. ...at least not in the sense of formal languages or pre- 
Chomskian grammatics... This doesn't imply that this 
tradition has no general theory of language of its own 
with its specific problem of representing interpreted sys­
tems of (highly organized) knowledge, and thinking as a 
"process". (Cf. Gauthier C19843, pp. 308-309, and Nilni- 
luoto C19843, "The Evolution of Knowledge", pp. 61-71.).
100. Popper [19633» p. 328.
101. Cf. Popper [19633, pp. 317-323. and p. 327.
102. Ibid., Cf. Lakatos [19763, p. 104.
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103. See WheweIX C18603, pp. 307ff.
104. Hegel C19563, pp. 17., 20.
105. Lakatos Cl978b3, p. 61. added: "I am quite convinced that 
even the poverty of historicism is better then the 
complete absence of it - always providing of course that 
it is handled with the care necessary in dealing with any 
explosives. " (italics mine - A.B.) It can help to realise 
that we can try to describe the role that heuristics 
plays both on "metaphysical" (i.e. methodological) and 
"meta-mathematical" level (i.e. in the process of formal 
interpretation).
106. "Justificationlst epistemology has... two main problems: 
how to discover (ultimate) Truth and how to prove that it 
is the Truth... (1) the problem of foundations of know­
ledge (the logic of justification) and (2) the problem of 
the growth of knowledge (the problem of method, logic
of discovery, heuristics)." (Lakatos C1978a3, p. 196.)
107. Lakatos Cl978b3, pp. 3-4.
108. RFM
109. Cf. Pólya-Szegő C19723, iii.
HO. The problem (of heuristics) is presented in our con­
temporary history and philosophy of science, as well as 
in model theory, in ncn-Cantorian set theoretical methods 
of forcing, and in terms of the problem of structural 
representation of knowledge in the artificial intelli­
gence framework.
111. Pólya-Szegő 119723, Preface to the First German Edition. 
C19243 "One should try to understand everything: isolated 
facts by collating them with related facts, the newly 
discovered through its connection with already assimilat­
ed. . .
There is a similarity between knowing one's way about 
a town and mastering a field of knowledge, from any given 
point one should be able to reach any other point... If 
one is very well informed indeed, one can even execute 
special feats, for example, to carry out a journey by 
systematically avoiding certain forbidden paths which are 
customary - such things happen in certain axiomatic in­
vestigations." (Ibid.)
112. This was always the case - although to varying degrees - 
in new informal branches of mathematics: the "theoretical" 
and the "empirical bases" were the same: namely the his­
tory of mathematical reasoning itself. This history was 
"alienated" in the form of operations and "heuristical" 
methodological reflections in formalized or symbolic 
languages and structures, even though mathematics was in­
volved in rational and not historical re-construction. To
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provide a mathematical interpretation of historical 
representation of knowledge what we require is a good 
heurietical concept of non-linear, pattern-generated 
thought-processing as a counterexample (to deductive 
logic).
113. Wittgenstein, Tractatus. 5.62.
114. Popper C19633, p. 199.
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THE ROLE OF A METAPHOR IN THE BIRTH OF GENERATIVE GRAMMAR
Gábor Forrai
Noam Chomsky is not only the most influential linguist of the 
second half of the century, but also a leading political writ­
er. So the question may be put if there is a connection between 
his political and linguistic ideas. At first sight, the answer 
seems to be no. He never appeals to political philosophy in or­
der to justify his linguistic theories. Nor does he claim that 
his linguistic findings prove that American foreign policy 
should be changed. However, he himself believes that there is a 
connection, even if not a direct one. He says both his linguis­
tic and political ideas derive from the same general view of 
human nature. This paper is an attempt to scrutinize the heu­
ristic role Chomsky's view of man played in the birth of gen­
erative grammar. First, I will describe Chomsky's view of man. 
Then I will sketch how these ideas came to be connected to lin­
guistics; and finally, the particular points of connection will 
be considered.
Chomsky's rather implicit philosophy of man is built on 
three notions: creativity, freedom and constraints. It may be 
best summarized perhaps by saying that man is a being that 
creates freely within constraints. This may sound somewhat par­
adoxical. First freedom is most commonly regarded as the ab­
sence of constraints. Second, constraints seem to restrict 
creativity. Nevertheless, the air of paradox disappears as soon 
as we begin to understand these notions in the same way as 
Chomsky does. The constraints in question are our common bio­
logical characteristics, which are determined genetically. They 
do not prevent us from being free. The fact that we may not 
have wings does not make us unfree. Hence constraints like this 
do not contradict freedom. On the contrary, Chomsky says they 
are constitutive of it. Freedom involves capability to resist 
external pressure. A free man cannot be controlled and coerced
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at will. He is always capable of saying no. A particularly 
important source of this resistance, Chomsky says, is our bio­
logical nature. No external pressure can make us do certain 
things, just as no propaganda can make us grow wings. So our 
freedom steins partly from our biological characteristics. Bio­
logical constraints are essential to creativity as well. An 
activity can only be called creative, if it takes place within 
a framework of rules. Activity without regularity is just act­
ing at random. Throwing patches of paint at a canvas is not 
artistic creativity unless it shows some pattern. Chomsky is 
convinced that some of the rules that govern our activities, 
and make them, in this way, creative are supplied by our innate 
biological characteristics. However, these biological con­
straints are not to be mistaken for the external ones, which 
are imposed on us by certain social institutions. The latter 
are always harmful. They restrict our freedom, and thereby 
stand in the way of our spontaneous creativity. They are only 
legitimate in so far as they facilitate the survival of the hu­
man species.
How does this view of human nature connect to the study of 
language? The connection might have been set up by Chomsky's 
definition of the subject of linguistics. Linguistics is as­
serted to be the science of the idealized native speaker's lin­
guistic competence. This definition may give rise to a very 
special kind of analogical reasoning, which can be schematical­
ly described as follows: Premise 1: p is a part of w. Premise 
2: u has property A. Conclusion: p has property A^, which is 
similar to property A. It is a non-demonstrative inference from 
a property of the whole to a property of the part. Chomsky's 
definition of the subject of linguistics establishes whole-part 
relationship between man and his linguistic competence. As a 
result, it facilitates inferences from the properties of human 
nature to the properties of linguistic competence. Consequently, 
ideas about human nature may infiltrate into linguistic theory. 
What I will try to show is that the birth of some of Chomsky's 
linguistic ideas might be explained in this way.
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Five particular points will be examined. The first one is 
what might be labelled as the "principle of regularity". It 
involves a theoretical assumption and its methodological con­
sequence. The theoretical assumption is that in language reg­
ularity prevails. Systematicity belongs to the very nature of 
language. It is this assumption which is at work when Chomsky 
accuses traditional grammar and structuralist linguistics of 
not discovering enough regularities. The assumption implies 
the methodological rule that irregularities are not worth in­
vestigating. They are peripheral phenomena, which cannot help 
us to a deeper understanding of language. They should be rele­
gated to the lexicon or to the theory of markedness, and should- 
not be dealt with any more. Since the validity of this rule 
depends on the soundness of the assumption we have to return 
now to the assumption. It may strike us at once that it is not 
directly testable. Imagine a debate between radical regularists, like 
Chcmsky, and moderate ones who are convinced that there is no regularity 
in language over and above the obvious cases of agreement, ccrpar- 
ison of adjectives, etc. The opposing parties would soon be 
involved in vicious circles. The radicals would argue from the 
underlying regularities they unearthed. The moderates would 
dismiss these examples as artefacts. In fact, the very ac­
ceptability of the data relevant to the question seems to de­
pend on a prior decision concerning the degree of systematicity 
of language. Hence the assumption of regularity cannot be re­
garded as a generalization from hard facts. I would like to 
suggest that it may be understood, partly, in terms of Chomsky's 
views on human nature. He thinks that creativity presupposes 
rules. So if language use is creative, it has to take place 
within a system of rules. Thus it might be the rules governing 
our creative activities where the principle of regularity 
comes from.
With this, I have arrived at the second point of possible 
connection, namely, the idea of the creative use of language 
and its explanation. Chomsky was the first to attribute great 
significance to the widely known fact, that we are able to 
produce and understand sentences we have never heard before,
51
i.e. our language use is in a sense creative. This fact could 
be most easily explained perhaps by saying that language is 
not regulated strictly. Grammatical rules are too few and too 
loose to prevent innovations. Chomsky's explanation is marked­
ly different. Innovations do not occur inspite of the rules.
On the contrary, those are exactly the rules that make them 
possible. In his theory, the rules of grammar specify an in­
finite number of sentences. So all the sentences that are re­
garded as innovations are given in advance by a system of 
rules. This conception of linguistic creativity may be readily 
accounted for in terms of Chomsky's view of man. Linguistic 
creativity is important, since creativity is a fundamental 
characteristics of the human species. It is explained by the 
rules of grammar, since human creativity in general is governed 
by rules. This explanation seems to be supported by the fact 
that Chomsky is fully aware of the analogy between the creative 
use of language and human creativity in general. He considers 
the former a particularly crucial realization of the latter.
The third point is the notion of universal grammar. This 
notion appears already in Chomsky's doctoral dissertation under 
the name "general theory of linguistic form". Universal grammar 
consists of constraints imposed on the form of grammars. The 
set of all these constraints defines the class of possible hu­
man grammars, which, in turn, defines the class of possible 
human languages. The qualification "human" is important. There 
could be languages violating these constraints which could be 
used for the very same purposes as languages that do not vio­
late them. These languages, however, would not qualify as hu­
man languages, since people could not possess them. The reason 
is that universal grammar reflects the innate structural 
characteristics of human mind. And if human mind has got a 
definite structure, this structure restricts the kinds of in­
formation it can accomodate. We cannot put a pair of skis into 
a bookcase. In the same manner, languages incompatible with 
the structure of human mind cannot be accomodated in it. So 
the languages violating universal grammar cannot be used by 
human beings. This should suffice to see that universal grantnar
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is a good exemplification of Chomsky's idea of biological con­
straints characteristic of the human species.
The fourth point, which heavily relies on the previous 
one, is Chomsky's theory of primary language acquisition. He 
has vehemently criticized Skinner's behavioristic approach, in 
which language is impressed on the child's brain by means of 
selective reinforcement. Even though his criticism is strictly 
factual and methodological, his motivations, he admits, were 
partly political. What worried him in Skinner's account was 
that it implies that human beings are infinitely malleable. 
That is to say, their knowledge and personality is determined 
fully by the external influence they have been subjected to. 
This idea is said to have dangerous political implications, 
namely, that manipulation and coercion are always successful. 
As a result, this view is suitable for laying the foundations 
of doctrines of manipulation and oppression. From Chomsky's 
own theory an entirely different view of man can be gathered. 
In his opinion, the process of language learning is by and 
large determined by universal grammar, which he calls language 
acquisition device in this context. The role of external fac­
tors is reduced to supplying linguistic data. So the child is 
not the passive subject of external influence, whose knowledge 
can be arbitrarily shaped by careful doses of reinforcement.
He is an active agent, who looks for the best way to adapt the 
data to his innate mental structures. He is not infinitely 
malleable either. If a language does not fit these structures, 
i.e. it runs counter to universal grammar, he simply will not 
learn it. This picture of the child constructing the grammar 
of his mother tongue in accordance with the principles of 
universal grammar resembles strongly Chomsky's vision of man 
creating freely within the constraints of his biological na­
ture. Thus it seems reasonable to suppose that his theory of 
language acquisition might have been suggested by his views on 
human nature.
The last point is the idea of evaluation measure, which 
figured in Chomsky's earlier accounts of language learning. It 
was introduced so as to solve the following problem. There may
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be several grammars which are compatible both with the con­
straints of universal grammar and the linguistic data. The 
child has to choose somehow from among them. The problem is 
how he makes this choice. Chomsky's solution was that universal 
grammar contains an evaluation measure which selects the best 
grammar. He said the selection was based on a criterion of 
simplicity. He emphasized, however, that this kind of simplic­
ity. He emphasized, however, that this kind of simplicity is 
not an a priori aesthetic category which is understood in ad­
vance outside of linguistic theory. It has to be discovered 
empirically just as the value of a physical constant. It may 
even run counter to our intuitive judgements of simplicity. So 
why did Chomsky call it a criterion of simplicity at all if it 
has nothing to do with our intuitive understanding of simplic­
ity? The answer may lie in the idea he took over from his 
teacher, Nelson Goodman, that simplicity and systematicity are 
more or less synonymous. So what Chomsky’s claim that the 
evaluation measure utilizes a criterion of simplicity really 
amounts to is that the child chooses the most systematic granmar. 
Thus we once again ran into the idea of systematicity, which 
we have already tried to derive from his view of man.
Finally, I would like to forestall a possible objection. My 
reconstructions presupposed that Chomsky believed in the psy­
chological reality of grammar at the time of the conception of 
these ideas. There is, nevertheless, a widespread conviction 
that it happened only in 1959 or 60 that Chomsky began to in­
terpret generative grammar mentalistically. It was even argued 
that his mentalistic turn was brought about by his entering 
into controversy with Skinner. If this conviction is correct 
all my reconstructions fall, except the one which was concerned 
with Chomsky's theory of primary language acquisition. However, 
this conviction captures only the half of the truth. It is 
right in so far as there was really a turn in Chomsky's thought 
at that time, and it was probably brought about by the contro­
versy with Skinner. Nevertheless, what happened was not that 
Chomsky gave up his antimentalistic position. What he did was 
rather to make his mentalism explicit. To be more exact, his
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mentalism became a programmatic claim from an insignificant 
assumption. This interpretation may be supported by two ar­
guments. First, Chomsky himself says that the mentalistic 
position was taken for granted as early as his 1955 doctoral 
dissertation. Second, his doctoral dissertation, in fact, con­
tains numerous mentalistic formulations which are clearly not 
used for the sake of convenience.
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LAWS OF LOGIC FROM THE POINT OF VIEW OF PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE
Katalin G. Havas
"...the most certain principle of all 
is that about which one cannot be mis­
taken; for such a principle must be 
both the most familiar (for it is about 
the unfamiliar that errors are always 
made), and not based on hypothesis. For 
the principle which the student of any 
form of Being must grasp is no hypoth­
esis; and that which a man must know if 
he knows anything he must bring with 
* him to his task."*
In present day philosophy of science the question arises 
whether it is possible that a principle has those properties 
which Aristotle attributed to the principle of contradiction.
Is there any principle which is the most certain, about which 
one cannot be mistaken, which is, at the same time, the most 
familiar and not based on hypothesis and a man must know it if 
he knows anything? Or, is it the case that every principle, 
and therefore Aristotle's principle of contradiction, is a 
standard way of looking at the world, a paradigm shared by 
scientists for a long time without questioning its validity?
Nowadays we recognize that there is no one Aristotelian 
logic in general but, rather, several different ones, and that 
each of them has a special formulation of the principle of con­
tradiction. But, in this case, there arises another question, 
namely which Aristotelian principle of contradiction is the 
most certain, the most familiar, etc.?
The generations following Aristotle read his work from the 
point of view of their own paradigms and regarded their own 
interpretation as "the authentic reading of the principle of
*Aristotle, Metaphysics, IV. III. 7-8.
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contradiction", as "the really Aristotelian principle of con­
tradiction". Some of them thought that the principle of con­
tradiction was an ontological principle, a most general prin­
ciple of being. Others held that it was about language use, 
while the adherents of a third approach thought that it was a 
general methodological rule for discussion, etc... Which, if 
any, of these different interpretations is the fundamental 
one?
I think, that, although Aristotle gives several and, to a 
certain extent, different formulations of the principle of con­
tradiction, these formulations are not independent of each 
other. More over they are closely connected. Aristotle believed 
that Being as Being had certain peculiar modifications and from 
them there followed the principles of sound reasoning. That is 
why, if we want to answer the above stated questions, then at 
first we must study the connection between ontologically in­
terpreted logics and reality.
Logic and reality
In order to understand the relation of an ontologically in­
terpreted logic to reality we have to take into account that 
the recreation of reality in the mind is accomplished by the 
activity of consciousness. One of the manifestations of the 
activity of mind is the process of homogenization. The term 
"homogenization" was first introduced in a philosophical sense 
by G. Lukács. In explaining the meaning of this term I will 
rely on G. Lukács's suggestions.*
Homogenization is a necessary concomitant of every cogni­
tion, it is a form of abstraction. In the process of cognizing 
heterogenous reality man views various things, by emphasizing 
some of their characteristics, and relations, as bearers of
*See, Lukács, G. Hegel“8 False and His Genuine Ontology. Transi, 
by D. Fernbach, London, Merlin Press, 1978.
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these characteristics and relations. He identifies them on the 
basis of some common characteristics while disregarding others 
in which these things differ from one another. The identifica­
tion is always effectuated on the basis of characteristics 
which are essential in the given process of cognition, while 
the characteristics which are left out of consideration are 
such that, from the point of view of the process of cognition, 
theyare inessential, they are negligible. It is possible that 
something on the basis of which this identification is effec­
tuated is not essential as far as the thing or its objective 
existence is concerned, and it is possible that something, from 
the difference of which we make an abstraction in certain con­
crete cognitive situations, is necessarily an inherent property 
of the objective existence of the thing.(Primitive man, in or­
der to select from among the stones that happened to be lying 
around those suitable for his cutting requirements and to 
leave the unsuitable behind, had to separate the contingent, 
natural form of stones- that is, a contingent, not essential, 
form of existence of a stone "as stone" - from their other prop­
erties, and had to view them as bearers of this property. This 
homogenization is the precondition of establishing the suita­
bility or unsuitability for cutting. Stones, by virtue of their 
natural form, are suitable or unsuitable for cutting, but this 
property can only be actualized in and by human labour. In the 
simple existence of the stone it would remain a never realized 
possibility.)
If we refer Lukács's statement concerning homogenization 
to logical laws interpreted as ontological laws we have to ad­
mit that each of them is only an abstract, idealized apprehen­
sion of certain relations between things. Thus, for example in 
the laws of two-valued first-order predicate logic (PL) heter­
ogenous reality is homogenized first of all by virtue of the 
condition - condition exists in every classical, two-valued 
logical system - that we presuppose the existence of individ­
uals having sharply different properties and relations. This
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presupposition is the generalization of man's practical ex­
perience of cognition. In order to judge things, man has to 
distinguish, has to separate them from one another. The ob­
jective basis of this distinction, or separation, lies in their 
inherent relative otherness. (This otherness is relative be­
cause every individual as far as its properties and relations 
are concerned, is such that it differs from other individuals 
and that it also has identical traits.)
Heterogeneous reality becomes homogenized in PL because PL 
disregards the time factor. This presupposition is also the 
generalization of man's practical experiences. In order to be 
able to think man has to disregard, to a certain degree, the 
eternal change of things. The objective basis of this lies in 
the relative constancy of things. (Things preserve some of their 
characteristics for a relatively long time.)
PL homogenizes again because in investigating individuals 
and their properties (relations) it disregards the properties 
of properties (e.g. relations of relations), it disregards the 
modality of properties (e.g. necessary, possible properties) 
and so on.
As a result of what we have said above, logical laws ex­
pressed in the language of PL reflect reality in the condition 
of abstraction, and on the level of homogenization which is a 
peculiar quality of PL. In a similar way the laws of Aristotle's 
ontology are about peculiar modifications of Being as Being, 
i.e. Being as conceived of by consciousness in specific concepts 
and propositions in the language of Aristotle's ontology.
Unlike Aristotle, PL presupposes that for every x either F 
or its privation (not-F) is true. In PL, but not with Aristotle, 
asserting that x has not the property F is equivalent to as­
serting that x has the property not-F. This means that in PL,
Vx(Fx v Fx) is a law and the formula 3x(Fx S Fx), which is call­
ed "the law of contradiction in PL" (CPL) is also valid. But 
CPL is valid only in the framework of logics where it is pre- 
suppoed that for each object it is significant to predicate ei-
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ther F or its privation (not-F). CPL is not valid in logics 
which presuppose the possibility of situations with objects 
having neither a given property F nor its privation. However, 
in these logics, the principle of contradiction in Aristotelian 
ontology can be valid. Namely: "It is impossible for the same 
attribute at once to belong and not to belong to the same thing 
and in the same relation."*
In the time of classical logic, man - relying on objective 
bases - created a world concept in which individuals possess 
sharply defined characteristics, relations, etc., as I have 
mentioned before. With the advancement of the science of logic 
- led by needs of certain cognitive objectives as, for example, 
the problems of microphysics and microbiology - there evolved 
investigations which ventured to establish a world concept 
resting on different principles than those of the world of 
classical logic. In various systems of logic and in virtue of 
various cognitive aims the 'world of beings' becomes a dif­
ferently homogenized world which is selected by the conscious 
activity of the cognitive man. The 'different worlds' which 
appear in logical systems exist together, constitute the 'World' 
together, not separate from one another in objective reality 
and independent of human cognition. We have to allow for this 
in order to be able to formulate more clearly the problem at 
issue. The problem of the general validity of logical laws is 
a question which refers to individuals already homogenized in 
thinking, to individuals conceptualized in some way for a goal 
of cognition.
The laws of some logical systems - in case of ontological 
interpretation - reflect reality on a level of homogenization 
which is defined by the abstractional conditions of the system. 
Various systems of logic differ from one another not in the 
fact that their scope of validity belongs to different sub- 
-classes of the class of beings but, rather, in the fact that
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their scope of validity is the reflection of the totality of 
beings on various levels of homogenization. (Of course, we can 
say that some homogenization is suitable for certain investi­
gations, in other cases, however, it is not relevant.)
Therefore, when examining reality on a given h^ level of 
homogenization, the laws of a given ontologically inter­
preted logical system are generally valid, universal laws in 
every field of reality. If, however, certain objectives of cog 
nition require us to change over to another examination on h2 
level of homogenization and we employ the corresponding L2 sys 
tern, it is possible that we get out of the scope of the laws 
of the system. The laws of both and L2 systems are equal 
ly valid in every field of reality if the conditions of employ 
ing them on the corresponding h^ and/or h2 level of homogeniza 
tion are fulfilled. Otherwise, however, I think there is no, 
and that it is impossible to create, such an ontologically 
interpreted logical system, such a universal logic, the laws 
of which, examining reality on any level of homogenization, 
would be valid. The existence of a logical system like this 
would mean that there is cognition the results of which convey 
closed, final, non-improvable knowledge of reality in every 
aspect.
If we wish to introduce logic in some field of inquiry 
(e.g. quantum-mechanics) as a tool of cognition by which we 
could express the specificity of objects in that field, it 
would be more expedient to employ more refined means than the 
abstractional conditions of two-valued logic, means which do 
not presuppose such an extent of homogenization as does two­
valued logic.
The name 'logic of micro-world' is related to what we have 
said above. The term 'micro-world' refers to the fact that, in 
the process of cognizing the structure of the material world, 
we penetrate ever deeper into the structure of things and we 
separate the image which we have obtained as an other 'world'. 
Among these 'worlds' there are some (e.g. the 'micro-world') 
in the examination of which it is useful to employ other log­
ical means than those of two-valued logic. Of course, the de-
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terraining factor of what logic can be suitably employed in 
examining micro-world is the nature of the micro-world itself, 
namely, what specificities of the World make the objects of 
our consciousness. In my opinion, however, this does not mean 
that we could speak of the 'logic of the micro-world' as dif­
ferent from the logic of other fields which would mean the 
refutation of the general validity of logical laws in the sense 
of what we have said above. It is not at all proved that we 
shall never need the 'logic of micro-world' in some other 
fields, namely, in fields where the means and abstractions of 
two-valued logic seem to be appropriate. Taking mathematical 
logic in general as an analogy we can mention that it is not 
exclusively the logic of the "world" of mathematics. To date, 
the results of investigations in exploring the logic of math­
ematics are applied in several fields of research and if they 
are not applied in some field it does not mean that in this 
special field we have reached at opposite results, it means at 
best, that in some cases it is not relevant to apply them or 
the conditions of their adoption do not exist.
The principle of contradiction as a general 
metalogical principle
We must distinguish the Aristotelian law of contradiction 
as a part of his ontology from another Aristotelian principle 
of contradiction, or, it may be better to say: another
possible interpretation of the Aristotelian principle of con­
tradiction, which is a metalogical principle. It is a formula­
tion of a general precondition of understanding and communica­
tion.
Aristotle says: "Now those who intend to join in discussion 
must understand one another to some extent; for without this 
how can there be any common discussion between them?" ... "Now 
he who says that A is and is not denies that the term signifies 
what it does signify. But this is impossible. Therefore if 'to
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be so and so' has a definite meaning, the opposite statement 
about the same subject cannot be true."*
Here I would like to point out that Aristotle formulizes 
this principle in the framework of terms which signify some­
thing and have a definite meaning. I think that in this frame­
work the Aristotelian principle of contradiction interpreted as 
the principle of understanding (GMPC) is a general principle of 
sound reasoning. In this framework it really is a principle 
which is the most certain, about which one cannot be mistaken, 
etc... It will have these characteristics as long as the nature 
of human beings is such that man necessarily builds his know­
ledge on the pillars of terms used with definite meanings in a 
universe of discourse.
GMPC is not an axiom of one or another logical theory which 
may be questioned or omitted by a rival theory. It is a final 
precondition to any theory, at least up to our time and in the 
framework of our cultural community.
J. von Neuman called the logic of central nervous system, 
viewed as language, a primary language. He wrote that this 
primary language must structurally be essentially different 
from the one to which common experience refers. When we talk 
about logic we discuss a secondary language which is, although 
built on the primary languaga, not absolutely relevant from 
the point of view of evaluating the primary language that is 
truly used by the central nervous system.**
I think the line started by von Neumann should be continued. 
What is at stake in the science of logic is indeed the logic 
of thought expressing itself in natural languages, but we speak 
about these second-order languages in a third-order language. 
Third-order languages may have essential variants. One of them 
is the language of the Aristotelian syllogism, another one is,
*See, von Neumann, J. The Computer and the Brain. Yale Univ.
Press, 1959. p. 82.
**Aristotle, Metaphysics, XI. V. 4-5.
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for example, classical predicate logic, etc. These various 
third-order languages are suitable means of revealing certain 
characteristics of logic expressed in secondary language, i.e. 
some characteristics of thought expressed in natural language. 
But a particular third-order logical language constitute only 
one approach to concepts and propositions having concrete con­
tents in second-order language. On the other hand, these third- 
order logical languages extrapolate. They deal with the forms 
and laws of possible operations which can be used to attain 
knowledge independently of whether anyone uses them or not in 
the practice of thinking.
On the page preceeding the one quoted above from von Neu­
mann's work, we can read the following:
"Just as languages like Greek or Sanskrit are historical 
facts and not absolute logical necessities, it is only 
reasonable to assume that logics and mathematics are 
similarly historical, accidental forms of expression.
They may have essential variants, i.e. they may exist 
in other forms than the ones to which we are accustom­
ed."*
My question is: which logics does von Neumann speak about 
here? First let us see if he means what we have called third- 
order languages, when logics are viewed as languages. In this 
case we can bring up as an argument in support of his hypothe­
sis any many-valued logic or paraconsistent logic etc., which 
is really other than that to which we have been accustomed for 
centuries and about which we have learned that it originated 
from Aristotle and developed on a higher level through Russell 
and Whitehead's Principia Mathematica to gain its full-blown 
form as classical mathematical logic.
On the other hand, if he thinks here of the logic of thought 
as it is expressed in natural languages (in secondary lan­
guages) then could it, or could it not, have essential vari­
von Neumann, J. Op. ait. p. 81.
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ants. This is a question to which I cannot give a general an­
swer, but I think that at least the natural languages of our 
cultural community are subsumed under some common laws one of 
which was that formulated by Aristotle as GMPC. These laws are 
the objects of the third-order languages. The third-order lan­
guages refer to these laws through different homogenizations 
and presuppositions following from the nature of the given 
third-order language.**
Institute of Philosophy 
Hungarian Academy of Sciences
**0n the validity of APC in paraconsistent logics see Havas 
K.G., "Differences in the Unity". In: Logique et analyse, 
1986. N° 114. (June), pp. 149-160.
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CHANGING EPISTEMOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVES ON SCIENTIFIC COGNI­
TION - WHITHER NOW?
Imre Hronszky
It was commonly held for a long time that scientific research 
is an exceptional, self-sufficient and closed intellectual 
enterprise in which mind works in itself for itself by using 
proper rational argumentation (based on experimental as well 
as theoretical considerations). This assumed self-sufficient 
character of scientific argumentation was taken to be the 
basis of the necessary autonomy within society of the insti­
tution called science. Nowadays the situation has slightly 
changed. A quite strong stream of epistemologically relevant 
sociologies has been attacking the old positions during the 
last 15-20 years.
One of the aims of this paper is to summarize the histori­
cal process of changing the perspectives in the theory of ex­
planatory historigraphy of science as a gradual deconstruction 
of that basic mystifying attitude in which scientific cogni­
tion has been seen as a self-sufficient intellectual enter­
prise (and consequently, society as its bare vehi-
There had been, it is true, some sociology of science even 
earlier which in its "extemalistlc" approach had attacked 
this or that element of the prevailing rationalistic posi­
tion of its time in exploring history of science. There had 
even been some epistemologically relevant sociology of sci­
ence already in the first half of the century. Nevertheless 
the debate has reached a new level by now. To name just one 
difference in advance let me mention that any normative 
theory of science does not seem to be able to abandon the 
sociological challenge without answering it if it does not 
want to loose some credit.
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icle.* Having acknowledged then the development of the ration­
alist perspective on science (from the possible narrowest con­
ceptualization realized by positivist thinking to the much more 
flexible ideas of Larry Laudan or Ernán McMullin, just to name 
some of the modem leading rationalists) the question arises 
how the idea of a full-blooded analysis (which is not willing 
to exclude any part of scientific reasoning ab ovo a prior- 
istically from such an analysis) should be realised.
Based on the validity of some conception of a sociology 
of the rational (that means: denying the validity of the idea 
of social or rational) the paper tries newertheless to be 
critical of some assumed weaknesses and overtones in modern 
epistemologically relevant sociology of sciences**
*Sociology of scientific knowledge does not mean validly, at 
least to my mind, a sociological reductionists. That accepts 
either pure social causation without the mediating effect of 
rational argumentation as a general model or reduces the so­
cial information of scientific knowledge to the determination 
of the cognitive agent as if he were doing nothing but using 
his action for fitting into the social interactional net­
work and forgets about the other side that the activity of 
this agent is aimed at cognition of the world.
*4What is given here is a very elementary outline of the proc­
ess, a phenomenal description. On a deeper level a sociolog­
ical analysis and evaluation of the story of science research 
should be given. In that even the internalist analyses of 
science could be demonstrated as not pure cognitive activities 
but also as justificatory efforts for ideological goals set 
within the scientific "society" or sometimes explicitely in 
the broader society. An element of this here neglected level 
would analyse the effect on Sarton's historiography of his 
commitment to his idea that science is to be seen as the most 
humanistic effort. The trial of healing social life and the 
way he explicated history of science were consciously con­
nected by him. Another element could be an analysis of how 
B. Hessen was influenced by the slogan of Bucharin that "great 
practice requires great theory" and by the task made explicit 
with Bucharin that scientists in a new socialist society 
should bç aware of the practical functioning of scientific 
knowledge when he formulated his Newton-understanding. The 
bewildering tone of the debate about the "sociological turn" 
gives another immediate example that not only pure cognition 
is at stake.
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*The epistemological basis for modern theory of science laid 
down by the neopositivists of the Vienna Circle aimed at the 
fullest insulationiat, demarcationist approach to science. It 
even claimed that science was the only true form of knowledge, 
secured by its unquestionable fundament and strict methodology. 
Individual mindcontents were assumed to be the valid object of 
research in philosophy of science. In a long process of a step 
by step giving up of this original position only minor modi­
fications were introduced initially. Popper's reorienting 
thinking in methodology from inductivism to hypothetico-de- 
ductivism was based on his antifundamentalism. He reformulated 
a moderate task when he raised the problem and asked the ques­
tion of qhy science should be seen as an exceptionally ade­
quate mode of cognition, besides others. Science became seen 
no more as the only real form of knowledge. Research on scien­
tific cognition was later reoriented to a new item, the as­
sumed "objective knowledge", a special world, of its own, as 
it was claimed, with the idea in mind of defending "objectiv­
ity". From the early aprioristic preconceptions aprioristic 
normativism as basic attitude for the theory of science was 
preserved. This attitude kept philosophy of science as norma­
tive issue separated from the historigraphy of science as a 
descriptive one.
Coming back for a moment to the beginnings I have to draw 
attention on the case that positivist intellectual historians 
of science became more immediately challenged by historians 
who tried to describe and explain history of scientific cog­
nition as determined by social factors. Just take the
strange example of B, Hessen, who preserving the, then prevail­
ing, positivist idea of scientific cognition tried to emphasize 
the decisive role of factors from "outside" (technological 
needs, mediated by technological cognitive needs, or metaphys­
ics) as “driving forces" (for example of the motivation of 
scientists), on the choice of research topics within science,
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or on the formulation of scientific ideas effected by "good*or 
“bad" metaphysics.
Following the advices of vulgarmarxism Hessen tried to 
exemplify a onesided determinism concerning the "interaction
of science and material production" presuming, of course, that*science has its own laws of development, laid down in a pure 
cognitive situation. Denying the strong reductionistic ten­
dencies and the one-sided conceptualization what the effect 
of society is on science-development, R. Merton conceptualized 
science-development as also influenced by social values, se­
curing the acknowledgement of scientific activity as long as 
it is not able to rely on its own values and merits. He also 
assumed that some special groups carried with them some cer­
tain general ontological ideas about the world which were fa­
vourable for scientific reasoning.
The "externalism" of Hessen or Merton challenged the pre­
vailing "internalist" attitude to history of science at some 
important points (whether acceptably or not for us is not the 
problem we are dealing with here) but left intact the posi­
tivist understanding of scientific reasoning process. This was 
successfully challenged and broadened later by the new historio­
graphy of Koyré type that made intellect the basic cognitive 
item for historical research, and the advance of objective 
spirit became the leading idea in research front for a long 
time, criticising successfully the positivistic-empiricist con­
ceptualizations of scientific reasoning and the sociological 
approaches based on this sort of epistemology.
One more remark on this situation. Already G.N. Clarck was 
ready to accept the idea sketched by earlier German economy 
historians, that basic attitudes from outside, such as the 
calculative one of the merchants, may have informed scientific 
cognitive attitude. Nevertheless he did not think that sci­
entists accepted this point of view for some social reasons 
having function on the socialinteractional layer of social 
life and he also held that the scientific cognitive attitude.
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once informed, followed its own closed dynamics.*
Let's return from descriptive historiography of science to 
the crisis caused by the historical turn made by Kuhn. It 
threw out a serious challenge with its questioning the meaning­
fulness of supposed existence is history-independent norms, an 
idea that continuously served for justification of the task of 
philosophers of science so far. Based on insights reached in 
philosophy of science he recalled into question many parts of 
the earlier images of scientific activity.
A lot of old presuppositions were challenged by the rich 
content of the Kuhnian model (for example: the cumulativity 
assumption). The problem also emerged: how to learn from his­
tory in developing philosophy of science, what is the validity 
of factual history for normative issues? (It was not true that 
Kuhn simply changed normativism to descriptionism of factual 
dynamics, evaluating it in a simple Darwinistic way, as some 
German constructivists believed.)
Some sort of apriorism had to be given up after the 
Kuhnian model. History had to be included in some way into ra­
tionality of science considerations when scholars wanted to get 
credit for their rationality models. Apriorism had to be 
weakened but the efforts at overall models of rationality eoual- 
ly valid for all periods of history of science were not given 
up. To overcome the "irrationality" to be found in the paradigm 
model, because of the necessarily further not rationalizable 
step made as decision at paradigm change M. Hesse developed a 
very abstract model of a "learning machine" based on an "in­
ductive logic” in order to save the rationality of decisions 
in the development of scientific cognition.
*1 think one of the equivocal presumptions in science research 
has until now been the idea of growing insulation and autonomy 
of science, presuming that science became Increasingly self- 
developing. The differentiation of the meanings of this con­
cept seems to be one of the basic conditions for meaningful 
discussions nowadays.
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Lakatos acknowledged that historiography and philosophy 
of science should be seen as interrelated ones and tried to 
adjust on Popperian methodology so that it could be believed 
appropriate to reconstruct history of scientific cognition. It 
seems that he took his quasi-Kantian phrase seriously enough 
when he divided the tasks of both parts of the connection 
driven in on each other. Normative rationality approach was 
preserved and historiography was kept in the role of ancilla 
by him. I think the weaknesses of his approach were prettily 
discussed by Larry Laudan and Ernán McMullin, respectively.
Let me only mention McMullin's criticism to which he intro­
duced the term "imputed rationality" criticising Lakatos say­
ing that latter tried to "impute" rationality into science and 
believed that, according to his model, history really behaved 
rationally on a deeper level. McMullin reformulated the 
division of labour laid down earlier for philosophy and his­
tory of science and advised intellectual historians to explore 
what he called the implicit rationality of historical events. 
The task of intellectual historians was formulated by him as 
hietoricized one, following the tradition of intellectual 
historiography of the type begun with Koyré.
It is now a platitude to say that Lakatos’s efforts belonged 
to a period of a philosophy of science that was still led by 
a sort of methodologism, an idea that the rationality of sci­
entific enterprise relies on the (assumed) existence of a gen­
erally valid methodology, an ahistorical ideal of scientificity 
("loqic" of science).
Giving a pragmátic characteristic to what makes scientific 
reasoning rational Laudan also hietoriaized it. The overall 
problemsolving activity, the general feature of scientific ac­
tivity was assumed being realized in historically various ways 
and advancement of scientific reasoning in a historical learn­
ing process. Laudan's purpose was to unify pragmatistic under­
standing of rationality (of science) with historicity and to 
save in this way the idea of rational advancement of scienti-
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fie thinking, given that there is a valid overall definition 
of rationality throughout history: problem solving activity.
Rationality came to be seen as a self-developing process 
the framework of which became the historically varying broader 
cognitive culture.The attack on self-sufficient rationality of 
science (made decidedly but somehow restrictedly by Kuhn and 
in a much broader way by the new generation of knowledge-so­
ciologists to be discussed later) was intended to avert by 
him broadening the concept of rationality. But the concept of 
rationality could be saved only in its more moderate form 
bringing in foreground the problem of a sociology of cognition 
looking for preconditions of the historical forms of rational­
ity in form of cognitive attitudes characteristic for special 
layers within society or for special periods of history and 
so on. In that meaning some effortst of earlier sociologists 
became implicitly acknowledged by the problem-solving model.
A long period of a theory of science seems to have reached 
its endpoint, for abstract, autonomous mind has became, within 
the barrier of being autonomous, practical and historicized.
The self-development of mind through continuous feedback loops 
to the factual world through solving "empirical problems" and 
to itself through "theoretical problems" has become the last 
word for those who insisted on the presumption of the autono­
mous development of cognition. Not science but broadly: mind 
became the active subject. It is not a special methodology that 
secures the rationality of knowledge anymore, but the continu­
ous double feedback. But instead of an idea of "knowledge 
without knower" the idea of a purely cognitive practice got 
the task of preserving the validity of the idea of the 
autonomous development of cognition.
This point has not been attached. Society could not change 
its moderate position of being a bare vehicle, and realists 
and pragmatists could jointly command sociology to reduce its 
activity to dealing with the "deviants". But anyway, they might 
have forgotten that a metaphysical reason, that they allow.
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can have the form of reason, nevertheless as metaphysics it is 
ideology, too, in some way. Through this characteristic a 
reasoning process using metaphysical starting points has also 
a necessary ideological side role. The picture of rational 
reasoning process as a closed process of reasoning could have 
been preserved but its functioning, has to be seen as includ­
ing an ideological role, too. Their working included what I 
would call, ân implicit social reasoning.
With the renewal of the knowledge-sociological approach to 
scientific cognition a new perspective has challenged the 
philosophy of science. To sum up briefly, what became at stake 
was the cognitive sociology of the reasoning process when 
sociology has been defined as a research dealing with social 
causation (included social reasons). To speak of sociology of 
the reasoning process means that it is assumed a valid task 
of science research to look for social causation of choosing 
objects of knowledge in science. And it is also valid to look 
for the social causation of the reasoning process itself, 
including the acceptance of the results. But to put it this 
way, that means: emphasising the reasoning process, could be 
misunderstandable. Let me summarize the main point of recent 
knowledge-sociological approach a bit broader. It allows for 
the validity of knowledge sociological exploration of all 
possible knowledge items;
1. to see the possible variety of cognitive goals as being 
caused or at least effected by genuine social effects, from 
social cognitive needs to ideological ones, by social effects 
coming from "outside" or inside within the "scientific com­
munity", 2. to explore the necessarily open structure of sci­
entific reasoning (being open because of the indeterminacy of 
advancing and applying rules) as permeated by sociological 
effects. That idea commits knowledge sociologists to see the 
product of cognition, the knowledge as having internalized a 
series of decisions. Those decisions may seem irrational or 
impossible to explore further for rationalists or even denied
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as fact by them. And further, 3. that the reasons that may 
have been developed to validate the process of cognition by the 
actors themselves Cor later on) should be seen as genuine so­
cial action, open to sociological analysis.
An enormous number of case studies argue for the validity 
of the basic knowledge sociological tenets. They force, to say 
the least, to rethink rationalistic reconstructions of the same 
events. And some of them seem to be really persuasive and 
bringing important differences in the description of the events 
in comparison to the rationalistic reconstructions not only a 
sociological explanation.*
Let me draw the attention on some justifications of know­
ledge sociology, that means on the philosophy of science of 
knowledge sociology. Mary Hesse lately drew the conclusion of 
the necessary sociologization of epistemology from an analysis 
of the failure of validating efforts based narrowly on the 
bare historicizing or naturalizing of epistemology. (The same 
conclusions were reached by e.g. M. Fehér.) As Hesse argued 
scientific cognition should be opened for all those perspectives 
of investigation that have been developed for the analysis of 
the other forms of cognition. For, scientific cognition can 
get all the functions that knowledge can get at all. If I 
understand her correctly, she states that the difference of 
the presence of these factors is not of yes or no but of in­
tensity or mode. This perspective justifies the opening the 
field in its whole range for the various social disciplines.
No part of the field could be saved by the rationalists as 
untouchbar. Science, just as any other forms of cognition, is 
made by concrete social agents and its peculiarity does not 
make it an exception of being socially permeated and formed.
Of course, Larry Laudan (and other rationalists) are right in
*The purpose of the paper allows not to deal with the problem 
that knowledge sociology has developed into some different 
mainstreams by now and their tenets are different enough. I 
think there is a broadening of the perspective; we return to 
this problem later.
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a minor point when they arque for the fullest possible (ration­
al) reconstruction of the reasoning processes. The reconstruc­
tion can be fatal to those knowledge sociological perspectives 
which would make a short-circuit and would give social causal 
explanations instead of reconstructing a framework of rational 
argumentation itself fully open to sociological analysis. And 
taking as a starting point a vision of scientific cognition 
that looks at scientists as real social subjects there is all 
reason to draw attention on those social effects, too, that 
are caused by the simple fact that a scientist has got to 
preserve its position(at least within the "scientific com­
munity'!). This "overdeterminatinq" social causation of scien­
tific cognition can be in a very intermingled, interprenet- 
ratea relation to other types of social causation of ideas, 
e.g. to the socially fixed goals of cognitive activity.
The very task of a knowledge sociologist is to point out 
why and how the cognitive action is governed and permeated by 
its concrete social milieu. The commitment to microsociological 
perspective seems vitally important here. It is a point of 
second rang I think what is sometimes emphasized that minor 
causes can effect major results and microsociologically oriented 
sociologists should be cautious with macrosocioloqical con­
clusions because the latter are all to overgeneralizing or at 
least too fast drawn. (I think knowledge sociology makes itself 
a lot of difficulties when trying to omit more general social 
determinations onesidedly tries to explain by contingencies, 
exclusively by factors of short range. Put this way of doing 
microsociologically relevant knowledge sociology together with 
a one sided effort to take into account microsociological only 
social interactional efforts as social effects - say, the sci­
entists trial to fit into the acknowledged core of experts in 
the field - may even help to develop its self-caricature.) But 
the more important point with microsociology is that it makes 
the working of rationalists reconstruction really concrete.
(And, as Bloor made clear sometimes, the knowledge sociologist's 
reconstruction of the rationality of the event, the rational
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frame of the reasoning process may show the incorrect­
ness of the rationalist's reconstruction havinq stopped too ear­
ly in searchinq for further important differences in the re­
constructed arqumentation.)
Science and the cognitive effort should just be seen as 
one peculiar sort of socially formed activity. And social ac­
tivity is social practice by nature. Perhaps those perspectives 
within knowledge sociology can be seen the most progressive 
ones, the most promiseful ones that try to take into account 
this social practice nature of scientific cognition. As far as 
I see two different approaches try to utilize this practice 
perspective. The first identifies practice as something not 
fully rationalizable. If so then scientific reasoning should 
be seen as a genuine psychological item and persuasion as only 
partly based on rational argumentation. For it is not fully 
propositional. But the idea that the nature of scientific cog­
nition is social practice can also be utilized in a different 
way, too, when pointing out that cognitive activity always has 
its even in words inarticulable knowledge ingredients. This 
perspective leads to the rethinking of the "tacit knowledge" 
dimension of scientific knowledge from a sociological point of 
view.
But there is another possibility.of utilizing the mentioned 
perspective and that is I intend to follow here a bit more de­
tailed. We have dealt so far with conceptualisations of de­
scriptive art.* They aimed at the reconstruction of the as­
sumed rationality of scientific cognition or the reconstruc­
tion of how scientific cognition was constructed by its social 
milieu. The latter had critical potential without aiming at
*Knowledge sociology has so far mostly aimed at an explanative 
descriptive reconstruction. It concentrated on the refusal 
of the claim of the rationalist that the story of scientific 
cognition can be meaningfully reconstructed evaluating and 
comparing it to some aprioristic rationality models. But it 
is not necessary to reduce the set of possible tasks to the 
descriptive one.
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being of social practical-critical nature. But science itself 
and meta-scientific analysis, too are (conscious or uncon- 
cious) practice in them values, with social effect are set, 
realized, validated, reset, reevaluated an so on. This charac­
teristic may sometimes be strongly mediated to be seen evident­
ly, nevertheless the metaanalyst may have the task to reflect 
on, make conscious and be critical of this social value content 
of scientific cognition. Science and metascience are both types 
of ideologies, too and some sort of cognitive sociology should 
evaluatedly analyse this social value commitments of cognitive 
actions. That is the point where a new program of the theory 
of science should have its starting point. A normative theory 
of science (and hence a normative methodology) can only be 
based on the sociological analysis of modem science and can be 
hoped to be valid for modem science (as far as it is not 
changed) trying to make evaluations of alternatives of inves­
tigation. I think this type of analysis can not be imagined as 
just an application of some general theory of scientific growth, 
say e.g. that one that prefixes the essence of scientific cog­
nition in its problemsolving rationality.
Sal Restivo and Daryl Chubin seem to have given a promising 
characterisation of the task when they ask a general question 
as follows. "In what kind of world would what kind of epistemic 
activity lead an epistemic community to conclude that it was 
(.according) to its own definition (improving its model of the 
world and what are the implications for those inside and out­
side of the epistemic community?”) This practice perspective 
seems to be able to unify the normative and descriptive task.
The lastly mentioned perspective seems to relativize the 
perspective radically. It really does in some respect. And, ac­
cording to its proponents it does in that direction, too, that 
it includes the rather ad hoc characterisation "insight" in­
stead of the idea of "truth”. Knowledge systems are nothing but 
more or less successful "insights". This is the point where I 
would like to differentiate my point of view from theirs. Since
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I think that even when we acknowledge the validity of the know­
ledge sociological turn (in the meaning I have been trying to 
sketch throughout the present paper) we seem not allowed simply 
to neglect the acknowledgement of some sort of truth concep­
tion. The last part of the presentation tries to sketch this 
opinion.
It seems that knowledge sociologists pointed out success­
fully that there is nothing in scientific cognition that makes 
it apart from a full-blooded sociological analysis, an analysis 
of full scale. As a method of analysis sociology seems to have 
proved its right basically. But having developed this side of 
analysis, another side of the uniqueness of scientific cogni­
tion seems to have lost. To make the problem a bit clearer it 
is now necessary to bring into mind that all the perspectives 
developed so far have forgotten that modern science (since the 
mid-17th century) has became such a sort of practice, in rela­
tion to Nature, in which, if it was possible the external world 
has been simultaneously reproduced not only in mental but in 
mental and material models by which the "appropriateness" of 
the mental has been measured.* I suggest looking at science as 
something the fullest expressed, realized in the branches which 
can connect theoretical thinking with experimentation (even: 
with experimental production of their object).
Then science is to be seen as a joint effort in understand­
ing and transforming Nature both in mind an material reality. 
Theorists of science may have "forgotten" about this character­
istic in some way. The old prejudice has been prevailing until
*It is perhaps possible to argue (in the case of special types 
of knowledge) for the falsity of the commonly accepted pre­
conception that the practical success of knowledge utilization 
brings with itself nothing more argumentative power than 
instrumental validity. This demarcationism seems to be vased, 
at least partly, on a deeper one that keeps doing and under­
standing apart. Assuming that the natural world is immediate 
object of knowledge deprives philosophy of science of arguin 
for the thesis that practical success in transforming material­
ly the natural processess (into "material models" of these 
processes) can have argumentative power for more than the idea 
of a bare instrumental success.
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now that cognition is something to be characterised in separa­
tion from the material transformation of Nature.*
Put otherwise, cognition is made within the subject, in 
mind which is connected to the external world only outwardly. 
The conceptualisation of this sort of subject could be changed 
from the individual to the collective one, yet all this has not 
changed this sort of demarcationistic tendency in understanding 
cognition. And this failure seems to have the necessary conse­
quence that the cognitive practice of the collective subject 
had to be understood as nothing but one type of shared conven­
tion. It seems that the other way of conceptualizing our image 
of cognition has not been utilized until now, at least not in 
connection to the achievements of modern theory and cognitive 
sociology of science. I mean especially that mental models 
seem to reflect not Nature as such, but immediately our prac­
tically prepared material models. Pairs of the mental and mater- 
rial models have realized jointly the advancement of man 
Nature relation, the "success" of transformation of Nature by 
collective human practice.
It seems true, scientific cognition is tied to, informed 
by a complexity of social activities. But within them it is a 
special type of social activity, a material traneformatory 
effort with aiming at knowledge, unique in this meaning. All 
this, I think, should force us to rethink the sociological 
achievements. Nature, through the peculiar material practice 
of science, does influence coqnition in a very influential way, 
in comparison to other types of cognition. If this is true, we 
have to rethink the truthproblem. This rethinking should be 
oriented on the problem: How some sort of thinking about the 
characteristics of truth relation, realized in scientific cog-
*Other cases seem to be deducible from this main core. To make 
another remark there has not been place to analyse whether 
an argumentation based on the idea sketched here can give 
reasons for the idea that because material models "mediate" 
spontaneous natural processes hence something can be stated 
validly about how Nature per se is.
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tion, can be unified with the recently reached knowledge- 
sociological achievements.
It seems we are allowed to speak of the progress of the 
"appropriation" of Nature, even in a mental form, having been 
developing adequate mental models for the parts of the world 
which are successfully reproduced in our material practice. So 
the truth problem should be set within the joint problem of 
"appropriation" of Nature and objectification of our socially- 
historically acquired mental and material reproductive capacity. 
Some sort of "moderate" realism should then be brought back 
into the considerations without committing ourselves to being 
"arrogant" or "ignorant", as Newton-Smith suggested. Mentioning 
this possible perspective I do not want to forget about the 
logical problems raised by this assumption especially and by 
all sorts of "realism" in general. (To put just one: the rela­
tive indeterminatedness of the reference relation.) I only in­
sist on the idea that in the recent crisis we clearly need some 
further "new" visions of scientific cognition.
To sum up: The progress in the "sociological turn" seems 
partly not to have been running far enough in giving up old 
prejudices and so it has been necessarily overhasty in rela- 
tivizing scientific cognition. The social nature of scientific 
cognition, that informs it in historically varying ways, does 
not make disappear the determinations, rooted in Nature, that 
are effected on it, but it transforms them into socially di­
gested form.
Technical University
Budapest
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EXISTENCE, QUANTIFICATION AND THE MEDIAEVAL THEORY OF
AMPLIATION 
Gyula Klima
1. Introduction
(1) Bucephalus is dead
(2) What is dead does not exist 
Therefore,
(3) Bucephalus does not exist 
Therefore,
(4) something does not exist
In my opinion this is a conclusive argument for the thesis 
that something does not exist. As is well-known, however, many 
philosophers regard this thesis as paradoxical in a way, and, 
consequently, they would make several objections.to the simple 
reasoning that led to it above.
In what follows I firstly deploy some typical objections 
to this reasoning. After this I give replies to these objec­
tions. The informal discussion will be followed by the descrip­
tion of the syntax and semantics of a formal language, AMPL, 
which, in my opinion, can serve as a suitable frame of refer­
ence for handling the problems that occur in the course of the 
informal discussion. Ps the language AMPL is a certain exten­
sion of the language MPL I used in an earlier paper for re­
constructing mediaeval logical theories concerning extensional 
contexts,* I shall relate here the language AMPL to a mediae­
val theory concerning intensional contexts, namely to the 
theory of ampliation. This will be followed by a formal recon­
sideration of the introductory objections and replies. The pa­
per will end with some historical and philosophical concluding 
remarks.
*Klima CIO 3.
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2. Objections
1. In the arqument above, if conclusionC(3) is true, then 
it is false, therefore it is false. (By the "consequentia 
mirabilis": (pa'v.pfcs'x.p. ) For if a statement is true, then that 
which it is about must exist. (About something non-existent 
one cannot make a true statement.) So, if (3) is true, then 
Bucephalus exists. But so (3) is false. Therefore (3) is false, 
of necessity.*
2. In the whole argument existence is treated as a pred­
icate. But existence is not a predicate. For if it were, then, 
since a statement implies the existence of what it is about, 
all positive existential statements would be necessary, and 
all negative ones would be contradictory. But this is surely 
not the case: "There are extra-terrestrial intelligent beings" 
is contingent.**
3. "Exists" in the argument is used as if it were a first- 
level predicate. But it is a second-level predicate. So the 
argument is senseless. That existence is a second-level pred­
icate may be seen from the following: "'pink iguanas exist' 
means nothing more nor less than 'Something is a pink iguana'; 
since the latter is formed by wrapping the second-level pred­
icate 'something' around the first-level predicable 'is a pink 
iguana' it seems all but certain that the 'exist' in the for­
mer sentence must also be deemed a second-level predicate.”***
4. The inference from (3) is invalid. For "to be is to be 
the value of a bound variable", therefore, if (3) is true, 
then Bucephalus cannot be a value of a bound variable. So the 
bound variable in (4), if (4) is to be thought of as "For some
*Cf. Plato C171 236E-239B, Quine [193 pp. 1-2., Russell [253 
Linsky C113 pp. 1-2.
**Cf. Ayer C43 pp. 57-58., Kiteley [93 pp. 365-366.
***See Flint [73 pp. 131-132.
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x, x does not exist", cannot take up the value Bucephalus, and 
so, even if (3) is true, (4) may be false.*
5. The claim: "Something does not exist" is simply in­
consistent. For "Somethlnt does not exist" is equivalent to 
"There is something that does not exist" and this further to 
"There exists something that does not exist" and this is clear­
ly inconsistent.**
3. Replies
1. To the first objection we may give a twofold answer. 
First, we can point out that the rule "if a statement is true, 
then that which it is about must exist" holds only for positive 
statements. For a negative statement is true, iff the corre­
sponding positive statement is not true, i.e., if tertium non 
datur, is false. But the non-existence of its subject is just 
one of the possible reasons on account of which a positive 
statement may be false. (It is not true that the present King 
of France- is bald, just because there is no such a person.)
So, if its subject does not exist, i.e. if its subject term 
fails to refer to anything, then a negative statement is true. 
As the schoolmen put it: Negativa cuius subjectum pro nullo 
supponit est vera.*** Secondly, we may point out that one must 
distinguish between referring to what does not exist (non­
existence of the reference) and failing to refer altogether 
(failure of reference).**** As Wittgenstein says: "That is to 
confound the reference (Bedeutung) of the name with the bearer 
of the name. When Mr. N.N. dies, we say that the bearer of the
*Cf. Quine C203 p. 145., Routley C243 p. 133., Linskv 1113
pp. 110-111.
**See Parsons C143 p. 365.
***See e.g. Cckham C133 P.II. c.12. pp. 284-285., Buridan 
C 6 3 c.2., Albert of Saxony C13 Tr.4. c.24., Ashworth C33 
p. 145.
****See Linsky C113 p. 18., Parsons C143 p. 366.
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name dies, not that the reference dies. And it would be non­
sensical to say that, for if the name ceased to have reference, 
it would make nonsense to say 'Mr. N.N. is dead'."*
But we can quite sensibly say that Mr. N.N., or Bucephalus 
is dead. So in (1) the name "Bucephalus" refers to Bucephalus, 
even if Bucephalus, since perished, i.e. ceased to exist, does 
not exist. So here "Bucephalus" refers to something that does 
not exist. Therefore it is true that the reference of "Bucep­
halus", i.e. Bucephalus, does not exist.
2. "Bucephalus existed, then died, i.e. ceased to exist, 
and now does not exist." This is a perfect example of the use 
of existence as a contingent predicate of things. So any ar­
gument trying to demonstrate the slogan "Existence is not a 
predicate" is simply futile. The objection, as it proceeds 
from the false assumption that "a statement implies the exist­
ence of what it is about”, proves nothing.
3. Again, since the example above beyond being an example 
of contingent existence-predication makes also perfect sense, 
therefore, any argument trying to prove in genere the sense­
lessness of existence-predications is doomed to futility. The 
causa apparentiae in the objection lies in our liability to 
take "Something is a pink iguana" to mean the same as "Pink 
iguanas exist". Now, it is true that in most cases a statement 
of the form "Something is an F" is equivalent to "F's exist", 
or "an F exists". But this by no means implies that these two 
forms of statement are synonymous. What is more, in some cases 
"Something is an F" and "an F exists" are not even equivalent 
to each other.
For example, "Something (or, rather, somebody) is dead" is 
true, but "A dead (man) exists" is false.**
*Wittgenstein C303 I. 5*0. as quoted by Geach C83 p. 58.
**See again Ashworth C33 p. 143. and p. 145.
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4. Since to be a value of a bound variable is to be an 
element of the universe of discourse, and what can be referred 
to in a language is an element of the universe of discourse, 
therefore, the slogan "to be (or to exist) is to be the value 
of a bound variable" reduces to the claim that everything that 
can be referred to in a language exists. But this cannot be 
true already for an artificial modal language (as Nicholas 
Rescher pointed out, (x)(Ex) (Everything exists) leads neces­
sarily to (x )(oEx Ex) (Everything that can exist exists), i.e. 
to the unpalatable: a posse ad esse valet consequentia,* and
a fortiori it cannot be true for a natural language, as it was 
shown in the preceding replies. But so, since Bucephalus, even 
though does not exist, can be the value of a bound variable, 
therefore, if (3) is true, i.e. "x does not exist" is true for 
Bucephalus, then "For some x, x does not exist", i.e. "Some­
thing does not exist" must also be true.
5. In reply to the fifth objection first we should ask: 
on what grounds does one say that "There exists something that 
does not exist" is inconsistent? For if you analyse this sen­
tence as "For some x, x does not exist" (i.e. "Something does 
not exist"), then, provided that “exist" is not a necessarily 
universal predicate, as it was argued for above, it is 3urely 
not inconsistent.
It would however, be inconsistent if you analysed it on 
the analogy of, say, "There runs something that does not run", 
i.e., if you treated "exist" as a predicate in both of its oc­
currences in "There exists something that does not exist". For 
Then this sentence would be equivalent to "Something exists 
and does not exist". But in this case it cannot be thought to 
be equivalent to "Something does not exl3t". So, if "There 
exists something that does not exist" is analysed as equivalent 
to a contradiction, then it is not equivalent to "Something 
does not exist", and, on the other hand, if it is analysed as
*Rescher C231 p. 161.
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equivalent to "Something does not exist", then "There exists 
something that does not exist" is not equivalent to a contra­
diction.
Now, whether or not these objections or renlies are con­
vincing, in my view, depends on certain rather vaque and con­
flicting intuitions. In the following two sections, therefore,
I shall describe the syntax and semantics of a formal language, 
AMPL, which, I hope, will be of some help in clarifying these 
intuitions.
4. AMPL Syntax
The language AMPL is defined as follows. AMPL:=<C,P,V,T,F>. 
Here C: = {'v, X , = , 3,1,. ,a, (, )} , P is a denumerably infinite set 
of parameters, V is a denumerably infinite set of variables 
(proper variables, as I shall call them), T is the set of terms 
and F is the set of formulae of AMPL. P detailed: P^P^UP^, 
where pp is the set of predicate parameters and P1 is the set 
of individual parameters of AMPL. Note: Ppnc := {3}.
-j g  2* iT is defined as follows: T := P UV is the set of variables 
of AMPL. Var is defined in the following manner. Var := VUVr, 
where Vr is the set of restricted variables of AMPL. Vr is 
defined as follows.
If v€v and Av6F in which some occurrences of v are free, 
then fv.Av16vr , in which all occurrences of v are bound, and 
any occurrence of any other variable is free, iff it is free 
in Av.
No other strings of signs are elements of Vr.
The set of formulae is defined by the following clauses.
(FI) If t,,...,t €T and Pn6pp , then rPn(t. )... (t )"* €F (in case I n  i n
pn = 3, n=l), in which, for any i,j (l£i<n; l^j£n), if 
ti€var and tj6Vr, then any occurrence of t.^  which is not 
an occurrence of t^ in t^ is free, and any other occur­
rence of a variable is free, iff it is free in t^.
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(F2) If t1,t26T, then rt^ = t^GF, in which, for any i and j
(l<i<n; l£j<n), if t ^ V 337 and tj6Vr , then any occurrence 
of t.^  which is not an occurrence of t^ in t^ is free, 
and any other occurrence of a variable is free, iff it is
is free in t ..D
( F3 ) If t1,...,tn6T and Pn6PP , then r ( ~Pn ) ( tj_ ). . . ( tR )’eF, in
which the free occurrences of a variable are the same as 
those in rPn(t^)...(t )1.
(F4) If A,B6F, then r~(A)\ ra(A)\ and r(A&B)1 are elements of 
F, in which the free occurrences of a variable are the 
same as those in A or B.
(F5) If v£Var and AvGF in which some occurrences of v are free, 
then r(3v)(Av)16F and r(iv)(Av^eF, in which all occur­
rences of v are bound, and an occurrence of any other 
variable is free, iff it is free in Av.
No other strings of signs are elements of F.
Further connectives and the universal quantifier are
regarded as shorthands for the usual definitions. S.
S. AMPS Semantics
The definition of a model for AMPL runs as follows. 
==<U/S,a ,D,R>, where U and S are nonempty sets, a, is aAHrL S S
distinguished element of S, D is a function from S to the set 
of all subsets of U, i.e., if s6S, then D(s)cU, where D(s) may 
also be designated as Ds and R is a function assigning semantic 
values to the parameters of AMPL.
Intuitively, U is the universe of discourse of M, S is a 
set of situations or states of affairs, ag is the actual situ­
ation and D is the domain assignment of situations so that 
D(s), i.e. Dg is the domain of the situation a.
R is defined by the following clauses.
(Rl) If aeP1, then R(a)eu.
(R2) If Pn£PP , then RCp" ^ ^ .
(R3) R(3)s= U .
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Let us define further the extension of Pn in the situation s, 
Eg(Pn ) in the following manner. Eg(Pn ):= R(Pn )snDg . Given a 
model M, aj^essignment f is defined for proper variables as 
follows.
(f) If v€V, then f(v)6U .
Given an assignment f, for every situation s and for every 
subset B of U we define a restricted, assignment associated to 
f in the situation s, f B, for proper variables as follows,
(f _) If BcU and v€V, then F _(v)6B, if B#0, otherwiseSc — SB
fSB(v) = U •
An assignment in the situation s associated to the assignment
Tf is a function fg€(UU{U}) , i.e. a function from the set of 
terms to UU{U) satisfying the following conditions.
(fgl) If v6V, then fg(v) = f(v) .
(fg2) If aCP1, then fg(a) = R(a).
(f 3) If v£V and Av€F in which some occurrences of v are free,
then fs(rv.Avi) = fsEv (Av)(v),
M,fg
where , (Av) a subset of U, the extension of Av with respect 
rsto v in M according to f is defined in the following manner:
Eu e (Av) : = {ueU: I Av I , ... = t}, where f0Cv:u3 is the same asM,1^ IgLVIUJ S
fs except that to v it assigns u, i.e.
I" fg(w), if w f v 
fgCv:u3(w) = J
[u otherwise,
and |Av|. = t, which reads "Av is true according to f " is
s s
defined by the following clauses.
(Tl) If tlf...,t 6T and Pn€PP , then
|rPn (t1)...(t )’|f = t, iff <fg(t1),...,fg(tn )>6Eg(Pn ) .
s
(T2) If t.,...,t €T and Pn6Pp , then ± n
|r(~pn )(t1)...(tn )'1|f = t, iff <fg(t1),...,fg(tn )>eD" -
90
(T3) If t£T, then
lr3(t)1 If = t, iff fs(t)6Ds/=Es(3)
(T4) If tx,t2eT, then
lrti = t^lf = t, iff fs(ti) = ^ U
s
(T5) If A€F, then
lr~(A)1lf = t, iff IAIf f t .  
s s
(T6) If A,B£F, then
Ir(A&B)1 If = t, iff IAIf = t and IB If = t 
rs rs rs
(T7} If A£F, then
lra(A)'llj = t, iff there is an s' such that IA1^ , = t. 
s s
(T8) If v£Var and Av€F in which some occurrences of v are 
free, then
Ir(3v)(Av)1 Ic = t, iff there is an assignment in s g 
fs s
such that g differs from f at most in the value of v s s
and IAv|fg[v;gs;l(v)3 = t .
Note-. If v€Var, f and g are assignments, s and s' are situa­
tions, fg, is an assignment in s' associated to f and gg is an 
assignment in s associated to g, then
f fsf(w), if v f w
fs' Cv 1 gs(v > -1 (w) = ]
l 9s(y ) otherwise
that is, fg ,Cv:gg<v)3 is the same as fg, except that to v it 
assigns the same value as gg.
(T9) If v€Var and AvGF in which some occurrences of v are 
free, then
Ir(ív)(Av)1 If = t, iff there is exactly one gg such
that g differs from f at most in the value assigned to s s
v and gs(v) f U, and IAvlf Cv;g = t .
91
Truth in a model M is defined as follows.
(T) If A6F, then IAIM = t, iff there is an f such that 
.A,f = t. 
as
If A6F, then A is eatiefiable, iff there is a model M such 
that IAIM = t. A formula is valid, iff its negation is not 
satisfiable. If A,B€F, then A=i>B, iff ^S-B1 is not satis- 
fiable.
6, AMPL and the Theory of Ampliation
a, the intensional operator of AMPL, is called - barbarous­
ly enough - the ampliator of AMPL. As to its intuitive meaning, 
it has no single natural language equivalent, instead, in 
several applications it may serve for several intensional op­
erators .
For example, in modal contexts it may serve for the famil­
iar possibility operator, ('0' or 'M'), while in tensed con­
texts it may serve for the past or the future tense operator 
('P' or 'F'). Of course, accordingly, the set of situations S 
is to be interpreted as the set of possible, past or future 
situations.
As an indication of the actual intended interpretation I 
shall use subscripts to a. (Even if these stricto sensu do not 
belong to the vocabulary of AMPL.) For example, for the sen­
tence "A white thing can be not white" I shall write 
'(3x.Wx)aM~(W(x.Wx))', while for the sentence "A white thing 
will be not white" I shall write '(3x.Wx)aF~(w(x.Wx))'. Of 
course, in "mixed contexts", where e.g. both tense and modal 
operators are involved (as in an argument concerning the fu­
ture contingents) the single a would not suffice. In such a 
case further operators should be introduced, and, accordingly, 
the set of situations should be further specified. (E.g. in 
the case of tensed modal contexts the elements of S should be 
ordered pairs of time points and possible worlds à la Montague.) 
But for our present purposes the single a with its multifarious
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intuitive interpretation will suffice. For with the aid of o 
in AMPL we can represent that conunon feature of intensional 
sentences that an adequate statement of their truth conditions 
involves reference to situations beyond the actual one, and 
that, accordingly, it contains (at least implicit) reference 
to individuals beyond the actual ones.
Now, according to the mediaeval analysis of sentences of 
this kind, the common feature of these sentences is that the 
range of reference of their subject terms is extended, ampliat- 
ed beyond the sphere of actual entities to several past, fu­
ture or possible non-actual ones. For example, while in the 
sentence "A man runs" (Homo currit) the subject term "man" re­
fers to what is a man, in the sentence "A man ran" (Homo cu- 
currit) it refers to what is or was a man, so that according 
to this analysis the sentence "A man ran" could be true even 
if actually there were no men.*
Now this analysis can be represented in AMPL as follows.
(Bx.Mx v ap(Mx))ap(R(x.Mx v ap(Mx))), i.e. a thing that is a 
man or was a man ran (quod est homo vel fuit homo cucurrit). 
This might be called the common analysis of a sentence contain­
ing an ampliative verb (verbum habens vim arapliandi)** But, as 
it is well-known concerning modal sentences, the mediaevals 
also made a distinction between de dicto and de re sentences, 
or de dicto and de re readings of sentences containing such 
ampliative verbs.
For example, let us take the following sentences.
(1) A white thing can be balek (Album potest esse nigrum)
(2) A thing that is white can be black (Quod est album potest 
esse nigrum)
(3) It is possible that a white thing is black (Possibile est 
album esse nigrum)***
*See e.g. Buridan C53 c.6. p. 349.
**For a "catalogue" of these see Buridan ibid.
***See Buridan C6D pp. 68-69., Albert of Saxony Cl] Tr.2. c.10. 
ff. 15-16. and Tr.5. c.4. f. 40.
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(2) is a de re modal sentence, and (3) is a de dioto modal 
sentence. (2) can also be regarded as the de re, while (3) as 
the de diatO'reading of (1); or, according to another termi­
nology, (2) can be regarded as expressing the content of (1) 
in sensu diviso, while (3) can be regarded as doing the same 
in sensu composite/. Of course, if we take (2) and (3) as ex­
pressing different readings of (1), then we must hold that (1) 
is ambiguous, and, consequently, we cannot hold that there is 
a single common analysis of (1). If, on the other hand, we ac­
cept that (1) has a single common analysis, then we cannot 
take (2) and (3) as expressing different senses or readings of 
(1), instead, we must regard them as being different sentences 
in their own right.*
Which way we choose, I think, is a matter of convention.
What concerns us more in the present context, however, is 
that the differences of (1), (2) and (3) can be brought out 
very clearly im AMPL. For the sake of simplicity interpreting 
"black" as "not-white", we can write:
(1') Ox.Wx v o (Wx))l« ((~W)(X .Wx) V a (Wx)))M M  M
(2') (3x.Wx)(aM ((~W)(x.Wx)))
(3') aM ((3x.Wx)((-W)(x.Wx))) .
Now as it is easily seen, while (2') is satisfiable, (3')
is not. For (2') is true in a model M, iff there is an f inasM such that (2') is true in f3s in M. But (2') is true in
•ftAs from the texts referred to above is quite clear, this was 
the attitude taken by Buridan and Albert of Saxony. In his 
Tractatus de Fallaciis, Buridan explicitly states: "Ista 
enim propositio 'laboráns sanabatur' non est distinguenda: 
habet enim unicum sensum qui explanandus est per propositio- 
nem unam de disiuncto subiecto sc. istam 'qui est vei fuit 
laboráns sanabatur'." See Pinborg C163 p. 155.
On the other hand, Ockham writes thus: "Et ideo quaelibet 
talis propositio est distinguenda, eo quod talis terminus 
potest supponere pro his quae sunt vel pro his quae fuerunt." 
See Ockham C133 P.I. c.72. p. 216.
Again, for a "catalogue" of the technical terms for such and 
closely related distinctions, see St. Thomas Aquinas C27 3 I. 
q.14. a.13. ad 3-um and 1283 lb.l. c.67. n.10.
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an fag in M, iff there is a gSg in M such that It differs from
f at most in the value assigned to 'x.Wx' and 
s
laM ((~W)(x.Wx))lf [x>Wx:g (x.wx)] = t • Let such a gg be
â â SS S
such that g (x.Wx) = d. (Of course, by (f 3), dSE (W).) NowS äs s
laM ((~W)(x.Wx))lfa [x>Wx;ga (x.Wx)] = t, iff there is an s'
such that l(~W)(x.Wx)lf [x.Wx:ga (x.Wx)] = t, i.e. iff there
is an s' such that fg,[x.Wx:g (x.Wx)](x.Wx) = gg (x.Wx) =
as as
= d€Dg, - E ,(W). So, in a model M in which there is an s'
such that there is a d€E, (w) which is also an element ofas
Ds, -Eg,(W) (2') is true. But since there is such a model,
(2') is satisfiable. On the other hand, (3') is true in a model
M, iff there is an fag such that (3') is true in fag in M.
Now, (3') is true in an f„ iff there is an s' such thatas
I(3x.Wx)((~W)(x.Wx))I, = t. But this condition is satisfied
r s 'in an s' iff there is a gs, such that it differs from fs, at
most in the value assigned to 'x.Wx' and
I(~W)(x.Wx)I, r „ , t, ,1 = t .fs,[x.Wx:gs ,(x.Wx)]
But in any M, there cannot be such a gg, , so (3') can be 
true in no M. For R(W) in a model M is either empty or not.
If it is, then - since in this case for any s' E ,(W) = 0, and, 
therefore, for any g, gg,(x.Wx) = U , for any gg, 
l(~W)(x.Wx)tfg[x-Wx!gsf(x>Wx)] * t. (Since for any g,
gg,(x.Wx) = U$Dg, - Eg,(w).)
If, however, R(W) in not empty, then for any s' in which 
Eg,(W) f 0, for any gq, gg/x.Wx)6Eg,(K). So, for any gg, 
gs ,(x.Wx)$Dg , - Eg ,(w). So, again, for any ggi 
'(~W)(x.Wx)lfs>[x>Wx:gs/(x>Wx)j * t. Therefore, for any model
M, there is no such a gs, that would make (~W)(x.Wx) true in 
an fs, in M. So there is no model M in which (3r) is true. 
Therefore it is not satisfiable.
Now, since (2*) is satisfiable, and (3') is not, therefore 
r(2')&~(3'P is satisfiable, i.e. an argument from (2') to
(3') is fallacious. In particular, such an argument from a 
proposition in senau diviso to a proposition in sensu compo­
site? would be a case of a fallacy termed by the mediaevals as 
fallacia compositionis et divisionis.
A notable example of this fallacy would be an argument from
(4) It is possible that the number of the planets is less than 
seven
to
(5) That number which is the number of the planets is possibly 
less than seven
That is, from
(4') aM ((1 x.Nx)(L(x.Nx)(s))) 
to
(5') (lx.Nx)aM ((L(x.Nx)(s))
(Vocabulary: 'N' = "is the number of the planets"; 'L' =
= 'less than"; 's' = "seven")
Clearly, (4') does not imply (5'), and so they cannot be 
regarded to be equivalent. So even if the argument from (5) 
with
(6) The number of the planets is nine 
to
(7) Nine is possibly less than seven
is valid, still as (5) is false, (7) may also be false. On the 
other hand, the argument from the true (4) with (6) to (7) is 
not valid. So the falsity of (7) is in no conflict with the 
truth of (4). Therefore, if we carefully distinguish between 
the true de dicto C(or opaque, (4)3 and the false de re Cor 
transparent, (5)3 readings of "The number of the planets is 
possibly less than seven", then, contrary to Quine's claim,* 
no inconvencience follows from the "essentialism" involved in 
(5), or in its existential generalization, the false
(8) A number which is the number of the planets is possibly 
less than seven
(8') (3x.Nx)aM((L(x.Nx)(s)))
*
Quine C203 p. 148.
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(Of course, (8') follows from (5'), but does not follow 
from (4'), neither is it implied by (9') a„( ( 3x.Nx)(L(x.Nx)(s))) - 
- (9) It is possible that a number which is the number of the 
planets is less than seven,)
According to Quine, another inconvencience which follows 
from "Aristotelian essentialism" is that, at least on Quine's 
interpretation of this view, the same attribute of an object, 
depending on which description of the object is considered, 
must be regarded both as essential and not essential to the ob­
ject,* For example, Socrates' wife is necessarily Socrates' 
wife. So being Socrates' wife is an essential attribute of 
Socrates' wife. But Xanthippe is not necessarily Socrates' wife 
(she might have married another man), so, being Socrates' wife 
is not an essential attribute of Xanthippe. But Xanthippe is 
Socrates' wife. So, being Socrates' wife is both essential and 
not essential to the same person, namely, Xanthippe.**
Now this line of reasoning involves two fallacies at once. 
One is the already familiar fallacia compoaitionis et diviaionia, 
and the other is an ignoratio elenohi. The ignoratio consists in ignor­
ing the proper definition of what it is to be an essential at­
tribute of something. The fallacia compositionis et divÍ8Íonie 
(hand in hand with the above-mentioned ignoratio) is involved 
in the transition from "Socrates' wife is necessarily Socrates' 
wife” to "Being Socrates' wife is essential to Socrates' wife".
Now, let us introduce a necessity operator in AMPL in the 
following way:
(DN) lpN(A)-'lf = lr-(aM (~(A)))'llf
As one can see, the following formula is not valid.
(10') N( (ix .Wx)(w(x.Wx) ))
(10) It is necessary that Socrates' wife is Socrates' wife 
(Vocabulary: 'W' = "is Socrates' wife")
*Quine C213 p. 199. For an informal criticism of Quine's 
original argument, see Rasmussen C223.
**For the sake of formal simplicity I have changed Quine's 
original example, the cycling mathematician. See note above.
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For in a model M in which there is a situation s in which 
Eg(W) = 0 (i.e. in which Socrates has no wife) (lo') is false.
The following (de dicto) formula, however, is valid.
(11' ) N( ( t x .Wx ) ( 3(x.Wx) )=>(Tx.Wx) (w (x .Wx ) ) )
(11) It is necessary that if Socrates' wife exists, then she 
is Socrates' wife
(Or, more smoothly: It is necessary that if Socrates has a 
wife, then she is Socrates' wife - whoever Socrates' wife may 
be. )
But the corresponding de re formula is not valid.
(12') (ix.Wx)(N(3(x.Wx)o W(x.Wx)))
(12) Of that person, who actually is Socrates' wife, it is 
necessarily true that if she exists, then she is Soc­
rates' wife
(i.e., this is true of Xanthippe)
For in a model M in which there is exactly one d, such 
that d€Eas(W), and there is an s such that d€Ds but d^Es(W) 
(i.e., in which Xanthippe exists, but is not Socrates' wife) 
(12') is false.
Now a predicate of an object is essential to this object, 
iff it is necessary that if the object exists, then the pred­
icate is true of the object.*
This definition can be introduced in AMPL in the follow­
ing way
(DNe) I rNe ( P ( t ) )1 lf = ll‘N(3(tj3P(t))1 lfrs rs
As it is easily seen, the argument from (12') to
*It is interesting to see that Rasmussen, while criticizing 
Porphyry for being unfaithful to Aristotle's original 
doctrine, embraces the same definition (see Rasmussen C223 
p. 323.), which, however, is a quite straightforward con­
sequence of Porphyry's definition of an accident. As it was 
cited by the mediaevals (in Boethius' translation): "quod 
adest et abest praeter subiecti corruptionem", Cf. Ockham 
C13 D P.I. c,25. pp. 81-84,
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(13') (1 x.Wx) (Ne(w(x,Wx) ) )
(13) Of the person, who is Socrates' wife it is essentially
true that she is Socrates' wife 
is valid, still, as (12) is false, (13) may be, and actually 
is, false too.
But the argument from (11') to (13') is not valid.
So the transition from the true (11) to the false (13) is 
clearly fallacious. Therefore the argument proves nothing 
against Aristotelian essentialism.
Now in the foregoing formulations we find a strange use of 
the symbol 3. What justifies this queer use is, in my view, 
the following metatheorem.*
(EQ) If vEV and Av6F in which some occurrences of v are
free, then for every model M
lr (3v)(Av)'1 |M = lr3(v.Av)’'lM , iff eX (Av ) = 0 orM 'as
EM a (Av)nDa * 0 ' 
f s s
EM =, (Av) != - eX| , (Av), in which <p is the
M,as fa ^ <pa M' a ass s s
set of all assignments in ag in M.
Proof
To simplify the proof first I prove two lemmas.
Lemma 1. Ir(3v)(Av)1|M = t, iff eY. (Av) ^ 0.M'as
Proof
a. Suppose eX (Av ) # 0. Then there is an f_ such that M,as as
eX f (Av) = {u€U : I Av I f Cv;u;| = t} # 0. So there is a 
f as as
uGEjJ , (Av) such that |a v |, r - = t. Therefore, there is 
ras rasLV-UJ
a g, such that |a v |, r = t and g is the same as
as rasLV"^as'v 'J r as
f except that to v it assigns u. But so |(3v)(Av)"| = t.ac
where
b. Suppose eX „ (Av) = 0 n »as
Then there is no f_ such thataS
f (Av) # 0. Therefore, for any gas |Av|f Cv.g (vj3 f t. 
= as as
Q o & o d «So |r(3v)(Av)1 |M ^ t.
*Cf. the last two sentences of Section 7.
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Lemma 2. Ir3(v.Av)1 IM = t, iff E^ (Av)nD + O.
M 'as as
Preof
a. Suppose (Av)DD ^ 0. Then there is an f suchM,as as as
that E^ , (Av) «= {u6U:|Av |„ p , = t}CID ^ 0. So there is 
M 'ras ias11171113 as
an f such that f ( V a v1 ) = f (Av)(v)€Das • So
Ir3(v.Av)1 |M = t. S
b. Suppose (Av)flD = 0. Then there is no f such
M »as as as
that E^ , (Av) = {u€U: IAvIr r . = t)nD = 0. So thereM,fas rascv:u;l as
is no f such that f ('v.Av1)6D . So Ir3(v.Av)1 |M ^ t.
as as
Q.e.d.
Now, suppose that 1. E^ (Av) + 0 and 2. E^ (Av)riD ^ 0.ra,as M,as as
Then, by 1. and lemma 1. |r(3v)(Av)1 |M = t and, by 2. and lem­
ma 2. |r 3(v.Av)7 |M 0 t.
Suppose further that 1. E^ (Av) = 0 or 2. E^ (Av)flD ^ 0.
M 'as M 'as as
From 1. by lemma 1. it follows that |r ( 3v) (Av)7 I1' ^ t.
From 1. it also follows that E^ (Av)flD =0. Therefore, by
M »as as
lemma 2. also |r3(v.Av)1|M # t.
From 2. by lemma 2. it follows that |r3(v.Av)1 |M = t. From
2. it also follows that E^ (Av) $ Therefore, by lemma 1.
as
also Ir(3v)(Av)11M = t.
And this completes the proof.
The significance of this metatheorem is that it shows the 
close connection, but without blurring the distinction, be­
tween an existential statement and an existential, or perhaps 
it is better to say, a particular quantification.
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What metatheorem (EQ) actually says is that if the actual
extension of the ooen sentence (E^ (Av )) involved in theM,as
quantification and in the restricted variable of the existen­
tial statement is not ampliated to non-actual individuals, 
then these two forms of statement are equivalent, i.e. inter­
changeable ealva veritate, but if it is ampliated to non-ac­
tual individuals and does not contain actual ones, then they 
are not equivalent.
For example, in virtue of metatheorem (EQ) the following 
formulae are equivalent.
(14') (3x)(Cx)
(15') 3(x.Cx)
And this is how it should be. Clearly, the sentence
(14) Something is a centaur
is equivalent to
(15) A centaur exists*
This is why we are entitled to use, even in our logical
practice, the types of statements represented by (14') and 
(15') interchangeably.
But let us take the following two sentences:
(16) Something is destroyed
(17) A thing that is destroyed exists**
These are clearly not equivalent.
*0r "There is a centaur" or "There exists a centaur". I do 
not believe that these sentences are totally synonymous.
Nor do I believe, however, that "There is ..." or "There 
exists ..." can never carry exactly the same idea as 
"Something is...". But for the present I am only concerned 
with the ouneeptual difference between existence and 
quantification, with no special regard to linguistic form.
**In this sentence "thing" is not to be thought of as a
predicate, but as a natural language equivalent of a proper 
variable. See Appendix.
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Let us Introduce a distinguished predicate 'D' ("is de­
stroyed"] in AMPL in the following manner.
(D) |rD(t)n |f = |ra (3(t) S ~(3(t))'l|f
s s
(i.e., a thing is destroyed, iff it existed and does not 
exist.)*
Now with this interpretation of 'D' the following formulae 
are not equivalent:
(16') (3x)(Dx)
(17') 3(x.Dx)
For
(18') (3x)(ap(3(x)) t ~(3(x))) (Something existed and does
not exist) is evidently not equivalent to
(19') 3(x .ap(3(X)) & —(3(x)))
(A thing that existed and does not exist exists]
Actually (19') is inconsistent, i.e. not satisfiable, while 
(18') is satisfiable.
And this is why we cannot use (16) and (17) interchangeably.
7. Objections and replies reconsidered
After this rather prolonged overview of how AMPL is sup­
posed to work, I think it is time to see how it resolves the 
informal objections listed at the beginning of this paper. The 
main argument can be formalized as follows.
(1') Db
(2') (Vx.Dx)(—(3(X.Dx)))
O') —( 3b)
(4') (3x)(—(3x))
*0f course, accordingly, the definition of Es(Pn ) is to be 
understood with the exception of 'D'.
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(Vocabulary: 'b' = "Bucephalus"; 'D' = "dead".)
The argument Is valid.
The first objection, as the reply rightly states, is a 
blatant non eequitur. From -(3b) it does not follow that 3b. In 
general, from ~(Pa) it does not follow that 3a.
The second objection, again, assuming the false principle:
'-(Pa)' => '3a', proves nothing.
An analogous true principle would be the following:
'(~P)(a )' => '3a' . (Or better: 'Pa v (~P)(a)' => '3a'; cf. 
Strawson's existence-presupposition.*) The interesting case of 
which is '(~3)(a)' => '3a', which shows the inconsistency of 
'(-3)(a)' ("a is nonexistent"). But this does not show the in­
consistency of '~(3a)' ("a does not exist").
To the third objection the reply is evident from the re­
sults of the preceding section. The ecruivalence of "Something 
is a pink iguana" with "Pink iguanas exist" is not sufficient
to show that existence is a quantifier, a second-level predi­
cate.
In reply to the fourth objection I can simply point to 
the fact that the inference from (3') to (4') is valid in AMPL. 
Of course, the construction of AMPL in itself is such that it 
involves the denial of Quine's slogan. For this denial, how­
ever, I can find no better justification than the simple fact 
that we do quantify over individuals that do not exist. Just 
consider "Some of the things which existed before the Second 
World War do still exist, but some do not".
Lastly, the fifth objection, as the reply states, rests on 
a confusion between '(3x)(~(3x))' and '3(x.~(3x))' (or the 
equivalent '(3x.~(3x))(3(x.-(3x)))*, the former of which is 
satisfiable, while the latter is not, and so the latter is equi­
valent to '(3x)(3x * —(3x))'. I think it is also worth noticing 
that while in '(3x)(~(3x))' the first occurrence of '3' is a
*Cf. Linsky CUD p. 90.
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quantifier and the second one is a predicate, in '3(x.~(3x))' 
the same symbol functions as a predicate in both of its occur­
rences.
8. Concluding remarks
In the preceding sections I investigated the interconnec­
tions between the notions of existence and quantification with 
the help of the interpreted language AMPL. The basic result of 
these investigations, precisely formulated in metatheorem (EQ), 
is that while in purely extensional contexts, where no refer­
ence is made to non-actual individuals, an existential state­
ment and an existential (particular) quantification (exist­
entially quantified statement) are interchangeable salva veri- 
tate, the same does not necessarily hold for non-extensional 
contexts.
Now, I think, it is for this reason that in mathematical 
logic, where there is no need of, indeed, no place for, a dis­
tinction between actual and non-actual elements of the universe 
of discourse, the notion of existence could be analysed in 
terms of existential quantification. (Such and such a number 
exists, iff some number is such and such.) But this analysis, 
backed up by the Kantian tradition on the one hand, and by the 
amazing successes of mathematical logic on the other, led to 
an overall identification of the two notions. This situation, 
however, unavoidably led to certain "anomalies" in the logical 
analysis of non-extensional contexts.*
But as soon as we realize the proper connection between 
the two distinct notions, most of our most recalcitrant puzzles 
get solved. Not all, however.
*For an imposing list of these "anomalies" and an abundance 
of "epicycles", so to speak, "to save the phenomena" see 
Williams C293.
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On the preceding pages I have taken my examples from modal 
and tensed contexts. I have also indicated how AMPL could be 
extended to cover also mixed contexts.
There are, however, several further intensional contexts, 
e.g. those created by intentional verbs.* One of the main 
characteristic features of these verbs is that they may be 
true of objects that do not exist.
Now, let us introduce into the language AMPL an intentional 
predicate 'Pa' in the following manner.
In any model M E (Pa) = R(p“ ), for any s. s s
An ampliated assignment in the situation s associated to 
the assignment f, f° is defined in the following way.
^ s 1’ fs(a) » V a>
< V >  fs(v) - fs(v)
(fs3) f“(rv.Av"*) = fs(rv.a(Av)1 )**.
Let (Tl) be modified so that it concern only elements of 
Pp-{'pa '}. And for Pa let us formulate the following clause.
There are even further (and broader) intensional contexts, 
like the context of a myth, legend or any fiction. (Or, for 
that matter, the context "in the legend".) These all may be 
represented, through some rroDer modification of a m p l , by a 
situation s and a corresponding special a which "takes over" 
the discourse from as into that s. In general, here I take 
sides with Leonard Linsky, who writes:
"I would not, in my own ontology, divide objects into ideal 
objects which subsist and real ones which exist, but into ob1 
jects which are, e.g., characters in fiction, legendary 
figures, mythological figures, comic strip characters, make- 
believe figures, as well as abstractions, mathematical ob­
jects, concepts, etc." See Linsky [111 p. 20.
ftft
Note-. fgs,(v), if v = w
fgCv:gg,(v)3(w) = ■<
f°(w) otherwise s
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(T1X ) lrp“(ti)‘llfs = t, iff fgít^eE^p“ )
Now, with these formulations at hand we can see that from
(1) I seek a unicorn
(1') Pa(x.Ux)
it does not follow that
(2) Something that is a unicorn is such that I seek it
(2') (3x.Ux)(pQ(x.Ux))
Neither does it follow that
(3) Something is a unicorn
(3') (3x)(0x)
nor that
(4) A unicorn exists
(4') 3(x.Ux)
These do not follow, because (1') may be true in a model M in which
E (0) = 0, i.e. in which unicorns do not exist, but in which 
asthere is an s, such that Eg(U) ^ <t> and there is a d€Eg(U),
such that d6E (Pa ) = R(Pa ). And this is possible because 
a asE (P ) may extend beyond D , i.e. because such a predicate as ascan be true of anything that can be referred to, with no re­
gard to whether it exists. And this is so, because such pred­
icates signify certain acts of the mind, which, by means of 
its abstract concepts, can think of things indifferently wheth­
er they exist or not.
As Buridan's pupil, Albert of Saxony puts it:
"All verbs, even in the present tense, which of their 
very nature can concern future, past and possible things 
as well as present ones (habent naturam transeundi super 
rém ita futuram vei praeteritam vel possibilem sicut 
super praesentem) ampliate their terms to all times, 
future, past and present, like these: think, know, mean 
and the like. And what accounts for this is that a 
thing can be thought of without any difference of time
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(sine differentia aliqua temporis), sc. abstracted 
from any place or time. And so, when a thing is thought 
of in this way, then a thing which was, or will be, or 
can be may be thought of as well as a thing which is. 
Therefore, if I have the common concept from which we 
take (a quo sumitur) this name 'man', then I can think 
indifferently of all men, past, present and future.
And this is why these verbs can concern past or future 
things as well as present ones."*
There remain, however, problems in connection with intentional 
verbs which can not be handled even with this extended appa­
ratus of AMPL. Such is e.g. the problem of non-interchangeabil­
ity of identicals in the context of such verbs.
For example, the following argument is not valid:
(i) You do not know the man with his face covered
(ii) The man with his face covered is your father 
Therefore
(iii) you do not know your father**
Now, for a solution of this sophism we need some more 
sophisticated devices, namely the devices of the mediaeval the­
ory of appellation?**But for a reconstruction of this theory 
first we need a reconstruction of a more basic mediaeval the­
ory, the inherence theory of predication.11*** *
*Albert of Saxony Cll Tr.2. c.lo. 8a regula.
**Cf. Aristotle 123 ch.24. 179a27-179b33. For this version 
of the sophism see Lucian's Philosophies for Sale, ch.22-3.
***See Buridan C63 pp. 59-83. esp. pp. 72-74.
****The job will be done in my paper currently being prepared - 
"The Inherence Theory of Predication."
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APPENDIX
In note 22 above I asked the reader to understand the word 
"thing" in "A thinq that is destroyed exists" not as a pre­
dicate, but as a natural language equivalent of a proper vari­
able. Let me explain why.
If we understood "thing" as a predicate in this sentence, 
then the AMPL equivalent of the sentence in question, one might 
think, should be something like this.
(i) 3(x.Tx S Dx]
But, in my view, this formulation is mistaken. For just 
like a fictitious centaur is not something that is a centaur 
and is fictitious, so a thing that is destroyed is not some­
thing that is a thing (a being) and is destroyed. (Ens et res 
convertuntur.) Formally, the problem is this.
If 'T'epp , then E (T)cD . for any s. So for any f ,S S
E* , (Tx)cD . But given the definition of 'Dx', for any f M, is —  s a
E* * (Dx)nE* , (Tx) = E* , (TX S Dx) = 0. But so, for any f , M,rs M,rs M t r s
fs(x.Tx * Dx) = fgEX , Dx)Cx) = U. And so, even
M 'fs
(ii) Ox.Tx S Dx)ap( 3(x.Tx S Dx)) 
i.e. on the intended reading,
(iii) A thing that is destroyed existed 
could not possibly be true.
So we cannot take (ii) as being a correct formalization of 
(iii), or, conversely, we cannot take (iii) as being a correct 
reading of (ii). Indeed, a correct reading of (ii) would be 
rather this.
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(iv) Something that is a thing (a being) and is destroyed 
existed
And this surely cannot be true. But, then, what would be the 
correct formalization of (iii)?
For an answer to this Question we need a slight modifica­
tion of AMPL. First, in its syntax, we should permit restricted 
variables to be the operator variables of other variables. 
Secondly, we should work out the semantics for the newly got 
variables that makes possible the distinction between, say, a 
fictitious centaur and something (an x) that is a centaur and 
is fictitious.
The required modification is served by the following 
clauses.
Syntax
If vGVar and Av€F in which some occurrences of v are free, 
then rv.Av'1 EVr , in which all occurrences of v are bound and an 
occurrence of any other variable is free, iff it is free in Av.
Semantics
(fgB)* If BcU and v6Var, then fgB(v)eB, if B f <J), otherwise
W v) = °*
(fs3)* If v6Var and Av€F in which some occurrences of v are 
free, then
fS(rV-AV) = fsEv (Av^v> ,
where
EM,fs(Av) != ígs'(v)eü! lAvlfgCv:gg,(v)l = t K  (Here c’s'e«’' the 
set of all assignments in all situations.)
(f“3)* If v€Var and Av€P in which some occurrences of v are 
free, then
fg(rv. Av"1) = fs(rv.a(Av)1) .
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Now with these definitions at hand we can give as an answer to 
the above question the following formula.
(vi) (3x.Tx.D(x.Tx))ap(3(x.Tx.D(x.Tx)))
Substituting the definiens of 'Dx' we get
(vii) (3x.Tx.ap(3(x.Tx))*-(3(x.Tx)))ap(3(x.Tx.«p (3(x.Tx))S 
S~(3(x.Tx))))
that is
(vili) A thing that existed and does not exist existed 
And this is surely true.
Pari ratione the following sentence
(ix) A fictitious centaur is fictitious
that is,
(x) Pa(x.Cx.P°(x.Cx))
(Vocabulary: 'pa ' := "fictitious", 'c' := "centaur") is true. 
But the following sentence,
(xi) A fictitious centaur is a centaur
that is
(xii) C(x.Cx.Pa(x.Cx))
there being no centaurs, not even fictitious ones, is false.
So even if a fictitious centaur is not a centaur, a destroyed 
thing is not a thing, a dead man is not a man, a potential 
being is not a being, still, these are fictitious, destroyed, 
dead and potential, respectively. See Peter of Spain C153 pp. 
158-9. "Et gaudeo haec intellexisse" (Buridan C63 p.31.)
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ON THE HIDDEN ARISTOTELIAN THERMODYNAMICS
Katalin Martinás and László Ropolyi
Aristotle's ideas appear in modern physics, too. Neverthe­
less we think that the similarity between Aristotelian and mod­
ern physics is more important and more fundamental than it is 
usually supposed. The reason why this deep similarity is never 
recognized is what might be called the "mechanicist interpre­
tation” of Aristotelian physics. According to this interpreta­
tion, which is prevalent in the standard textbooks on the his­
tory of physics, Aristotle's physics is essentially a kind of 
mechanics. As a result, Aristotelian physics is reduced to an 
immature or even primitive form of Newtonian mechanics. We 
think, however, that the mechanicist interpretation does not 
do justice to Aristotle's complex and highly organized system 
of thought.
We shall break with this tradition in pursuit of an inter­
pretation which leans more toward thermodynamics. In doing so 
it is not our wish to gloss over the distinctions between the 
Aristotelian and thermodynamic concepts. We are well aware that 
there is an incommensurable gap between Aristotelian physics 
and macroscopic phenomenological thermodynamic^ and the fact 
that while centuries of reflection on Aristotelian physics 
figured prominently in the development of today's mechanics, 
no such activity can be observed in thermodynamics. That is why 
any thermodynamic interpretation would seem startling beside the 
mechanistic one which wins universal acceptance. Although ther­
modynamic interpretations may at first glance appear unhistori- 
cal, they put the history of thermodynamic concepts in new 
perspective.
1. On the dynamical aspects of Aristotle3 8 natural philosophy
It is an important feature of Aristotle's natural philoso­
phy that nature exhibits an all-embracing universal order. This
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is not simply given. It is continuously created and recreated. 
So this order is always in the state of becoming. This might 
be expressed by saying that Aristotle's world is stationary.
It is in state of an equilibrium which exists and goes on ex­
isting as the result of the constant movement of its parts.
One manifestation of this idea of the world is the principle 
that nature and movement are indivisible.
Aristotle classified movement and change along several 
lines: He distinguished between first, the movement of living 
creatures and inanimate bodies; second, the movement of celes­
tial and earthly bodies; third, natural and constrained move­
ment. The circular movement of celestial bodies and the move­
ment of earthly things striving upwards and down is natural, 
while constrained movement is produced when one body is direct­
ly influenced by another one. A fourth kind of classification 
is based on his theory of categories. According to this, move­
ment (or change) can be divided into 4 types: a) substantial 
change (coming to be and passing away); b) quantitative change 
(increase and decrease); c) qualitative change (such as the 
change of color); and d) locomotion (movement where place is 
changed). The most general one of these last four kinds of 
changes is locomotion.
In all movements we can identify the following factors: 
mover or movent (action), moved (passivity), moving in some­
thing (date), and moving to somewhere (relation) C13.
In what follows we will concentrate on earthly locomotion 
of unanimate bodies. The reason is that Aristotle investigated 
the quantitative aspects only for locomotion.
1,1 On natural locomotion
Problems in Aristotelian dynamics are usually divided into 
two parts: problems of natural and problems of constrained 
movement. It is this division that sometimes seems to legiti­
mate the mechanicist interpretation. E.g. Árpád Szabó C23 
writes: "Aristotle differentiated between 'natural' and 'con-
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strained'movement (movement 'caused by force'). Natural move­
ment more properly corresponds to our concept of motion oc- 
curing under the impact of gravity." We find here two essential 
components of the mechanicist interpretations. First, force is 
regarded as if it were the cause only of constrained movement. 
Second, natural movement is to some extent equated with move­
ment due to gravitation.
Nevertheless, Aristotle's concept of force is somewhat 
more complicated. As Jammer C3I points out there are two kinds 
of force in Aristotle's work: "...the Platonic conception of 
force inherent in matter, which he (i.e. Aristotle) calls'na­
ture' (physis), and force as an emanation from substance, the 
force of push and pull, causing the motion in a second object, 
and not in itself." When we speak about natural locomotion, we 
must pay special attention to this first kind of force, i.e. 
force inherent in matter.
However, it is not quite clear what Aristotle thought about 
this force. Mary Hesse C41 asks the following question: What 
does this force essentially belong to? To the body or to its 
natural place? Is it the "wish" of the body to come to rest in 
its natural position? Or is it a kind of attraction exercised 
by the natural position on the moving body? One way to solve 
this dilemma is to consider the body and the environment which 
includes its natural position a single system. Now we may re­
gard natural motion as the common-existence of elements in this 
system. In other words we may make an attempt at a thermodynam- 
icist interpretation instead of the mechanicist one.
When bodies have come to rest in their natural position the 
system can be said to be in a state of equilibrium. A moving 
thing embodies the passive principle of motion in so far as it 
undergoes movement only as a result of its lightness or heavi­
ness. That is to say, it is "spurred" to action by its relation 
to its environment, namely that it is not in its natural posi­
tion. In this way the force or "nature" inherent in the matter 
can be said to have a twofold character. On the one hand,- it 
is an internal characteristic of the body, i.e. its lightness 
or heaviness. On the other hand, it belongs to the natural po-
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sition. This double faced force strives to return the body to 
its natural position, and thereby to restore order or equilib­
rium.
Equilibrium is not the only thermodynamical concept that 
can be discovered in Aristotle's physics. The distinction be­
tween natural and unnatural positions amounts to the intro­
duction of the principle of inhomogeneity, These questions are 
discussed at length in Book IV. of his Physics, where he argues 
against the possibility of void. Aristotle writes,
"But how can there be any natural movement in the undif­
ferentiated limitless void? For qua limitless it can 
have no top or bottom or middle, and qua vacancy it can 
have no differentiated directions of up and down..."
In other words space is isotropic. Furthermore,
"in vacancy neither of these agencies would be in opera­
tion, so that nothing could go on moving unless it were 
carried. Nor (if it did move) could a reason be assigned 
why the projectile should ever stop - for why here more 
than there. It must therefore either not move at all, 
or continue its movement without limit, unless some 
stronger force impedes it." C5D
Aristotle explains the various kinds of resistance that can 
be encountered during motion as resulting from the differing 
densities of various media. Thus we can posit the existence of 
varying densities from the existence of motion itself and apply 
this in a more general sense to include the inhomogeneous dis­
tribution of matter in the world.
Actually, he proves there the more general thesis that 
movement is impossible in homogeneous world. If natural locomo­
tion is to be subject to mechanistic interpretation as motion 
under the law of gravity, we must bear in mind that only the 
"inhomogenitive" character of the impact of gravity is of 
primary importance in Aristotle's system. Aristotle was inter­
ested in primarily the particularity of inhomogeniety, its 
disappearing, its counterbalancing phenomena. Aristotle put 
down a classical version of non-equilibrium thermodynamics in 
several key ideas: the concept of natural position or equilib­
rium of the body undergoing natural locomotion; the proposi­
tion that natural and unnatural must be differentiated (inho-
116
mogeneity)} and the law that bodies strive toward natural po­
sition - toward counterbalancing the inhomogeneity (equilib­
rium ).
Book IV. is the place that Jammer uses, when he shows that 
Aristotle investigated the quantitative aspect of the dynamics 
of natural movement as well C6J. If this quantitative aspect 
is also taken into consideration, we can develop the following 
thermodynamicist interpretation of natural movements. (See 
Table 1)
Table 1
The Thermodynamic Interpretation of Saturai Movement
Aristotle's Concepts Their Thermodynamic Interpre­
tation
Moving body and its environ­
ment
Thermodynamical System
Natural locomotion Transport process
Velocity of moving body (v) Flow of extensive quantity (j)
Natural position State of Equilibrium
Moving toward natural posi­
tion
Process aimed at counterbal­
ancing inhomogenious distri­
bution
Moving force (A)
(heaviness proportionate to 
density, or lightness pro­
portionate to low density)
Driving force (gradient of 
intensive parameters of 
state) (X)
Resistance yielded by the "en­
vironment" (B)
Specific resistance (R)
Dynamic relation Dynamic formula
v 1 j = -3 R
Unnatural forces can assist 
or hinder natural movement
The processes of thermodynamic 
system can be influenced by 
external constraints, forces
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1,2 On constrained locomotion
In the standard mechanistic interpretation of constrained 
locomotion, the force exercised by other objects on the moving 
body is termed the cause of movement, (This is the second kind 
of Aristotelian forces, i.e. force of push and pull.)
Constrained locomotion, too, can be understand in terms of 
thermodynamics. (See Table 2 and Table 3,)
Table Z
Interpretations of the Basic Elements of Constrained 
Locomotion
The Four 
Factors of 
movement
Aristotle
Standard
Mechanical
Interpre­
tation
Aidun's 
Mechanical 
Interpreta­
tion [73
Thermodynam­
ic Inter­
pretation
A mover force power driving
force
B moved
thing
weight or 
mass
frictional
resis­
tance
specific
resistance
C displace­
ment
displace­
ment
displace­
ment
change of 
the ex­
tensive 
quantity
D time
interval
time
interval
time
interval
time
interval
In favour of the thermodynamical interpretation the fol­
lowing argument can be adduced. In the mechanicist interpreta­
tion ‘of constrained movement Aristotle's dynamical law is the 
following:
(velocity force . mass
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This law is false. However, if we take the thermodynamicist
interpretation the same law can be formulated as follows:
i = 2 ( flow .v driving froce .
1 R 'rrow resistance '*
Table 3
Similarities in the Dynamics of Constrained Move­
ments
Aristotelian 
(Peripatetic) 
Dynamics C83
Newtonian 
(Mechanical) 
Dynamics C83
Thermodynamics
to sustain move­
ment an acting 
force is needed
acting force is 
needed to change 
state of move­
ment
to sustain 
movement driving 
force is needed
V F at v ~  F . j ~  X
if F = 0 
then v = 0
if F = O
then v = constant
if F = 0 
then j = 0
the movement: 
process
the movement: 
state
the movement: 
process
This equation is not false any more. So while the mecha- 
nicist interpretation has to attribute a mistake to Aristotle, 
our interpretation shows that Aristotle was right. So the 
thermodynamicist interpretation leads to a unified view of the 
dynamics of natural and constrained mpvements. The content of 
the dynamical principles is an essence identical with the Se­
cond Law of thermodynamics. We can therefore regard the entire 
Aristotelian world system as an antique thermodynamics system.
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2. On the Organizing Principles of Aristotle1s 
natural Philosophy
In addition to the principles and statements we have al­
ready dealt with, Aristotle's work is replete with references 
to the organizing role of thermal effects. The heat of the 
sun is preminent in the development and sustenance of univer­
sal order. Thus, the Physics tells us, "In Nature man generr 
ates man; but the process presupposes and takes place in nat­
ural material already organized by the solar heat..." C91.
Furthermore, according to Aristotle, things with various 
qualities can be constructed of elements characterized by 
primary qualities. These primary qualities must be tangible, 
since touch is the primary sence. Primary qualities can be 
classified as pairs of opposites: hot and cold, wet and dry. 
Hot and cold are described as active, wet and fry as passive 
primary qualities C101. So thermal qualities are both primary 
and active. Mechanical qualities, such as lightness and heavi­
ness, are, in contrast, only derivative ones.
The notion of temperature, too, is reduced to the primary ther­
mal qualities. The temperature of a body expresses the propor­
tion in which they are combined [111. When Aristotle calls 
these two primary qualities hot and cold, he speaks literally 
and not metaphorically. Solmsen argues that "hot" as one basic 
quality generally "does not really act as hot; it does not 
burn, scorch, consume, harden, or exsiccate. These are the 
functions which had been of interest to earlier physicists and 
physicians; "active power" as such would have meant nothing to 
them. Where Aristotle introduces hot and cold into the present 
discussion, he defines their specific, "active" powers as ca­
pacities of bringing together (i.e. "associating")... C121.
In other cases - for instance, in biological applications- 
heat fulfills these two roles; it generates warmth and imposes 
order on the development of living creatures C131.
Aristotle uses thermal qualities to explain principles in 
a dual sense. As we saw in Solmsen's explanation earlier, hot 
and cold are possessed of an active force which draws things
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together? as such they are the medium for function. At the same 
time they retain much of their concrete nature and'exert this 
inherent force. Most examples drawn from Aristotle exhibit this 
dual character. Heat restores the part of the body afflicted 
by disease by causing it to grow warm. C143
The pre-eminence of hot/cold also ties in with ideas on 
material structure. The fall of Democritus' atoms through space 
can be described as having rectilinear, vertical motion. At the 
same time Aristotle found many arguments in support of the im­
possibility of void. As a result, in Aristotle's way of think­
ing matter is constantly filling the world. Because of the nat­
ure of this matter all different sorts of objects existing in 
the world simply cannot be generated according to Democritus' 
method. Consequently, Aristotle must turn to new areas of ex­
perience where hot and cold become the main organizing and 
moving principles. And these principles are not only preeminent 
in material structural processes, but play a prime role in 
organizing the world order. Thus the sun's heat is essential 
to the great natural cycles governing the circulation of water 
C151.
Aristotle's ideas on the active character of thermal 
qualities sometimes sound startlingly modern. They appear, e.g. 
in Prigogine's and Stenger's recent book on thermodynamics 
C163: "We know now that non-equilibrium, the flow of matter and 
energy, may be a source of order...this... leads to a new con­
cept of matter, matter that is 'active', as matter leads to ir­
reversible processes and as irreversible processes organize 
matter."
3, Deacribing a Particular Change
Aristotle considers movement as a process in which potent! 
alities become actual. He describes each particular process of 
this kind in three concepts: dynamis, energeia, and entelek- 
heia. Dynamis means roughly ability to change C17D. Energeia 
stands for the working of this ability C183. Finally, entelek-
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heia is best construed as realized ability C191. (Table 4„)
Table 4
Interpretations of the Concepts Concerning a Partic­
ular Change
Aristotle
Concepts
' s Their
Meaning
Mechanicist | Thermodynamical 
Interpretation
dynamis ability force driving force
the poten­ (associated caused by in-
tiality of to constrained homogeneity
change movement)
X ’
energeia working of ^-potentialenergy<f
kinetic
the process of
the ability homogenization
the actualisa-
tion of change
* X '
entelekheia realized - equilibrium
ability as the ac-
change which tualized ho­
has been mogenization
actualized
Another shortcoming of the mechanicist interpretation is 
that it devotes too much attention to dynamis and neglects or 
misinterprets the other two concepts. In the thermodynamicist 
interpretation, nevertheless, these concepts regain their full 
importance. The fact that in each of Aristotle's analysis these 
concepts appear in dynamis - energeia - entelekheia order can 
also be readily explained. It is a central idea in thermo­
dynamics that natural processes have directions. It is exactly 
this idea of direction which is signified by this order. We 
would like to add here, that the direction of natural processes
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has been already touched upon. We said that natural locomotion 
is a movement towards the state of equilibrium. What we can 
see now is that all Aristotelian processes have definite di­
rections .
A brief comment on Aristotle's theory of causality is in 
order to illustrate the efficiency of thermodynamic interpre­
tation. Ke shall only deal with one specific problem in rela­
tion to the four causes (material, formal, effective, and fi­
nal). C203 The presence of the effective and final causes mer­
its special consideration. Applying a purely mechanistic in­
terpretation to the principle of final cause would lead us 
nowhere. However, this is not the case with a thermodynamic 
interpretation, since thermodynamics takes a basically tele­
ological view of the problem. This teleological approach stems 
from the uniquely global character of the thermodynamic thought- 
process .
4. Aristotelian Thermodynamics
We have strived so far to present arguments in favour of a 
possible thermodynamicist interpretation of Aristotelian phys­
ics. If this interpretation is accepted, it will turn out that 
nearly all the experiences that are essential to thermodynam­
ics were described by Aristotle. His descriptions include 
biological, medical, meteorological and technical observa­
tions, as well as knowledge necessary for cooking.
Most of the basic thermodynamic concepts such as equilib­
rium inhomogeneity, irreversibility, driving force, thermal 
interaction C211, self-organization can be found in his dy­
namical views. We have hinted at his recognition of the con­
tent of the Second Law of thermodynamics, and it is clear that 
he was familiar with the essence of the First one, too. Evi­
dence for this is the knowledge of the fact: heat could be 
produced by friction [221.
It does not require much effort to identify in his work 
important features of modern thermodynamical theories.
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Some very important problems are also present in his work. 
For instance the very fascinating question why there is no 
heatdeath. His solution runs as follows. If in the course of 
natural movement bodies moving into natural position have come 
to a state of equilibrium, one wonders why they do not stay 
there. In his explanation the heat of the sun makes the water 
evaporate. This water then falls down to the earth when it 
rains, and it does so again and again. Thereby the equilibrium 
is broken again and again. However the sun acting as a foreign 
external force transforms water into vapour. Furthermore the 
sun moves itself, and its movement was started by and main­
tained by the motionless mover. Thus the motionless mover 
governs the world in such a way that he is constantly jarring 
it from its state of equilibrium! Aristotle’s God is the great 
jumbler of the Universe - an entropie God. He is not at all 
like the clockmaker of the seventeenth century - the magnifi­
cent constructor, the mechanistic God. So the Aristotelian 
world was simultaneously closed and open; the motionless mover 
closed the world logically and made it open physically.
Aristotle arrived at great many thoughts on thermodynamics 
by subjecting all earlier theories to critical summary. He 
summed them up in a single theory and added a lot of ideas 
that were completely new. These new concepts and ideas proved 
to be of such enormous social and cultural value that they 
completely overshadowed older theories, or at least threw them 
into new perspective.
Aristotelian physics contained the possibility of both 
thermodynamics and mechanics. Nevertheless, it was only the 
latter possibility that was eventually realized. While centu­
ries of reflections on Aristotelian physics figured prominent­
ly in the development of today's mechanics, thermodynamics was 
born independently from it. It emerged only in the nineteenth 
century. But why did not the nineteenth century thermodynam- 
icists consider Aristotle their predesessor? As the mechanical 
world view gained wide spread acceptance, the evolution, in­
terpretation and explanation of Aristotelian physics also be­
come subject to mechanistic thought. As a result, by the time
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scientific thermodynamics had begun to develope the chance for 
using Aristotelian physics to interpret thermodynamics was 
lost.
So we can say that there is a close analogy between Aristo­
telian physics and modern thermodynamics, but we cannot say 
that it was Aristotelian physics that developed into modern 
thermodynamics.
Nevertheless, we may put the following question. What im­
peded the continuous development of thermodynamics and sup­
ported the development of mechanics in particular? There were 
a lot of causes, but we have only a highly tentative sugges­
tion :
The relation between man and his natural and social en­
vironment has radically changed: "the active man in an active 
environment” view was superseded by "active man in a passive 
environment" view. A parallel process was the transition from 
physics of the world of observers to the physics of the world 
of handicraftsmen C233. This new physics facilitated the de­
velopment of mechanics, since its content harmonized with the 
handicraftsmen's world view; and hindered the development of 
thermodynamics because its content would not harmonize with 
this new world view. The transition from the physics of the 
world of observer to that of physics of the world of handi­
craftsman was so alluring and successful, that the thermody­
namic elements of Aristotelian physics were relegated to the 
background until they completely disappeared or were submerged 
in mechanistic propositions.
S. Summary
We have shown that if we break with mechanicist interpre­
tation, lots of new features of Aristotle's physics will be 
revealed. We have found fairly strong analogies between Aris­
totelian physics and modern non-equilibrium thermodynamics. 
These analogies are so strong, that we may try to reconstruct 
the Aristotelian thermodynamics. Constituents of Aristotelian
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thermodynamics can be identified in different levels of ab­
stractions. First of all there is an adequate thermodynamic 
interpretation of Aristotelian dynamics leading to a unified 
view of natural and constrained movement, and the content of 
his dynamic principles is in essence identical with the Second 
Law of thermodynamics. Furthermore in Aristotle's natural 
philosophy the hot and cold are the organizing principles. So 
the name "Aristotelian thermodynamics" was coined so as to 
refer to two things. First, to an ancient period of thermody­
namics which remained largely unnoticed for a long time. Sec­
ond, to a relatively neglected part or aspect of Aristotle's 
physics.
* * *
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BEMERKUNGEN ÜBER DIE ÖKONOMISCHE ANSICHTEN VON LEONARDUS
LESSIUS
Károly Redl
Der langwierige und in Weltmaßstäben bis heute auch noch 
nicht abgeschlossene Prozeß bürgerlicher Umwälzung setzte ir­
gendwann im Mittelalter ein. Diejenigen großen Kämpfe und Re­
volutionen, die die Entwicklung vorwärtstrieben, brachen nicht 
auf einen Schlag durch, sondern arbeiteten unter sich ändernden 
historischen Bedingungen und mit mannigfachen Methoden an der 
Entfaltung dieses welthistorischen Prozesses. Die ersten Zu­
sammenstöße zwischen der alten Ordnung und den neuen Kräften 
gingen noch inmitten eines erdrückenden Übergewichts der feuda­
len Verhältnisse vor sich, als die ideologische Form des Kamp­
fes noch eine religiöse war; in unserem Zeitalter jedoch, in 
welchem der kapitalistischen Entwicklung gegenüber auch schon 
die Möglichkeit anderer Alternativen sich zeigt, sind verspäte­
te bürgerliche Revolutionen auch gezwungen, unter der Hülle so­
zialistischer Ideen zu erscheinen. Mochte es aber die Mönchskut­
te oder die Toga eines römischen Republikaners gewesen sein, 
was der Bürger in seinem Kampf für die Macht anzog, er wählte 
diese Rollen nicht willkürlich, er war im Gegensatz dazu ge­
zwungen, diese Rollen zu spielen, weil er anderswie die Unter­
stützung der Massen nicht hätte erworben können. Die Bedeutung 
der Massen wuchs jedoch stets, um so mehr, weil um ihrer In­
teressen willen auch sie den Kampf immer besser erlernten.
Die niederländische Revolution und der Freiheitskrieg, die 
Spinoza juristisch und moralisch legitimiert, galten jedoch 
nur als Ouvertüre von dem gewaltigen historischen Prozeß der 
bürgerlichen Unwälzung, sie galten als die erste groß Explo­
sion, die die Feudalordnung erschütterte. Die Kraft des Feuda­
lismus war in dieser Zeit noch bei weitem nicht gebrochen und 
die Herrschaft von mittelalterlichen Formen durchdrang noch je-
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de Lebensspäre. Währendder "goldenen" Periode der Niederlande 
ging jedoch der erste große Versuch vor sich, diese Formen zu 
verändern, sie umzuwälzen und neue Formen herauszuarbeiten.
Dies ist der Grund dessen, warum die Ergebnisse und Erzeugnisse 
dieser Periode in Hinsicht auf die bürgerliche Entwicklung für 
lange Zeit eine paradigmatische Bedeutung erlangten.
In seinen Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Weltge­
schichte würdigte Hegel diese große Umwälzung und setzte ihr 
mit folgenden Worten Denkmals "Die Niederlande aber brachen ge­
gen Spanien ln förmliche Empörung aus; ihr Aufstand war Lossa­
gung vom Glaubensjoche, aber auch politische Befreiung vom 
Drucke der Fremdherrschaft. Belgien war der katholischen Reli­
gion noch zugetan und blieb unter spanischer Herrschaft; der 
nördliche Teil dagegen, Holland, hat sich heldenmütig gegen 
seine Unterdrücker behauptet. Die gewerbetreibende Klasse, die 
Gilden und Schützengesellschaften haben die Miliz gebildet und 
die damals berühmte spanische Infanterie durch Heldenmut über­
wunden. Wie die schweizerischen Bauern der Ritterschaft stand- 
gehaltan haben, so hier die gewerbetreibenden Städte den dis­
ziplinierten Truppen. Währenddessen haben die holländischen 
Seestädte Flotten ausgerüstet und den Spaniern ihre Kolonien, 
woher ihnen aller Reichtum floß, zum Teil genommen Ewig denk­
würdig ist dieser Kampf betriebsamer Bürger gegen die Herren 
der Reichtümer Mexikos."
Holland erkämpfte sich jedoch seine Selbständigkeit nicht 
allein durch das protestantische Prinzip, auch wenn dieses die 
"Rechtschaffenheit" mit enthielt, wie Hegel an demselben Orte 
sagt. Die Erkämpfung der Selbständigkeit und die in ihren Spu­
ren einsetzende stürmische Entwicklung hatten auch andere, zum 
Teil internationale, zum Teil aber aus den Eigenschaften der 
lokalen Wirtschaft stammende Vorbedingungen.
130
Zeitgenossen über den holländischen "Wunder
Zeitgenössische Beobachter, die sich gewöhnlich bewun­
derungsvoll über die Entwicklung der Niederlande äußerten, wa­
ren auf diese Zusammenhänge aufmerksam geworden. Der englische 
Ökonom, Thomas Mun, sagt beispielsweise folgendes: "Von der 
Zeit an, seit diese (die Holländer) das Joch spanischer Knecht­
schaft abschüttelten, kann man nur bewundern, wie sie jede ih­
rer Fähigkeiten entfalteten. Was für gewaltige Mittel sie sich 
erwarben, um ihre Freihe-lt vor der Kraft eines so großen Fein­
des zu schützen! Und ist all dies nicht Frucht ihres im Handel 
entfalteten unermüdlichen Fleißes? Sind ihre Länder vielleicht 
nicht zu Warenlagern für die Mehrheit von den Ländern der 
christlichen Welt geworden, demzufolge ihr Reichtum, ihre Schif­
fahrt, ihr Seehandel, ihre Industrie, ihr Volk und folglich 
ihre öffentlichen Einkünfte, sowie Steuereinnahmen eine be 
wunderungswürdige Größe erstiegen? Vergleicht man die Zeit ih­
rer Knechtschaft mit ihren gegenwärtigen Zuständen, so bieten 
sie das Bild eines anderen Volkes.*
William Petty, durch den, wie Marx festseilt, die poli­
tische Ökonomie in England ihren Anfang nahm, befaßt sich in 
seiner zwischen 1671 und 1676 verfaßten "Politischen Arithme­
tik" (Political Arithmetic) eingehend mit den wirtschaftlichen 
und politischen Ursachen des holländischen Aufschwunges. Petty, 
der die Ansicht vertritt, daß "ein kleines Land von niedriger 
Einwohnerzahl durch seine geographische Lage, durch seinen Han­
del und seine Politik an Reichtum und Kraft gleichwertig mit 
einem viel größeren Volk, bzw. Gebiet werden kann", bemerkt 
über die Holländer folgendes: "Viele Autoren, die Uber dieses 
Thema schreiben, loben die Holländer so sehr, wie wenn sie sich 
in übermenschlichen Höhen befänden und die übrigen Nationen 
gleichzeit (in Handel und Politik) unter dem menschlichen Ni­
veau lägen; sie lassen die Holländer als Engel auftreten, wäh­
rend die anderen gleichzeitig als Dummköpfe, Tiere und Trun­
kenbolde beschrieben sind; ich bin aber der Ansicht, daß der
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Grund ihrer Ergebnisse ursprünglich die geographische Lage des 
Landes war; erst dadurch wurden sie in die Lage gesetzt, un­
nachahmliche Dinge vollbracht und beispiellose Vorteile erwor­
ben zu haben."
Diese Vorteile erblickt Petty in den folgenden Komponenten: 
weil das Land "flach, reich und fruchtbar ist, kann es deshalb 
viele Menschen ernähren", "die Menschen können in der Nähe von­
einander wohnen, weil sie mit Hilfe des Handels einander gegen­
seitig helfen können", überall können Windmühlen aufgestellt 
werden, demzufolge "viele tausend Arbeiterhände frei werden", 
ferner 1st es so, well man "mit der Manufaktur viel mehr ge­
winnen kann als mit der Landwirtschaft und mit dem Handel viel 
mehr als mit der Manufaktur" und "Holland und Zeeland befindet 
sich jedoch bei der Mündung dreier großer Flüsse, die reiche 
Länder überqueren und dies behält die gesamte Einwohnerschaft 
von den Ufern dieser Flüsse im Zustand der Landwirtschaft: 
während die Holländer selber all diese Produkte in Manufaktu­
ren aufarbeiten und in die ganze Welt in allen Richtungen aus­
einandertragen und die Preise von den Waren, die man ihnen für 
sie als Rückvergütung gibt, im ganzen nach ihrem Belieben fest­
setzen können." Petty erwähnt darüber hinaus noch eine ganze 
Reihe von ökonomischen Komponenten (die Nähe der schiffbaren 
Handelswege, die geringen Kosten der Landesverteidigung, die 
vor allem der günstigen Verteidigungslage des Landes entsprin­
gen, die niedrigen Landungskosten in der Schiffahrt, das Ein­
kommen aus der Fischerei, die Erkenntnis von den Schätzen und 
Bedürfnissen ferner Länder durch Schiffahrt und eine aus frem­
den Rohstoffen genährten und die Bedürfnisse der verschldensten 
Länder befriedigende Produktion) und dann geht er auf die Er­
forschung der politischen Gründe ein und hebt die große Be­
deutung von der Religions- und Gewissensfreiheit hervor.
Auch den Grund von der Loslösung von Spanien erblickt 
Petty darin, daß die Holländer, die "zumeist wirtschaftende, 
nüchterne und geduldige Menschen und als solche der Ansicht 
sind, daß die Arbeit und der Eifer ihre Pflicht dem Gott gegen-
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über ist" ("so irrig auch solche Ansichten sind" - fügt er hin­
zu), bestrebt waren, "der Steuerveranlaaung des Klerus" aus 
dem Wege zu gehen und die Pfarrer für "überflüssige Last" hiel­
ten.
Religiöse Toleranz gründet bei ihnen auf folgende Erwägun­
gen: "Ihre Überzeugung ist, daß vergeblich, absurd und der Ach­
tung Gottes fremd ist, wenn niemand seinen Neigungen nachgehen 
und glauben darf, was er will, ferner, wann die Menschen ge­
zwungen seien zu glauben, was sie nicht glauben." Die Hollän­
der, die sich für keine "unfehlbare Kirche" halten, "beobach­
teten" auch, "daß dort, wo die Aufrechterhaltung der Gleichför­
migkeit in religiösen Dingen" am meisten forciert wird, die 
Heterodoxie am schönsten blüht". In diesem Zusammenhang macht 
Petty, dessen Humor schon Marx pries, die folgende Bemerkung: 
"Wenn ein Viertel der Bevölkerung heterodox wäre und diese 
Gruppe vermittels irgendwelchen Wunders verschwände, so oder 
so würde ein Viertel der gebliebenen Bevölkerung wieder hete­
rodox werden, da es ein natürlicher Zug des Menschen ist, daß 
sich die Auffassungen über die übersinnlichen und übervernünfti­
gen Dinge voneinander unterscheiden und insbesondere die, die 
über geringeres Vermögen verfügen, diejenige Auffassung für 
selbstverständlich halten, daß in ihnen mehr Geist und Vernunft 
hauptsächlich in Fragen über den Gott existiert, weil sie 
diese Fragen als solche ansehen, die vor allem eine Angelegen­
heit der Armen ist."
Die scharfblickenden Zeitgenossen wiesen in der Tat auf 
richtige Momente hin, indem sie das Geheimnis des "niederlän­
dischen Phänomens" unter die Lupe nahmen. Die von Petty in die 
Rede gebrachte geographische Lage spielte tatsächlich eine 
große Rolle in dieser Entwicklung. Die Entfaltung der inter­
nationalen wirtschaftlichen Relationen, in der ersten Linie die 
Verschiebung der großen Handelswege verlieh diesem Gebiet eine 
eigentümliche Bedeutung. Die Bedeutung des Mittelmeers als je­
nes Wasserweges, welcher Europa mit dem Osten verbindet, ver­
blaßte, infolge der großen geographischen Entdeckungen gegen-
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Uber dem Atlantischen Ozean, welcher nun zur Landstraße des 
Verkehrs mit Amerika qeworden ist. Dadurch ist die Bedeutung 
des atlantischen Ufers, sowie die der Niederlande natürlich 
größer geworden. Die Ausnützung von dieser günstigen welthisto­
rischen Position wurde aber erst durch weitere besondere 
Komponenten ermöglicht. Unter diesen sind die mittelalterliche 
Entwicklung des Landes, sowie der Erfolg des Freiheitskriegs 
gegen die spanische Herrschaft, sowie der Sieg der Revolution 
die wichtigsten. Das Flandern des Mittelalters gehörte zu ent­
wickeltesten Gebieten im feudalen Europa, und zwar vor allem 
wegen seiner Tuchindustrie. Kein Zufall, daß dieses Gebiet, wo 
die städtische Leben blühte und der Demokratismus der Stadt­
republiken lebendig war, gleichzeitig als Brutstätte von Ketzer­
bewegungen galt. Der Freiheitskrieg gegen Spanien war nicht 
allein politisch und wirtschaftlich, sondern damit eng verbun­
den auch religiös von Bedeutung: der Gegensatz von Katholizis­
mus und Reformation war ideologische Form der Kontroverse 
zwischen feudalen Kräften und bürgerlicher Ordnung. Durchaus 
wichtig war auch der historische Umstand, daß England, die 
klassische Heimat der ursprünglichen Kapitalakkumulation und 
der frühen bürgerlichen Entwicklung sich in dieser Epoche noch 
auf seine innere Entfaltung konzentriert und sich noch in der 
Phase der Kräftesammlung befindet, in der - wie Marx darauf 
hinweist - auch die Wirkung eben von Holland eine überaus 
wichtige Rolle spielte, England trat auf dem Schauplatz der 
internationalen Wirtschaft also noch nicht mit seinem vollen 
Gewicht auf. Das geschieht erst seit der zweiten Hälfte des 17. 
Jahrhunderts, es ist die Zeit, nach der Holland auch in Welt­
maßstäben in den Hintergrund gerückt und aus seiner führenden 
Position verdrängt wird.
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Die Scheidung von Süd und Hord
Die Entfaltung der niederländischen Revolution und des 
Freiheitskrieges war nicht geradlinig, sondern ließ eine inne­
re Polarisation zwischen Süd und Nord entstehen. Die Wurzeln 
derselben reichen in die Vergangenheit zurück und entstammen 
u.a. den Unterschieden von der früheren Entwicklung der beiden 
Terltorrien. Die militärische Niederlage des Südens vollendete 
nur die in der Union von Arras (1579) deklarierten Loslösung 
von den von Vallonén bewohnten Gebieten. Durch den Fall von 
Gent, Bruxelles und Antwerpen (1584-1585) endete sich die Ero­
berung der Süd-Niederlande durch die Spanier und die im Mittel- 
alter einheitliche "natio belglca" entzweite sich endgültig: 
der Süden, d.h. Belgien, setzte seine Existenz unter spanischer 
Vorherrschaft fort und unter Albert von Habsburg (1596-1621), 
sowie seiner Frau, der Tochter von Phillipp II, Isabella (1595- 
1633) ging die Restauration von den feudalen Verhältnissen, 
sowie die von der katholischen Kirche vor sich. Im Norden je­
doch setzten die Vereinigten Länder, die nach ihrem führenden 
Gebiet Holland genannt wurden, den Kampf fort und so entstand 
die erste unabhängige Bourgeois-Republik Europas. Der Prozeß 
von der Entstehung der bürgerlichen Nation sowie der belgischen 
und holländischen Nation, der am Ende des 16. Jahrhunderts 
seinen Anfang nahm, erlebte jedoch mehrere Stadien und ließ 
sich erst im 19. Jahrhundert vollenden.
Die divergierende Entwicklung von Belgien und Holland offen­
barte sich nicht nur auf dem Gebiet der Wirtschaft und der Po­
litik, sondern auch auf dem der Religion und Kultur. Aus mög­
lichen Gegensätzen und Paralleler es wäre sehr interessant 
z.B. diejenige zu untersuchen, die zwischen den beiden Denkern 
Lessius und Spinoza, die in gewissen Sinne die belgische bzw. 
holländische Entwicklung representieren, zu ziehen wäre. Dies-
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bezüglich erwähnen wir hier nur einen, aber wichtigen Ver 
gleichspunkt: wie die Relation der beiden Denker zu der ka­
pitalistischen Entwicklung gestaltet ist.
Kapitalistische Entwicklung im neu- 
scholastischen Spiegel: Lessius und Antwerpen
Albert von Habsburg übernahm die Regierung des südlichen 
Landteils, Belgiums, als Protektorat und stellte sie in den 
Dienst von den Interessen des spanischen Absolutismus. Seine 
Verwaltung unterdrückte die Opposition mit Waffengrwalt, unter­
ordnete die ständischen Organe der Zentralgewalt, hob die po­
litischen Rechte von Zünften und die Tätigkeit von den demok­
ratischen Institutionen der Städte auf, rief die Ständerver­
sammlung der Länder durch zwei Jahrzehnte hindurch nicht zu­
sammen, setzte Jahressteuern von riesiger Größenordnung syste­
matisch aus und trieb außerdem auch noch außerordentliche mi­
litärische "Hilfen" ein. Grundlegende Maxime seine Politik war 
es, wie er das Land in einen geeigneten Aufmarschraum gegen die 
"aufrührerischen" Kräfte des Nordens verwandeln kann.
Die politische Restauration begünstigte die Erstärkung der 
feudalen Verhältnisse, sowie die der katholischen Kirche. Ihre 
Folgen stellten in wirtschaftlicher Hinsicht auch einen Rück­
fall dar, unter anderen auch aus dem Grunde, weil viele protes­
tantische Kapitalisten, Handwerker und Bürger vor religiösen 
Verfolgungen nach Norden flüchteten.
Die katolische Restauration, auf deren Spitze die Jesuiten 
standen war mit dem materiellen und gleichzeitig mit dem geisti­
gen Machtzuwachs der Kirche gleichbedeutend. In jesuitischer 
Hand waren die Universitäten von Douai und Leuven, die als 
geistige Zentren der Restauration aalten. So wurde Belgien zu 
einem Hauptbollwerk der Restauration.
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Eine der hervorragenden Persönlichkeiten katolischer Res­
tauration war Lessius, der zu der Spinoza vorangehenden Genera­
tion gehörte und sich ernsthaft mit den neuen Erscheinungen des 
zeitgenössichen Wirtschaftslebens auseinandersetzte. Leonardus 
Lessius (de Leys) (1554-1623), der Meister scholastischer Ana­
lyse der Wirtschaft, ist in Brecht geboren, in der Nähe Ant­
werpens und wurde von seinen Eltern zum Beruf eines Kaufmanns 
ausersehen. Nach dem Abschluß der Universität Leuven trat er 
in seinem 17. Lebensjahr in den jesuitischen Orden ein und 
lehrte zwischen 1575 und 1581 Philosophie im englischen Kolleg 
in Douai. Nachher studierte er zwei Jahre lang in Rom unter der 
Führung des berühmten Roberto Bellarmini (1542-1621) und Fran­
cisco Suárez (1548-1617), die damals als die bedeutendsten Den­
ker des jesuitischen Ordens galten. Aus Rom zurückgekehrt, er­
hielt er 1584 einen Lehrstuhl an der Universität Leuven, wo er 
sich bald eine große Berühmtheit verschaffte. Wegen seines 
schwachen gesundheitlichen Zustandes jedoch, der die Folge 
seiner Flucht vor den "geux" im Jahre 1578 war, zog er sich in 
seinem 46. Lebensjahr von dem Unterricht zurück und widmete den 
weiteren Teil seines Lebens der literatischen Tätigkeit. Außer 
seinen theolqgischen Arbeiten, die sich mit den Fragen den 
Gnade, des freien Willens, sowie der Prädestination befassen, 
ließ er seine Stimme auch in aktuellen Problemen der poli­
tischen Theorie hören und griff - wie auch Suarez - die absolu- 
tische Theorie von dem göttlichen Recht der königlichen Macht 
und der aus Gottes Gnade stammenden unbegrenzten Macht des Kö- 
nögs an, wie diese Theorie von Jakob dem Ersten, dem englischen 
König vertreten wurde. Das wichtigste Werk Lessius ist De Justi­
tia et Jure (1605)," welches die Gerechtigkeit und das Recht be­
handelte und in ganz Europa in zahlreichen Ausgaben erschien.
Der dritte Abschnitt von dem zweiten Buch diese Werkes (17-28. 
Kap.), welcher sich mit den Fragen der Verträge beschäftigt 
(De oontraotibu8), enhält die Erörterungen von Lessius über
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wirtschaftliche Thematik. Albert der König von Belgien, hielt 
der Überlieferung nach dieses Werk von Lessius stets bei der 
Hand und sah in ihm einen soliden Ratgeber.
Lessius, der einer reichen Kaufmannsfamilie entstammte, 
hatte Gelegenheit im Laufe des 16. Jahrhunderts das wirtschaft­
liche Leben des sich zu einem internationalen kommerziellen und 
geldwirtschaftlichen Mittelpunkt entwickelnden Antwerpen aus 
unmittelbarer Nähe zu beobachten und er beruft sich tatsächlich 
auf seine diesbezüglichen Kenntnisse. Unter den im 16. Jahr­
hundert emporgekommenen internationalen kommerziellen Zentren 
wie Kastilien, Lyon, Frankfurt, Besançon - errang Antwerpen 
eine führende Rolle für Jahrzehnte, seine Bedeutung wurde spä­
ter durch die holländische wirtschaftliche Blockade in den Hin­
tergrund gedrängt.
Unter der Hülle von den überlieferten Kategorien der 
scholastischen Analyse der Wirtschaft zeichnet sich bei Lessius 
die Bedeutung von der Geldwirtschaft, sowie den Marktverhält­
nissen bereits klar aus. Lessius' Protagonist ist nicht mehr 
der idealisierte Polis-BUrger antiker Philosophen, der als 
wohlhabender Herr seiner Wirtschaft, oikos, sich von den nied­
rigen Handwerkerberufen vornehm femhalten konnte, sowie über 
die genügende Freizeit verfügte, um mit der Pflege des eines 
freien Menschen würdigen Künste und durch das Studium der Phi­
losophie sich solide Seelenruhe und erhabene rationale An­
schauung der kosmischen Zusammenhänge und Gesetzmäßigkeiten zu 
erwerben. Er ist aber auch nich mehr eine Verkörperung von dem 
christlichen Lebensideal mittelalterlicher Doktoren, nich mehr 
der Gläubige, der aus den Früchten seiner Arbeit bescheiden 
lebt, anderen gern schenkt, sich an weltlichen Gütern nich fest­
hält und insbesondere den Geiz und die Geld- und Vermögensakku­
mulation ablehnt, das diesseitige Jammertal zugunsten des zu­
künftigen himmlichsen Glücks vernachlässigt und der Pflicht der 
persönlichen Dienstübung und dem Befehl der Liebe lebt. Der 
Protagonist von der wirtschaftlichen Welt ist bei Lessius be­
reits der negotiator diligens, der fleißige Geschäftsmann, der
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flinke Kaufmann, der der Abstraktion des "homo oeconomlcus” 
schon n:her als jenem adeligen Ideal von den herrschenden 
Klassen der Naturalwirtschaft betreibenden Epochen steht, 
welches die vollständige und vielseitige menschliche Persön­
lichkeit in den Mittelpunkt stellt und ist bestrebt, in seinen 
Berechnungen den erreichbar größten Gewinn zu erzielen.
Symptomatisch ist es schon auch, daß in seinem erwähnten 
Hauptwerk Lessius das Geld nicht allein als Wertmesser und 
Tauschmittel betrachtet, wie es die mittelalterlichen Doktoren 
gewöhnlich taten, sondern auch als Ware, was lirf Gègensatz zum 
römischen Recht und zur feudalen Auffassung stand.
Lessius erkennt aber auch die Kapitalfunktion des Geldes an. 
Während seiner Beschäftigung mit dem alten Problem des lucrum 
cessans, des "ausgebliebenen Nutzens", die ursprünglich die Be­
rechtigung der Zurückgabe der in Leihgeschäften gelegentlich 
erlittenen Schäden ausdrückte und sich immer mehr zu einem 
Prinzip entfaltete, welches die Rechtsmäßigkeit der nach jeder 
Geldanleihe erforderlichen Zinsen aussagte, hebt Lessius diesen 
"fruchtbaren" Charakter des Geldes hervor und hält ihn für voll­
kommen akzeptabel. Dies tut er im Gegensatz zur Auffassung des 
Mittelalters, welche das Geld im Grunde als "unfruchtbares", 
"unproduktives" Ding ansah und dementsprechend den Geldwucher, 
ln dem Geld Geld zeugt, als "unnatürlich" und als Sünde ab­
qualifizierte, Lessius das Geld als den "fruchtbaren Kern des
durch Eifer erzielten Gewinns" (semen foecundum lueri per 
industriam) definiert.
Von dem Entwicklungsstand von den geldwirtschaftlichen und 
kommerziellen Operationen, sowie von dem institutionalisierten 
und organisierten Charakter der Marktverhältnisse zeugt auch 
diejenige Überlegung Lessius', daß - wenn auch das Darlehen 
nicht identisch mit der Aufopferung grwissen potentiellen Pro­
fits ist, jeder Kredit für den Darleiher mit einer Aufopferung, 
bzw. Entbehrung des zur Verfügung stehenden und liquiden Geld­
summe gleichbedeutend ist, was unter den Verhältnischen eines 
gut ausgebauten Geldmarktes den Darleiher in ungünstige Situa­
tion zu bringen imstande ist und gerade deshalb gewährt der
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Verlust des liquiden, mobilisierbaren Kapitals im Laufe des 
Darlehens einen neuen Rechtstitel auf die Zinsen, die nach der 
verliehenen Summe verlangt werden dürfen. Diesen Fall nennt 
Lessius das Fehlen oder die Entbehrung des Geldes (carentia 
pecuniae).
Unter so entwickelten wirtschaftlichen und kommerziellen 
Verhältnissen, wie diejenigen, die im Antwerpen dieser Zeit 
vorherrschend waren, bedeutete die Verfügung über Bargeld, über 
liquides Geldkapital offensichtlich einen besonderen Vorteil, 
für welchen die Geschäftsleute bereit waren, Zinsen zu zahlen. 
Infolge dieser Nachfrage nach Bargeld wurde der Anspruch des 
Darleihers auf Kompensation, auf Zinsen als berechtigt aner­
kannt, worin Lessius mit den Geschäftsleuten vollkommen über­
einstimmt. Er beschwört in diesem Zusammenhang das Beispiel 
der Antwerpener Bröse herauf: "Und es scheint, dies Praxis der 
Antwerpener Börse oder Peristylium, wo die Kaufleute täglich 
Zusammenkommen und nachdem sie mit der Fülle oder dem Mangel 
des Geldes, mit der Anzahl der valutarischen Angelegenheiten 
(.cambia), mit der Masse der Waren und mit jedweder Art der 
Profitmachung (in denen Bargeld - pecunia praesene - erfordert 
wird), gerechnet hatten, setzten sie entweder allein oder durch 
ihre Makler den Preis von der Entbehrung des Geldes fest, den 
zu fordern die Kaufleute berechtigt sind, weil sie ihr Geld so 
lange entbehren und es vor dem festgesetzten Termin nicht zu­
rückverlangen können. Dieser Preis war manchmal 6% für ein 
Jahr, in anderen Fällen 7%, 8%, 9%, 10%, 11% oder 12%. Nach 
Anordnungen von Karl V., die er am 4. Oktober 1540 Brüssel 
traf, war es verboten, mehr als 12% zu verlangen und wenn ir­
gendwo mehr verlangt wurde, faßte man es als Wucher auf. Fer­
ner kann diesen Preis auf demselben Ort jeder Kaufmann verlan­
gen, auch wenn ihm kein Nutzen ausbleibt (nullum lucrum ceseet) 
... Den es ist dies der gerechte Preis für die Entbehrung des 
Geldens unter den Kaufleuten; denn der gerechte Preis von ir­
gendwelcher Ware (ree) oder Verbindlichkeit (onus) ist in einer 
Gemeinschaft, was dieselbe im Interesse des Gemeinwohls bei Er­
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wägung aller Umstände festsetzt... Wenn auch also mein Nutzen 
infolge der Entbehrung des Geldes durch ein Jahr hindurch nicht 
ausbleibt und mein Kapital nich gefährdet wird, kann ich sie 
(die Zinsen) ebenso verlangen, wie die anderen, weil für diese 
Entbehrung aus rechten Gründen so ein Preis ausgesetzt ist."
Hier können wir selbstverständlich auf eine Darlegung von 
den wirtschaftlichen Ansichten des Lessius nicht eingehen. So 
eine Untersuchung würde jedoch ergeben, wie dies vielleicht 
schon auf Grund des Bisherigen zu vermuten ist, daß die Aner­
kennung, sowie die theoretische Bestätigung von der Bedeutung 
der Marktverhältnisse eine beträchtliche Leistung des belgischen 
Theologen war. Nich nur Fragen des Warenmarktes, des Marktes, für Gelddar­
leihen, sowie des Devisenmarktes erscheinen in seinen Unter­
suchungen (was den Devisenmarkt anbelangt, ist es merkwürdig, 
daB er die Wechselkurse von Antwerpen (cursus cambiorum) nach 
der Situation vom 7. Dezember 1600 mitteilt), es tauchen aber 
auch einzelne Fragen des Arbeitskraftsmarktes auf. Sehr wichtig 
ist, daß das Wechselverhältnis, die Interdependenz verschiede­
ner Märkte auch schon in seinen Sichtkreis gerückt wird und da­
durch scheinen die Inneren Zusammenhänge der wirtschaftlichen 
Sphäre als solcher, sowie die von den ersten Gesetzmäßigkeiten 
der wirtschaftlichen Organisation auf. Die Untersuchung von dem 
Problem des Preises, inbesondere die Unterscheidung des "legi­
timen" Preises (pretium legitimum) von dem in markwirtschaft­
lichem Konsensus entstehenden "natürlichen" Preis (pretium vul­
gare seu naturale) weist darauf hin, daß die autonome Logik der 
Marktverhältnisse gelegentlich sich den Entscheidungsmechanis­
men der politischen Sphäre gegenüberstellen kann und Lessius 
erwähnt auch Fälle, in denen im Gegensatz zum offiziellen Preis 
gerade der natürliche Preis bevorzugt werden muß. Lessius 
billigt die Rolle der unternehmerischen Tätigkeit (industria), 
sowie deren Anspruch auf das Surpluseinkommen und erörtert merk­
würdige Ansichten über die Monopole, die er zwar wie auch die 
Mehrheit der Scholastiker im allgemeinen verurteilt, aber auch 
auf Fälle hinweist, in denen der Monopolreis begründet ist, wie
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es beispielsweise bei den von dem Fürsten im Interesse des 
Gemeinwohls gegebenen Konzessionen oder wegen der GröRe der 
Transportkosten bei Importmonopolien geschah. Auch seine Be­
handlung des Getreidemonopols beweist klar, daß Lessius die­
jenige, für die mittelalterlichen Doktoren charakteristischen 
Anschauung überwand, welche die zwischen partikularen Einzel­
nen zustandekommenden wirtschaftlichen Verbindungen vor Augen 
hielt. Er wird schon auf den unpersönlicheren, objektiveren Charak­
ter der marktwirtschaftlichen Zusammenhänge, bzw. Verhaltens­
weisen bereits theoretisch aufmerksam.
Die Anerkennung von der Objektivität des Marktes enthält 
in der Tat einen "subjektiveren" Gesichtspunkt. Es ist so 
einerseits dem "Objektivismus" der mittelalterlichen Doktoren 
gegenüber, die den Gesichtspunkt der Nutzens dem nicht in bloß 
juristischem, sondern auch in religiösmoralischem Sinne auf­
gefaßten Kriterium der Gerechtigkeit streng unterordneten und 
andererseits ist sie "subjektiver" auch im Vergleich zu den 
später ausgearbeiteten Ergebnissen der politischen Ökonomie.
In den Arbeiten von den Klassikern dieser Wissenschaft werden 
die Gesetzmäßigkeiten der ökonomischen Prozesse tiefer beleuch­
tet und es wird eine objektivere analytische Ebene ausgearbei­
tet, die jedoch in der Zeit von der Herrschaft des Handelska­
pitals noch unerreichbar war und erst mit der Entfaltung von 
der führenden Rolle des Industriekapitals möglich wurde. Es 
kann nicht als bloßer Zufall betrachtet werden, wenn Barry Gor­
don oder Raymund de Roover bei ihrer Untersuchung der Ansichten 
von Lessius auf Parallelen zu Standpunkten von solchen Ökonomen 
des 19. und 20. Jahrhunderts hinwelsen wie die Vertreter der 
subjektiven ökonomischen Richtung Jevons, Walras, Marshall, 
sowie Keynes.
Nachdem es am Beispiel Lessius' kurz demonstriert ist, wie 
sich Phänomene des frühen kapitalistischen Wirtschaftslebens 
ln der Neuscholastik widerspiegeln und bis zu welchem Punkte 
die Denker dieser Richtung in Erkenntnis, Analyse und Ver­
teidigung der kapitalistischen Entwicklung gelangten, können
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wir nun auch ihre Mängel nicht unerwähnt lassen. Raymond de 
Roover, der sich eigehend mit dieser Richtung des ökonomischen 
Denkens befaßte und ihre Bedeutung in der Geschichte der Na­
tionalökonomie in mehreren Studien würdigte, weist darauf hin, 
daß so große aufsehenerregende Ergebnisse diese Literatur in 
der Feststellung und Erkenntnis von den Tatsachen der ökono­
mischen Realität auch erreicht haben mag, erschöpfte sich diese 
Richtung im 16. und 17. Jahrhundert bald und verfiel in Kasuis­
tik. In den späteren gewaltigen Aufschwung von der Wissenschaft 
der Nationalökonomie konnte sie sich nicht mehr aktiv einschal­
ten, obwohl seine Wirkung ganz bis Adam Smith reicht. Der Grund 
dessen wäre vor allem daring zu suchen, daß die Neuscholastik, 
obwohl ihr Aufschwung während der Gegenreformation eine gewisse 
Rezeption von den Errungenschaften des Nominalismus und der via 
moderna voraussetzte, eigentlich nicht fähig war, die über­
lieferten konzeptuellen Rahmen wirklich erneuert zu haben. Was 
die Nationalökonomie anbelangt, führten die neuen Einsichten 
nicht - und wegen ihres auf Grund des mit den feudalen Kräften 
geschlossenen politischen Bündisses konservativen und defen­
siven Programms konnten es auch nicht tun - zu einer grund­
sätzlichen Umformung des theoretischen Instrumentariums. Auf 
diese Weise war diese Richtung nicht imstande, die faktischen 
Beobachtungen ln eine neue Theorie zu generalisieren. Das neu­
scholastische ökonomische Denken verblieb so auf der Bahn von 
der legalistischen und moralisierenden Logik, die von dem Mit­
telalter an charakteristisch für dasselbe war.
Institute of Philosophy
Hungarian Academy of Sciences
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LANGUAGE, PICTURES, AND TRUTH
Kornél Solt
Pictura est 
laicorum literatura
1. Two way8 of representing the world
1. Of the various modes of thinking and communicating, two 
stand out. These are: (i) description and (ii) depiction. We 
are able to think and to express our thoughts either by means 
of language, or by means of pictures. It is, of course, also 
quite natural to combine these two ways, the discoursive and 
the non-discoursive modes.
One is able, for example, to call one's friend John to 
mind either by saying John's name to oneself, (without ima­
gining his face), or by imagining John's face (without say­
ing internally John's name). These are two different ways 
of thinking about an individual object. (See FODOR C53, p. 
180. )
Similarly, we can also represent in our mind a fact 
either by means of propositions (statements) which denote 
a given fact or by imagining it pictorially. For instance, 
if it is raining we can represent this fact internally 
either by the proposition "It is raining", or by imagining 
an inner picture of a falling rain.
Likewise, we can consider two kinds of communication, (ex­
pression of our thought). It is possible to communicate some 
information to addressees either by means of words or by means 
of pictures. These two types of communication have several 
common features, as well as several points of difference.
2. Descriptions and depictions are among other kinds of 
world-representation, two types of "messages" in HOFSTADTER's 
sense. (C83, pp. 158-175, 369-390.) A message has form and con­
tent. Its content is its information. All messages have a code. 
Decoding a message is equivalent to understanding its content, 
the item of information expressed in it.
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3. What is a picture? I do not try to define it. Let me 
only mention two types of pictures.
(i) There are pictures which represent something from 
the real world, for instance, internal images of objects vis­
ually perceived, memory-pictures, mirror-images, photographs, 
graphics, paintings, statues, films etc.
(ii) Other pictures represent objects, or courses of 
events which, in this way, do not exist in the real world. 
These include, for instance, phantasy images, some images in 
our dreams, films which show us fictive stories, illustrations 
for science-fiction books etc.
4. It is sometimes a characteristic feature of certain 
good pictures that there is a strong likeness between the 
picture itself and its depictum.* It is trivial, on the other 
hand, to hold that there is no "likeness" between a name and 
its denotatum, or between a statement and the fact represented 
by it.
2. Static and dynamic messages
5. Let us distinguish between the issuing of a message by 
its author (sender), and the decoding of its content by its 
addressees.
From the point of view of their authors, messages are ei­
ther static or dynamic. Paintings and statues are static mes­
sages because they are, as information bearers nearly inde­
pendent of the passage of time. On the other hand, e.g. radio 
reports or moving pictures are dynamic messages because the 
sending of them is itself a process "moving" in time.
However, the decoding of a message is always a dynamic 
process because the interpretation of a message necessarily 
needs time, independently of the static/dynamic character of 
the message bearer.
*There may be a nearly "perfect" likeness between a photograph 
and e.g. the person represented by it. A photograph, says 
WALTION in C123, may be "transparent" in the sense that one 
can see the real object itself "behind it". - It is, however, 
clear that "likeness" alone is generally not a sufficient 
condition for a picture's goodness.
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6. An addressee of a static message has a great liberty 
concerning the order of succession in which he decodes the 
message. However, the order of succession of the decoding of
a dynamic message is, generally, determined by the sequence of 
the information given in the message. We are free to chose 
where to begin and where to finish our observation of a pic­
ture by TITIAN, but if we read a novel by Thomas MANN, then 
the rational sequence of its decoding is determined by the 
work, by the author, and not by us.*
S. Abstractness and concreteness in representation
7. Generally speaking, by means of depiction we can come 
nearer to the concreteness of a real object than by linguis­
tic means. Thus, a good painting of the Kirov Bridge in Le­
ningrad is able to show many more features of it than any ver­
bal description is able to do.
On the other hand, by means of language, we can, general­
ly, reach a level of abstractness higher than by means of de­
piction. However, there are a lot of exceptions to this rule. 
For instance, the statue Le Penseur (RODIN) expresses ab­
stractness in an impressive way and to a high degree.
8. An object in the real world either has a given property 
or does not have it. However, if we try to represent an object, 
then we are, of course, always unable to show it with all its 
properties. The real world is infinitely richer than any mes­
sage concerning it. Consequently, no information is "complete". 
Some features of the real object are always missing from its 
representation. In such cases we can speak of "lack of some 
information".
*A painter, however, knows many of ways in which he can draw 
one's attention to the most important features of his pic­
ture. A good example is The Breakfast by VELAZQUEZ (1617, 
Hermitage). If we follow the painter's "instructions" 
then our eyes will move round the table in the middle from 
figure to figure.
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4. The lack of information
9. This phenomenon differs profoundly from the truth value 
gap.* A proposition falls into the truth-value gap if it is 
neither true nor false. A well-known example of it is the sen­
tence "The present King of France is bald".
If something is missing from a piece of information then 
it is the real world which is richer than the information a- 
bout it. If, however, a proposition falls into the truth-value 
gap, it is the information which is "richer" than the real 
world because, in this case, something is missing from the ac­
tual world that is "given" in the sentence (e.g. the present 
King of France). Where is a lack of information, there is no 
truth-value gap.
10. Theoretical discussion about the "hattedness of a man" 
is already familiar. (See SHORTER C113, DENNETT C2I.) We can 
be in no doubt that a man either has a hat or does net have 
a hat on his head. However, in the sentence "Yesterday I met 
John" there is no information about John's "hattedness". This 
information is missing from John's portrait, too, if his fore­
head is obscured by a branch of a tree also in the picture. A 
lack of visual information is also possible in a picture with­
out obscuring the facts in question. (See BLOCK Cl].)
The pictograph of bison in the Lascaux caves contains 
much precious information concerning bison, however, much 
more information on bison is missing from it.**
It may be, of course, that a mirror-image of an object or 
a photo of it (without re-touching) is nearly "complete" as 
regards visual information. Even so, a lot of other informa­
tion is lacking from it (e.g. all tactile information).
*0n the truth-value gap see, e.g., von WRIGHT C13D.
**A remark: if one has a black and white photo of the pic­
tograph in the Lascaux caves, this does not lie concerning 
the colours of the original. It simply gives no information 
concerning the colours of the pictograph. This is a lack of 
information.
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11. The sender of a linguistic or of a pictorial message 
has plenty of liberty in selecting the features and details of 
the object concerning which he intends to inform his address­
ees .
Photos and films, however, have a peculiar status in this 
regard. The sender of a linguistic message (e.g. a writer) has 
more liberty in selecting than the maker of a photo or film 
(thus e.g. a director of motion pictures). (See DENNETT C2 3, 
p. 136.) Here is an example:
Let us call to mind of the scene on TOLSTOY's War and 
Peace, when Prince Andrei Bolkonsky is lying wounded on 
the battlefield at Austerlitz with the bare flagstaff (the 
flag having already been taken away by French soldiers). 
Napoleon just glances at him and says: "Voilà une belle 
mort". TOLSTOY describes this scene in a wonderful way.
He tells only what is important for him and for us. Now 
let us consider the same scene in BONDARCHUK'S film. 
BONDARCHUK deals with it in a very impressive way, but he 
is forced to present to us many unimportant details also. 
This is, of course, not his fault, but rather the "fault" 
of every kind of photograph and film. BONDARCHUK was 
obliged to show us nearly "all", TOLSTOY had more freedom 
to select.* (Abstractness in the novel, singularity in 
the film.) For instance, the flagstaff is "only"a type 
of entity in TOLSTOY's work, but it is a token of the 
same type in BONDARCHUK'S film.**
5. Truth and falsehood in depiction
12. The most difficult and the most interesting problem 
concerning pictures (from the point of view of logic) is, un­
doubtedly, whether they may have certain truth-value or not. 
Many authors categorically deny this possibility. They argue 
that only propositions (accordingly descriptions) may be ei­
ther true or false. (E.g. FODOR C53, GOODMAN C63.) Others
* Where some information is lacking from a text or from a 
picture, we are in the area of "open interpretation". (Cf. 
Umberto ECO's idea of the "Open Work" in C33.) - X do not 
deal here with the "vagueness" of some information. I con­
tend that this offer a possibility for the "open interpreta­
tion" of a message.
**The flagstaff in BONDARCHUK'S film is a strictly singular 
(unique) object, whereas in TOLSTOY's work it is "only" 
non-particular flagstaff.
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(these are fewer) accept that, in some sense also pictures may 
be true or false. (E.g. ROSKILL - CARRIERE CIO].)
I agree with this last opinion. If descriptions and de­
pictions are merely two ways of representing the world, then 
we have no reason to accept the legitimate applicability of 
truth-values in one of these areas and to refute it in the oth­
er.
There exists a great variety of truth-theories and, there­
fore, also of definitions of truth. Whether the informative 
content of a picture may be labelled with the words "It is 
true" depends mainly on the kind of definition of truth from 
which we start out.
13. Let us now adopt TARSKI's partial definition of truth, 
according to which the proposition "Snow is white" is true in 
English if and only if snow is white. If we use the word "true" 
in this sense (in accordance with the correspondence theories 
of truth) then, for example, a narrative description of an 
historical course of events is true if and only if what is 
described by it is really the case and, analogously, a picture 
(e.g. a photograph or a portrait) is true if and only if what 
is represented by it is really the case.
Using the word "true" in this very narrow sense we can 
state that, for example, the well-known portrait of Modest 
MUSSORGSKY painted by REPIN (Tretyakov Gallery) is a true 
representation of the famous composer. It is true on a 
concrete level. It shows him shortly before his death. But 
it is also true on a higher level of abstraction, as it 
represents generally his whole tragedy.
It is quite clear that the w h o l e  t r u t h  of 
this portrait does not consist merely in the simple addi­
tion of the truth of its parts. Thus, the Principle of 
Compo8itionality does not hold for depictions.
14. Now let me quote as examples of unquestionably false 
depictions pictures painted by sailors hundreds of years ago 
representing sea-serpents. These are false because what they 
actually depict are not sea-serpents but only dolphins playing. 
In these cases, the painters' intentions were to represent 
something from the real world. Therefore, we see that the truth 
Or falsehood of a picture depends on the authors' pragmatic 
attitude also.
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15. We have, however, no doubt that the above notion of 
truth is too narrow for artistic (narrative) descriptions and 
for many kinds of depiction. If we use the word "true" only 
in the Tarskian sense then the information content of nearly 
all literature and the overwhelming majority of paintings 
would be neither true nor false. Accordingly, we need a broder 
notion of truth concerning works of art. This is the "artistic 
truth". But what is meant by this?
Before touching briefly upon this problem, let us dwell 
for a while on the theme of the truth-value gap in connection 
with descriptions and depictions.
6. The truth-value gap in descriptions and in depictions
16. Let us now define the "truth-value gap" in a piece of 
information as the lack of the logical values "true" or "false", 
in the Tarskian sense. In this case, the greatest part of the 
information contained in the works of literature falls into 
the truth-value gap. If a narrative description (e.g. a novel) 
informs us about fictive persons, objects or stories, then 
this information is neither true nor false. For instance, all 
the information we receive from A. CONAN DOYLE about Sherlock 
Holmes or from Thomas MANN about Aschenbach (Death in Venice) 
or from SHAKESPEARE in A Midsummer Night’s Dream fall into the 
truth-value gap.
The case seems to be similar concerning the great majority 
of paintings too. If a picture shows us "only" a fiction (i.e. 
a segment of an imagined world), then its information content 
may be labelled only by the truth-value gap, for example, the 
information contained in The Last Judgement by Hieronymus 
BOSCH (Alte Pinakothek, Munich), or in modern illustrations 
for science fiction books.*
*There are many paintings representing the unicorn. If their 
artists’ intention was to show us something from an imagined 
world then the information content falls into the truth-value 
gap. If, however, the artists' intention was to depict 
something from the real world, then the picture may be 
beautiful but its information content will be false.
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17. There are several different levels at which fiction 
can be said to exist. For example, the whole of Macbeth is a 
fiction compared to the actual world, but Macbeth's dagger is 
a fiction within a fiction. The dagger is a fictitious object 
compared to the non-actual world represented in SHAKESPEARE'S 
tragedy.*
Although a fiction is neither true nor false, its inter­
pretation may be either true or false. It is possible to mis­
interpret a fiction also.
7. What is "artistic truth"?
18. It is clear that Tarskian truth is too narrow for the 
characterization of works of art. However, an acceptable con­
ceptual framework in which the "artistic truth" or the "ar­
tistic falsehood" of a novel or of a picture might be placed 
is unknown. Here I only venture a few remarks concerning this 
theme.
It is most likely that there are several different kinds 
of artistic truth. A novel or a picture has many ways of ex­
pressing thoughts, sentiments, criticisms and so on. Thus, we 
can speak of the symbolic, allegorical, metaphorical (etc.) 
truth of a novel or picture. (An artist is able to show us 
some characteristic features of our actual world in the "mir­
ror" of a non-actual world.)
I suppose that there is no clear-cut demarcation line be­
tween an objective report and a subjective fiction. It is 
probable that every kind of description and of depiction is a 
mélange of non-fictive and of fictive elements in a large va­
riety of different proportions. If so, it is reasonable to 
claim that the non-fictive elements of a work of art must be 
true in the Tarskian sense. But what can we say concerning a
*David LEWIS writes concerning Macbeth's dagger:
"It is a perfectly ordinary dagger. But it is part 
of another world, floating before the eyes of an 
otherworldly alternative Macbeth whom the real 
Macbeth takes himself to be."(C9I, p. 4.)
152
"real" fiction? Perhaps this problem can be solved by means of 
the semantics of possible model worlds.
19. If a novel or a picture does not represent the real 
world directly, but creates a fantasy-world, can we reasonable 
assert that it is false? In such a case is a discrepancy pos­
sible between the representing and the represented? There is 
nothing compared with which a picture can be said to be false 
if its painter intended it to be a fiction.
M. ROSKILL's examples of false depictions are not 
convincing. He mentions, for instance, that a picture is 
false if lines are made to appear to diverge, when they 
are in fact parallel to one another. (C10D, p. 83.)
20. Let us now turn our attention to AIVAZOVSKI's famous 
picture The Ninth Wave (Russian Museum, Leningrad). This does 
not represent something which has actually happened but some­
thing what was non-actual and, at the same time, logically and 
also physically possible.*
In this picture we see a turbulent sea and some ship­
wrecked people struggling for life. A very big wave is 
rolling on. We come to know only from the picture's title** 
that this is the critical ninth wave. If they survive 
this wave, they will be saved later. What will be the 
"actual" future of these shipwrecked people?
We can interpret the picture in two ways, in an 
optimistic way and in a pessimistic way. Which interpreta­
tion is the true one? There is a well-known tradition in 
European painting that warm yellow-red colours always 
suggest some optimism. And it is just these colours which 
prevail in the background of the picture. The sun is 
breaking through the darkness. Therefore, the optimistic 
interpretation seems to be true, and the pessimistic one 
false.
21. It is, of course, far from my intention to state that 
the entire content of a picture consists merely of true or
ft
The model world of some science fiction books is only logi­
cally but not physically possible.
**Also the title (inscription) of a portrait (statue) belongs 
to the informative content of the portrait (statue).
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false information. There are a lot of other very important 
messages in a picture. In first place, a picture may be beau­
tiful. Or it may be ugly. It may be interesting or annoying.
We can enjoy it or hate it.
In pictures there are artictic-aesthetic-moral values 
and these are not measurable in terms of truth-values.
A good picture has always not only a rational content but 
also is capable of moving us emotionally. It is well-known 
that sometimes a picture is also emotionally laden. Observing 
it, we often feel its emotive force. A picture can be strongly 
provocative. It can influence us to change our outlook on the 
world or even our way of living.
22. I must stress here that an interpretation of a picture 
[like a novel) is always context-dependent and background 
knowledge-dependent. If we are to interpret a picture correct­
ly, we need always to have a deep background knowledge. The 
richer this knowledge is, the richer the interpretation we are 
able to arrive at.
8. Paradoxes in descriptions and in depictions
23. By means of words we are able to create real paradoxes. 
The content of a paradox is true and false synchronically. For 
example, the following statement
(1) This sentence is false
is paradoxical. (This is an instance of a Liar-type paradox.)
I believe paradoxical information (in the sense of Liar- 
type) is expressible only by means of descriptive messages. 
Pictorial messages never express real synchronical paradoxes 
in the above sense. It is known that many excellent paintings 
by Victor VASARELY allow us two different, alternative inter­
pretations.* They are, separately, both consistent. We are 
able, however, to see at first only one visual variant in the
*E.g. V. VASARELY: Figure III. (2889).
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picture and, later, another, but never synchronically both. Cur 
visual cortex is unable to decode alternative visual messages 
in a really paradoxical way.
Another example for alternative visual messages is the 
curious picture of a "duck-rabbit" which offers us two alter­
native schemes for perceptual organization, each leading to a 
meaningful figure. (See E.H. GOMBRICH [7], p. 165.)
This is, I contend, also a basic difference between dis- 
coursive and non-discourslve thinking. Only rational thinking 
is able to create Liar-type paradoxes, the earlier and much 
more conservative visual thinking is unable to do it.
24. Some very impressive paintings by VASARELY which offer 
us more alternative ways to decode them are not analogous to 
the sentence (l) mentioned above. They are paradoxical only in 
a weakened sense and are similar, I consider, to the following 
sentence :
(2) Reginam occidere nolite timere bonum est si omnes
consenserint ego non contradico
This message is ambiguous. It has two contradictory mean­
ings, rather like the Dodonian oracles. There is no punctuation 
in it.
Some believe that (2) was the message given by Archbishop 
JANOS to the so-called "malcontents" who later killed Queen 
GERTRUDE.*
The use of differing punctuation allows two opposite inter­
pretations.
(i) The prohibitive version isi Reginam occidere nolite.
(Do not kill the Queen) Timere bonum est. (It is good to be 
afraid) Si omnes consenserint, ego non. (If everybody consents, 
I do not.) Contradico. (I oppose it)
(ii) The permissive version is:Reginam occidere nolite 
timere, (Do not fear to kill the Queen) Bonum est, (It is
*GERTRUDE was the wife of ANDREW II, King of Hungary (1205- 
1235).
155
good.) Si omnes consenserint, ego non contradico. (If every­
body is consenting, I do not oppose it.)
I think VASARELY's paintings are only in a weakened sense 
paradoxical like (2), and not like (1). (1) contains a single 
self-contradictory message but (2) contains two alternative 
and separately non-self-contradictory messages - like VASARELYs 
alternative paintings.
9. Impossible worlds represented by pictures
25. Earlier I mentioned that by visual means we are unable 
to express and to decode Liar-type paradoxes. This does not 
mean, of course, that there are not some very strange pictures 
expressing enigmatic, astonishing contents. For istance, a lot 
of excellent paintings depict some impossible worlds (impos­
sible not only physically but also from the point of view of 
classical logic).
For example, numerous graphics by M.C. ESCHER are of this 
type, e.g. the lithographs Relativity (1955), (See in C4], p. 
47.), Concave and Convex (1955), (p. 83.), Cube with Magic 
Ribbons (1957), (p. 85.), Belvedere (1958), (p. 87.) etc.
Their characteristic feature does not consist merely in 
the possibility of interpreting them in several different ways 
but in the logical impossibility of giving them at least one 
consistent interpretation.*
I have tried here to analyse some aspects of description 
and of depiction. My paper is, however, only exploratory. This 
stimulating topic needs further examination.
Address : 1092 Budapest
IX. Kinizsi u. 22. IV. 5.
*For exemple, the PENROSE impossible triangle (see C7], p. 87) 
transgresses the boundaries of rationality.
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PHYSICAL THEORY AND PHILOSOPHICAL VALUES
Philosophical Debates on the Theory of Relativity and L. Jdnos- 
8y‘s Interpretation
László Székely
I do not know what I may appear to 
the World; but to myself I seem to 
have been only like a boy playing on 
the sea-shore, and diverting myself 
in now and then finding a smoother 
pebble or a prettier shell than ordi­
nary, whilst the great ocean of truth 
lay all undiscovered before me.
CNewtonl
The physics of the present century revolutionized our world 
picture to such an extent that perhaps even the Copernican turn 
of thought cannot be resembled to it. At any rate, there is a 
great qualitative difference between these two shifts of out­
look; while Copernicus substituted another picturesque world 
picture for a qiven picturesque world picture - the world pic­
ture of the 20th century means a radical break from pictures- 
quesness. Galileo still illustrated the relativity of motion 
with a moving ship drifting along a ship at rest. But Einsteins 
formula concerning the relativistic addition of velocities can­
not be made picturesque anymore (not even by two spacecrafts 
that pass along one another).* Similarly, in the present-day 
conceptual framework of modem physics one cannot resolve by 
means of explanation in terms of picturesquesness e.g. that 
contradictory nature of the experimental results in quantum 
mechanics which follows from the wave-particle dualism,** and
*Albert EINSTEIN: Uber die spezielle und allgemeine Relativi­
tätstheorie. 12. Auflage. Braunschweig: Vieweg, 1921.p.24-28 
**For instance: Lajos JÂNOSSY : A filozófia jelentósége a ter­
mészettudományos kutatásban. In: JÂNOSSY L.-ELEKT.: A rela­
tivitáselmélet filozófiai problémái. Budapest, Akadémiai Ki­
adó, 1963. p. 19-34.
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the finite but boundless Universe of modem cosmology cannot 
be made pisturesque either.*
The revolution in physics taking place at the turn of the 
20th century was started by Planck's quantum hypothesis and 
Einstein's theory of relativity. From a physical point of view, 
the two theories cam be regarded as of equal importance, but 
as regards the sensation and popularity they aroused in a wid­
er intellectual and cultural context, the former theory is 
eclipsed by the latter: both meant a revolution in the develop­
ment of physical thought, though what threw out a challenge 
for the world picture (and, in general, for the thought) of 
the natural sciences was not Planck's but Einstein's theory.
It was Einstein who turned against the physical world picture 
which had earlier been believed to be natural and the only pos­
sible one, and by this turn realized a new Copernican revo­
lution of the world picture of the natural sciences, - however 
the fate of Einstein's thoughts has been just the opposite 
than the afterlife of Copernicus' theory. The theory of rela­
tivity became fashionable, which was perhaps the manifestation 
of the claim to novelty of the thought of the turn of the cen­
tury, that of the longing to get off the limits of reality and 
rationality on the part of the intelligentsia of the age, that 
of the claim to some myth - and all this was then offered by 
science. The slowing down and acceleration of time, the dec­
laring the lack of any absolute reference point as a thesis of 
natural science and the possibility of curved space recalled 
the vein of myths, and that on the part of science and ration­
ality, which so far had been characterized just by expelling 
myths from the world and by restricting the free soaring of 
fancy.
Einstein's theory was a breakthrough, in that he surpassed 
the outlook of the 19th-century natural sciences and of the 
common sense that had been shaped during centuries, and he
*Albert EINSTEIN: Über die... p. 105-110.
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laid down several theses as science and rationality such that 
would have been classified as myth and irrationality by 19th- 
century thought. This aspect of Einstein's theory soon turned 
out not to be an extraordinary or isolated episode in the his­
tory of physics but such a new factor in the development of 
physics which appears in other spheres of the general physical 
theories - in the first place in quantum mechanics - too. By 
the 1930s it had become evident and natural that the outlook 
and statements of fundamental physical theories run contrary 
to everyday thinking and that the statements that can be made 
in their frameworks are absurd for everyday experience. Prog­
ress in this respect 'surpassed' even Einstein himself, who - 
as it is known - could not accept the outlook of quantum me­
chanics in all his life.
In the name of dialectical materialism the first definite 
and sharp criticism against Einstein's theory was written by 
A.K. Timiriazev, in his book entitled Natural Science and Dia­
lectical Materialism, published in 1925.* The title is highly 
expressive and foreshadows the main line of the debate on the 
theory of relativity: Timiriazev criticizes and rejects Ein­
stein's theory using the categories and ideas of dialectical 
materialism, while the authors arguing with Timiriazev and the 
representatives of standpoints similar to his one reason the 
other way round, trying to defened the theory of relativity 
against attacks of ideological motivations by emphasizing the 
theory's natural scientific success and at the same time trying 
to prove its dialectical and materialistic character. The con- 
cemstone of Timiriazev's criticism is that the theory's sys­
tem of ideas and categories is Machian and as such it is the 
manifestation of Einstein's idealistic views. His book tries 
to follow the tradition started by Lenin and criticizes Ein­
stein's theory as the newest version of physical idealism,
*A.K. TIMIRIAZEV: Eetestvoznanie i dialekticheskii materializm.
Moskow, 1925.
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but in spite of this with him we cannot find that sharp dis­
tinction which Lenin made between the physical and philosoph­
ical viewes of his opponents. Timiriazev's viewes were crit­
icized by S.I. Semkovskii, stressina that Einstein's philosoph 
ical conception must not be mixed up with the world of thought 
of the theory of relativity, which, breaking loose from the 
earlier metaphysical physics, gives a dialectical materialis­
tic description of physical reality.* A decade later V.F. Mit- 
kevitch took a similar view to that of Timiriazev's; Mitke- 
vitch was criticized by S.I. Vavilov and A.F. Ioffe in the 
review Pod znamenem markeizma.**
The second phase of the debate concerning the theory of 
relativity in the Soviet Union took place between 1947 and 
1955. In terms of content the turning-point in the debate was 
the article of academician v.A. Fock, published in the review 
Voprosy filosofii (1943 No. 1) under the title 'The Incompe­
tent Criticism of Modern Physical Knowledge'.*** Here Fock re-
S. Iu. SEMKOVSKII: Dialekticheskii materializm i printaip 
otnositel’ noeti. Moskow and Leningrad, 1926.
V.F. MITKEVICH: Oanovnie fizicheskie vozhreniia. Morkow and 
Leningrad, 1926; S.I. VAVILOV: Po povodu knigi V.F. Mitke- 
viaha. in: Pod Znamenem Marksizma, 1937/7.; A.F. IOFFE : 0 
polozhenii na filoeofskom fronte 80Viet8koi fiziki. in: Pod 
Znamenem Marksizma, 1937/10-12.
***A.A. MAKSIMOV: Markeiatkii filosofakii materializm i aovre- 
mennaia fizika, in: Voprosy Filosofii, 1948/3. — : Borba 
Leninas fizioheakim idealizmom. in: Velikila Sila idea le- 
ninizma. Moskow, 1950.; G.A. KURSANOV: Dialekticheskii ma­
terializm o proatranatve i vremini. in: Voprosy Fil. 1950/3 
L.I. STORCHAK: Znachenie idei Lobachevskogo v razvitii 
predatavlenii o prostranetve i vremeni. in: Voprosy Fil., 
1951/1.; M.M. KARPOV: 0 filoaofakikh vzgliadakh A. Finetei- 
na. in: Voprosy Fil., 1951/1.; G.I. NAAN: K voprosu o 
printaipe otnoaitel1 noati v fizike. in: Voprosy Fil. 1951/2 
D.I. BLOKHINTSEV:Za leninakoe uchenie o dvizhenii. in: Vo­
prosy Fil., 1952/1.; G.A. KURSANOV: K kritisheskoi oteenke 
teorii otnoaitel1noeti. in: Voprosy Fil., 1952/1. V. SHTE 
V. SHTERN: K voproau o 'filo8ofkoi atorone teorii otnoaitel’ 
noati. in: Voprosy Fil., 1952/1.; M.B. VIL'NINSKII: Za 
poaledovatel’no-materiali8tiohe8kuiu traktovku printsipa 
otno8itel‘no8ti. in: Voprosy Fil., 1952/1. M.F. SHIROKOV:
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fûtes the ideological charges raised in connection with quantum 
mechanics and the theory of relativity. Fock's article was 
followed by that of A.A. Maksimov, who was the most extreme 
representative of the counter-camp and used the ideological 
'clichés' in the most prominently* - but an editorial note was 
attached to it to the effect that his article was published 
only for the sake of the correctness of the debate. In a later 
number of the same review, A.D. Aleksandrov criticized Maksi­
mov, and the editorial that formally closed the debate demar­
cated itself from the latter's standpoint too.** (From the a- 
foregoing it may be clear that the discussion of the theory of 
relativity was free from any such tragical turn as that in the 
debate on genetics. How much role did Stalin's death play in 
this? And how much can this be attributed to the special stra­
tegic function of modem physical research, as regards e.g. 
atomic energy or atomic bomb? These are interesting questions
0 preimucheetvennikh sistemakh ottechota v nutonskoi mekhani- 
ke i teorii otnoeitel’nosti. in: Voprosy Fil., 1952/3.;
Ia.P. TERLETSKII: 0 aoderzhanii sovremennoi teorii prost- 
ranstva i vremeni. in: Voprosy Fil., 1952/3.; P.G. KARD: 0 
teorii otnositel’nosti. in: Voprosy Fil., 1952/5.; I.P. 
BAZAROV: Za dialektichesko-materialieticheskoe ponimanij e i 
razvitie teorii otnoeitel’nosti. in: Voprosy Fil., 1952/6.;
A.A. MAKSIMOV: Provitiv reakteionnogo einshteiniantsva v fi- 
zike. in: Krasnyi Flot, June 23, 1952.; I.V. KUZNETSOV: So- 
vetskaia fizika i dialektioheskii materialism, in: Filosof- 
skie voprosy sovremennoi fiziki, (ed.: by A.A. MAKSIMOV) Mos- 
kow, 1952.; N.V. MARKOV: Znachenie geometrii Lobacheskogo 
dlia razvitii fiziki. in: Filosofskie voprosy ...; M.M. KAR­
POV: Kritika filosofskikh vzgliadov Einshteina. in: Filosof­
skie voprosy...; R.Ia. SHTEINMAN: Za materialistioheskuiu 
teoriiu byetrykh dvizhenii. in: Filosofskie voprosy...;
A.I. UIEMOV: Geliotsentricheskaia sistema Kopernika i teoriia 
otnoeitel’nosti. in; Filosofskie voprosy...; V.A. FOCK: Pro- 
tiv nevezhestvennoi kritiki sovremennoi fiziki.-in; Voprosy 
Fil., 1953/1.
*A.A. MAKSIMOV: Borba za materialism v sovremennoi fiziki. in: 
Voprosy Filosofii, 1953/1.
**A.D. ALEKSANDROV: Po povodu nekotorykh vzgliadov na teorii 
otnoeitel’nosti. in: Voprosy Fil., 1953/5.; — : K itogam dis- 
kuB8ii po teorii otnoeitel’nosti. in: Voprosy Fil., 1955/1.
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of the history of science but they cannot be answered from 
here, Hungary.)
The articles that defended the theory of relativitv, such 
as G.I. Naan's 1951 one or Fock's 1953 one, emphasized the im­
portance of differentiating between the natural scientific the­
ory and its ideological-philosophical interpretation. Maksimov 
also admitted the difference between the philosophical and the 
natural scientific level, but according to him Fock's chief 
mistake was just that Fock admitted the opposition between the 
two fundamental trends or attitudes of philosophy, namely ma­
terialism and idealism, only with regard to philosophical in­
terpretations, denying that there was a permanent struggle be­
tween idealism and materialism within physics itself and within 
the theory of relativity.* This is a statement which today 
sounds rather astonishing and runs contrary even to Lenin's 
standpoint concerning physics. It appears as an unambiguous 
evidence of Maksimov's philosophical and physical incompetence 
and we can regard it as a matter of fact as a cliché aiming at 
the fulfilment of the ideological claim of (political) power. 
But if we go beyond this point the following question might be 
raised at once: how does Maksimov try to prove this statement 
which at first sight seems to be, anyhow, surprising and bold? 
Answering this question will at the same time offer a key to a 
deeper understanding of the debate on the theory of relativity. 
First I am going to quote Maksimov:
"The Lorentz transformation, which was discovered even 
before the creation of the theory of relativity, is a 
rational thought. The phenomenon was given a materialistic 
explanation by Lorentz and an idealistic one by Ein­
stein."** "Lebegyev examined the relation between mass 
and energy in a materialistic way. Einstein explained this 
relationship idealistically."***
*Voprosy Filosofii, 1953/1. p. 179.
**Voprosy Filosofii, 1953/1. p. 194.
***ibid.
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On the base of these quotations it will be obvious that when 
Maksimov (as well as other critics of the theory of relativity) 
speaks about the struggle between two trends within physics, 
he differentiates between them not on the base of some artifi­
cial construction taken from without, but he has in mind two 
actually existing physical standpoints that run contrary to 
one another. That is all right. But one might ask: is not it 
just the fact that he attaches a positive sign to that very 
interpretation of Lorentz's which was 'refuted' by Einstein's 
theory that proves Maksimov's incompetence?
If we approach the problem on the base of the cumulative 
conception of the development of science, this question will 
be warranted, since looking at the situation from this aspect 
we can see that the representatives of Lorentz's theory cri­
ticize such a theory, which, to use V.A. Fock's words, has 
been confirmed so strongly as the roundness of the earth.* But 
on the base of the modem theory of science it will be clear 
that the critics of the theory of relativity try to defend a 
defeated paradigm - or, in Lakatos' terminology, a defeated 
'research programme' - and revive it. And in this respect the 
debate in the Soviet Union is similar to the western ones, 
where attempts have also been made at working out some alter­
native to (or against) Einstein' theory.** What was specific 
in the debate at issue was that, due to the particular internal 
conditions of power and ideèlogy in the Soviet Union, the de­
bate concerning the theory of relativity gained considerable 
ideological charge: the representative of the defeated para-
*Voprosy Filosofli, 1953/1. p. 172.
**for example: A. EHRENFEST: Zur Kriese der Lichtäther-Hypot­
hese. Berlin, Springer, 1913.; A.A. ROBB: The Absolute 
Relation of Time and Space. Cambridge, 1921.; E.A. MILNE: 
Kinematie Relativity. Oxford, 1948.; H. LAAGE: Der innere 
Mechanismus der Gravitationskraft. Hamburg, Laages Verlag, 
1985.
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digm turned for help to the politically victorious ideoloqy in 
order to strengthen their own position and to call into ques­
tion the scientific character of the victorious paradigm. In 
this sense, the charge of 'scientific incompetence' will also 
gain a new meaning: this is a typical charge, on the part of 
the representatives of the victorious paradigm, aqainst those 
committed to standpoints that oppose this paradigm.
Naturally, beyond a certain point it is indeed unreason­
able and unscientific to commit oneself to a refuted and re­
jected paradigm. It applies particularly to those cases when, 
facing facts raised a novel social practice more expanded than 
the earlier one, the old paradigm proves to be absolutely in­
efficient. But, as for the theory of relativity, in this re­
spect the situation in again specific. For, the relation be­
tween Lorentz's and Einstein's views is characterized by such 
a structural factor which offers the possibility of making 
Lorentz's theory just as efficient as Einstein's theory. This 
factor became quite clear and explicit only by virtue of La­
jos Jánossy's research to this effect, though latently and 
vaguely it was lurking in the studies of the Soviet critics of 
the theory of relativity. 6.1. Naan and V.I. Fock were stress­
ing the importance of the distinction between the physical 
theory and its interpretation in terms of world view, while 
A.A. Maksimov denied the possibility of making this distinc­
tion. But neither of them recognized that what is at stake 
here is a triple structure, whose members are as follows:
(1) the mathematical apparatus of the theory; (2) the physical 
interpretation of the mathematical apparatus; (3) the inter­
pretation in terms of ideology and philosophy of the theory 
that consists of factors (1) and (2). The attack of those crit­
icizing Einstein was challenged by factor (2). They demanded 
the substitution of this factor and they were speaking of the 
struggle between the two trends at this level. But since they 
did not make this triple distinction, their attack was directed 
to the physical theory that consisted of factors (1) and (2).
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On the other hand those defending the theory stressed its fruit 
fulness and were bound first of all to the first factor, but, 
in the lack of making these distinctions, they took factor (2) 
as well for irrefutably proved and hence undebatable. So, as 
the triple structure at issue remained unrecognized, the ques­
tions bearing real points of confrontation became blurred. 
Contrary to the analyses of Naan and Fock, the problem of in­
terpretation has two layers and hence it is deeper than they 
supposed to be: it appears not only in the relation between 
the physical theory and the philosophical standpoints of ideo­
logical nature, but also in the relation between the mathe­
matical apparatus and the physical interpretation. Therefore 
the demand for a new physical interpretation of the mathemat­
ical apparatus does not necessarily mean the calling into ques­
tion of the achievements of the theory or their rejection. 
Though Maksimov in this respect goes one step further than 
Naan or Fock, since he admits that the mathematical formulae 
describing the Lorentz transformation are right and regards 
as mistaken only their Einsteinian interpretation - yet he 
does not recognize the central importance of making this dis­
tinction. Thus the possibility and necessity of this distinc­
tion does not become the focal point of his criticism. But it 
follows also from the lack of making this distinction that e.g. 
6.1. Naan, who was an advocate of Einstein's theory and thus 
rejected Lorentz's standpoint, at the end of his article passes 
to the direction of the Lorentzian interpretation (though he 
himself does not recognize this).*
The clearcut distinction among the above-mentioned three 
factors was made by Lajos Jánossy. It was he who emphasized, 
from a theoretical point of view, that the mathematical appa­
ratus of Einstein's theory could be preserved even on the base 
of Lorentz's view, and at the same time he proved it 'in prac­
tice' by working out, in the form of a correct physical theory,
*G.I. NAAN: voprosy Filosofil, 1951/2, p. 76-77.
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the Lorentz-Jánossv alternative of Einstein's theory.* The es­
sential core of his standpoint is that according to him fac­
tor (2), namely the physical interpretation of the theory, was 
considerably influenced by Einstein's world view, and that the 
theory can be transformed into a materialistic one only if the 
physical interpretation of the mathematical apparatus is worked 
out in a Lorentzian vein. This standpoint of Jánossy's is sig­
nificant even from the point of view of György Lukács’ Onto­
logy: the reflections on the theory of relativity in his On­
to logy cannot be understood without Jánossy's views and the 
distinctions Jánossy makes between the mathematical apparatus 
and its physical interpretations.**
Naturally, these trials at the reinterpretation may be 
rejected in the narrower frameworks of natural scientific 
thought, or on the base of the Popperian criterion of falsifi­
cation. (Hungarian physicists reject Jánossy's theory in fact 
on the base of reasons of these kinds.***) But if we expect 
more from natural science than the fruitful and useful des­
cription of physical reality from a pragmatic point of view, 
if we do not regard it as a mere instrument but we have onto­
logical expectations from it too - as Lukács did in his Onto­
logy - then Jánossy's interpretation becomes relevant at once. 
In connection with this we have to mention that after the vic­
tory over the extremist critics of the theory of relativity, a 
certain differentiation followed also among those Soviet schol­
ars and scientists who defended the theory. For example, A.D. 
Aleksandrov emphasized that Einstein's conception should be 
surpassed in that the theory of relativity should be reinter-
*Lajos JÂNOSSY: Theory of Relativity Based, on Physical 
Reality. Budapest, Akadémiai Kiadó, 1971.
Georg LUKACS: Zur Ontologie des gesellschaftlichen Seins. Ï. 
and II. Darmstadt, Luchterhand, 1984. (I), 1986. (II.) I.: 
345., 353., 359-363., II.: 388., 391.
***for example: NOVOBÂTZKY Károly: A filozófia jelentősége a 
fizikai kutatásban, in: Magyar Tudomány, 1956/7-12, — : A 
Lorentz-elv a kritika mikroszkópja alatt. ibid.1966/6.
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preted as an absolute space-time theory determined by matter.* 
And in V.A. Fock's later view of the theory of relativity, the 
principle of the equivalence of inertial and gravitational mass 
is valid only locally and even that just approximately.**
Analyzing the debate concerning the theory of relativity, 
a new and important recognition was made by István Farkas. He 
pointed out that even from the point of view of physical inter­
pretation (factor (2)) neither Einstein's nor Jánossy's theory 
can unambiguously be considered idealistic or materialistic. 
According to him, both Einstein's and Jánossy's interpretation 
can be given a materialistic interpretation, and thus the cor­
respondences Einstein -*• idealist, Lorentz ♦ materialist are not 
warranted.*** At the end of his analysis he states that choosing 
between the Lorentz-Jánossy theory and the Einsteinian theory 
is a task of physics and not of philosophy, which has to be 
performed using the usual means of natural scientific cogni­
tion.****
As it may be clear from the aforegoing, the philosophical 
debate on the theory of relativity was centred around the ques­
tion whether the theory interprets physical reality in a posi­
tivistic-instrumentalistic way, or the other way round, accord­
ing to the dialectical materialistic outlook upon nature. The 
critical remarks concerning the theory's non-picturesque na­
ture (i.e. that it seems to be absurd in more than one respect 
for everyday consciousness) were embedded in and subordinated 
to this sphere of thought. But Timiriazev, who was the first
*see for instance: A.D. ALEKSANDROV: Teoriia otnositel’nosti 
kak teoriia absoliutnoge prostranstva-vremeni. in: Filo- 
sofskie voprosy sovremennoi fiziki. Moskow, 1959.
**for instance: V.A. FOCK: The Theory of Space, Time and 
Gravitation. New York, 1959.
***István FARKAS: Marxizmus és relativitáselmélet, in: Magyar 
Tudomány, 1979/6.
****Magyar Tudomány, 1976/6. p. 457.
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prominent Soviet critic of the theory of relativity, had al­
ready raised the problem of breaking loose from the old, pic­
turesque concepts: to understand the physical phenomena Ein­
stein explained "we do not need to accept the lot of paradoxi­
cal hypotheses in which Einstein's theory abounds”.*
In what follows, I am going to examine that shift on turn 
which I think 20th-century physics, and particularly the theory 
of relativity and quantum mechanics, meant in the history of 
natural scientific thought, or, in general, rational thouqht 
aiming at a scientific physical world picture. Then I shall 
point out that Jánossy was prompted to work out his alternative 
theory of relativity by the recognition - and rejection - of 
precisely this turn. This will be followed by analyzing the 
relation between Einstein's and Jánossy's theory of relativity; 
this section of the study will be closed by stating that, un­
like the conclusion of the debate on Jánossy's theory, we can­
not choose conclusively between these two theories on the base 
of physical or natural scientific considerations.
*
The 19th century was the period of the ripening of the 
natural science of Modern Times, which was developing parallel 
to bourgeois civilization. Though the beginnings of the rise 
of the natural scientific thought of Modern Times are usually 
marked by the Copernican revolution which threw out a challenge 
to that picturesque world picture which was based on the daily 
observable motion of celestial bodies, yet in the course of 
further development materialism and natural science opposed 
just the criterion of rationality which was entwines with pic- 
turesquesness and understandability to the religious and mys­
tic thought of the Middle Ages (constituting the ideological 
basis of feudalism), which briefly and symbolically can be
*A.K. TIMIRJAZEV: Esteetvoxnanie i dialektioheekii materialism.
Moskow, 1925. p. 259.
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characterized by Tertullianus' famous thesis: 'credo quia ab­
surdum est'. (The developing natural scientific thought was 
arguing directly not with the Tertullianus-like mysticism but 
with Aristotelian Scholasticism, and that is the reason why we 
can use here Tertullianus' words only symbolically.) Bruno re­
jects Aristotle's cosmological model on the grounds of common 
and natural sense; in this model, space is taken to be finite 
and bounded, and hence it is incompatible with our spatial 
notion. The same 'common sense' is present somewhere in Gali­
leo's words when he is mocking the Aristotle of the Scholas­
tics:
"For instance, if he moon is invariant, how would you 
have the sun or any other star act upon it? The action 
would doubtless have no more effect than an attempt to 
melt a large mass of gold by looking at it or by thinking 
about it. Besides, it seems to me that at such times as 
the celestial bodies are contributing to the generations 
and alterations on the earth, they too must be alterable. 
Otherwise I do not see how the Influence of the moon or 
sun in causing generations on the earth would differ 
from placing a marble statue beside a woman and ex­
pecting children from such a union."*
We can find two important theoretical factors in Galileo's 
ironical simile, due to which we can find his reasoning ration­
al and natural. One of them is the principle of interaction 
which is confirmed again and again by everyday as well as by 
scientific practice; the other is his conjecture according to 
which between things of in principle different species there 
cannot be any connection, which latently involves the principle 
of the world's material unity. It is quite different why 
Bruno's reasoning seems to be 'common-sensical': he rejects
what appears absurd for our notions and mind just on the 
grounds of this absurdity.
*Galileo GALILEI: Dialogue Concerning the Two Chief World Sys­
tems. (translated by S. Drake) Berkeley, Los Angeles, London: 
University of California Press, 1967. p. 60.
171
"If we conceive of the Universe as boundless in the sense 
we propose, then it will comfort our mind, while from the 
opposite view there always follow innumerable difficulties 
and absurdities",*
as he sums up the essence of his reasoning. The 'common sense' 
of Modem Times and the rationality connected with it eventual­
ly can be defined by the two factors at issue: first, by the 
claim that the statements concerning empirical nature, empiri­
cal-sensual reality should be compatible with empirical reality 
itself, i.e. that they should be based on actuallv observed 
phenomena and processes and not on a prioristic speculation; 
secondly, by the rejection of everything that is in a certain 
intuitive yet definite sense illogical, absurd and inconceiv­
able. Here we have to recognize that the latter is a principle 
which is independent of empirical reality and it can essential­
ly be deduced from the rejection of the Scholastic-Aristotelian 
thought which may be characterized, as mentioned above, by 
Tertullianus' thesis. (The rather interestina paradox that it 
was just Bruno, an advocate of hermeticism, and inclined to 
mysticism, whose reasoning rested on the base of 'common sense’, 
might deserve some investigation into the history of science.) 
Yet the connection between this principle and empirical reality 
is interesting, since the latter proved to be processable by 
means of the conformity to this principle, it 'fitted in' the 
demand involved in the principle. It would be a mistake to i- 
dentify the rationality or common sense at issue with everyday 
consciousness or everyday thought, which may involve even ele­
ments of superstition. . In the age of Copernicus his theory, 
among others, throw out a challenge just to everyday thought, 
to the 'ordinary mind' of the age. This kind of rationality 
and common sense rather meant a claim to some conscious, des-
*Da quel, ehe, dicendo il mondo interminato, nel modo nostro 
séguito quiete nell' intelletto, e dal contrario sempre in- 
numerabilmente difficultadi ed inconvenient!."
G. BRUNO: de Vinfinito, univereo e mondi. in: Bruno: Dialoghi 
Italian!, 3. ed. Firenze, 1958. p. 350-351.
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anthropomorphic, universal and coherent world picture that goes 
beyond the phenomenal aspect of reality and which aims at a 
full accordance with empirical-sensual world. On the other hand, 
it is also important that the criteria of this rationality are 
in rather close connection with those elements of everyday 
thought which have been shaped and have become natural evi­
dences during hundreds of years in the course of socio-histor- 
lcal practice.
The physics of the 20th century, and especially Einstein's 
theory of relativity, came into antagonism with the intuitive 
rationality-criterion analyzed above that had been one of the 
most important orderinq principles of the natural science of 
Modern Times so far. What is paradoxical in this antagonism is 
that at first approximation it seems to be the case that even 
if in other respects there was a break with the outlook of 
19th-century natural science, in the case of this criterion 
there was a full continuity: it is the inadmissible condition 
of the scientific character of theories that they be built up 
rationally as well as that they should make statements that are 
in every respect rational and 'this-worldly'. For instance, in 
the case of Einstein's theory what is usually stressed is just 
its simplicity and 'beauty'. So the criteria of the creation 
of scientific theories did not change, and the way how some 
theory should relate to empirical reality is the same as it has 
been shaped during centuries in natural scientific thought. Yet 
a fundamental turn followed just in the question of how the 
rationality-criterion should relate to empirical reality. For, 
the possibility of curved spaces, of the finite but boundless 
universe, the consequences of the uncertainty relations of 
quantum mechanics, or the possible explanations of their rer 
spectlve experimental results (traced back to the wave-particle 
dualism) are absurd for our thinking. And not in the sense as 
Copernicus' theory seemed to be absurd for the everyday thought 
of the Middle Ages, but in a much deeper and much more funda­
mental sense, though this can be grasped only intuitively. On
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the one hand, in Copernicus'case the matter in question was 
only that a world conceived of havinq a qiven structure had to 
be conceived of, on the base of novel thoughts, havinq another 
(different) structure. The problem did not lie in the fact 
that this other structure cannot be pictured or it is uncon­
ceivable but rather in that, because of the connection to the 
old structure, it seemed to be incredible that this other 
structure can describe the world. On the other hand, the prob­
lematic statements of 20th-century physics are simply uncon­
ceivable for us and their absurdity follows from this fact.
If we accept these statements we also have to accept that the 
structure of the world is contradictory. That is, modern phys­
ics found itself face to face with that element of the ration­
ality-criterion, which in the present paper is mentioned in 
connection with Bruno (cf. his reasoning against Aristotelian 
cosmology).
It is highly essential that, as we have already mentioned, 
the criteria of the creation of theories, of their empirical 
testing and of their selection are the same even in 20th-cen­
tury physics as those having been shaped during a number of 
centuries. It is precisely this fact that endorses, renders 
scientific and inappealable these scientific results which are 
otherwise absurd for our thinking. Yet behind this continuity 
there lurks the change of the relation between physical theory 
and physical reality. In the great theories of 20th-century 
physics the mathematical apparatus is of chief importance, and 
the relation of this apparatus to the physical reality under 
examination has just the opposite sign as in the case of New­
ton's mechanics. The Newtonian and Leibnlzian differential cal­
culus came into being for the mathematical treating of the 
mechanical phenomena under physical examination. In this math­
ematical apparatus the given sphere of reality under examina­
tion is mapped in an abstract and mathematical form. Hence, 
the relation between the apparatus and the physical reality 
under examination did not (and does not) raise any specific
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epistemological problems. But the mathematical apparatus used 
by the theory of relativity or quantum mechanics came into 
being not by mapping the physical reality examined therein, but 
those creating the theories depicted them from among the math­
ematical apparatuses that came into being in the course of math 
ematics' internal self-development, in order to solve their 
problems. What happened in the course of the theory-creation 
was in fact that a mathematical apparatus was attached to cer­
tain empirical facts and theoretical presuppositions as input, 
and after 'operating' the mathematical apparatus there came 
into being an output which, on the one hand, contained empiri­
cally measurable data which therefore were easy to test; on the 
other hand, such mathematical relationships which concerned 
physical reality and had to be provided with physical inter­
pretation. Thus here the applied mathematical apparatus had al­
ready existed before its physical application was raised; its 
selection and 'survival' was based on its efficiency, i.e. , on 
its heuristic power. Hence, the mathematical relationships ap­
pearing at the output had to be related to physical reality, 
they had to be given physical content, or had to be provided 
with physical interpretation. Slightly exaggerating we might 
say that while in the case of Newtonian mechanics we get the 
mathematical apparatus by means of the mapping of the physical 
reality - in the case of modern physics we get physical reality 
by means of the mappinq of the mathematical apparatus. As Hei­
senberg wrote about the already complete mathematical apparatus 
"Schrödinger's procedure considerably simplified the process of 
a number of computations which were extremely complicated in 
quantum mechanics. But the physical interpretation of the math­
ematical system met with serious difficulties."* (Italics mine
*"...man konnte nach dem Schrödingersehen Verfahren viele Rech­
nungen durchführen, die in der Quantenmechanik ausserordent­
lich kompliziert gewesen waren. Die Schwierigkeiten begannen 
aber bei der physikalischen Interpretation des mathematischen 
Schemas." (W. HEISENBERG: Der Teil und das Ganze. München, Pi­
per Verlag, 1971. pp. 102-103.)
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- L.Sz.) Heisenberg recalled the period following the working 
out of the mathematical apparatus of quantum mechanics as fol­
lows: "Durinq the following few months Bohr and I were speak­
ing in fact of nothinq but the possible physical interpreta­
tion of quantum mechanics."* (Italics mine - L.Sz.) And the 
situation is complicated further by the fact that the conse­
quences concerning physical reality, which are qained by the 
interpretation of the mathematical relationships we have got, 
are related to such spheres about which we cannot have any 
direct empirical experience: we can gain information about 
their behaviour and the processes that take place in them only 
with the help of complicated physical measuring apparatuses 
and empirical data, gained by the mediation of different theo­
retical presuppositions. The statements of 20th-century physics 
that are problematic for our outlook and 'natural' thinking 
appear when we interpret the relationships gained by applying 
the mathematical apparatuses, or at the physical interpretation 
of the latter ones themselves. Hence, with regard to modern 
theoretical physics, applying the thesis of 'credo quia ab­
surdum est' is demanded by the mathematical apparatus applied 
therein. The conflict we are faced lies in the question wheth­
er we should believe our common sense or mathematics? Common 
sense would imply the continuation of the materialistic tradi­
tion of the natural sciences, but the high efficiency of the 
mathematical apparatus is for it, as well as, first of all, 
the accordance of the information at the output with the re­
sults of the empirical measurements.
*
*
"In den folgenden Monaten bildete die physikalische Deutung 
der Quantenmechanik das zentrale Thema der Gespräche zwischen 
Bohr und mir."
(W. HEISENBERG: Der Teil und das Ganze. München, Piper Ver­
lag, 1971. p. 109.)
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*When Lajos Jánossy called into question that the physical 
interpretation Einstein qave the theory of relativity was 
right, he recoqnized the dilemma mentioned above and tried to 
resolve it. As he summarizes the essential core of his stand­
point: "The scientific way of thinking cannot be but the dia­
lectical refinement, deepening and further development of eve­
ryday thinking. "* The second thesis or element of his theoret­
ical startinq point is the conjecture that the mathematical 
apparatus of the theory of relativity does not necessarily gen 
erate that Einsteinian interpretation which contains the state 
ments absurd for everyday consciousness. He claims that it 
is possible to qive such a physical interpretation to the Ein­
steinian mathematical apparatus of the theory of relativity 
which corresponds to his conception of the relation between 
scientific and everyday thinkinq. As he writes,
"The best method to prove the thesis that scientific 
thinking is the dialectical improvement of everyday 
thinking is to point out that the whole complex of the 
theory of relativity can be built up by means of natural 
methods in conformity with everyday thinking. At the 
beginning of the Cpresentl century a great sensation was 
created by the statement that the scientific analysis of 
the experiments necessitates that we should break loose 
from the usual thinking and should introduce new, 'rev­
olutionary' concepts concerning space and time. - We 
are going to point out, by an objective and impartial 
analysis of the facts, that these sensation-creating 
statements were unfounded."**
Hence, Lajos Jánossy's approach to the Einsteinian theory 
of relativity is far from some damnation-like rejection of it, 
but rather outlining a positive programme: he aspires to work 
out such a new interpretation which corresponds to his concep-
*JÂNOSSY-ELEK: A relativitáselmélet filozófiai problémái. Bu­
dapest, Akadémiai Kiadó, 1963, p. 9.
** ibid.
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tion of the relation between everyday and scientific thinking. 
Note that this decision is eventually a value-choice, which in 
the given situation goes beyond the scope of natural scientific 
and, more concretely, physical judgement. What is at stake in 
this value-choice is the tackling of the traditional ration­
ality-criterion of materialism and natural scientific thought, 
or its rejection, according to the widely spread attitude of 
modem physics - and on the part of natural science the first 
alternative could be excluded only if it might be proved con­
clusively and in an exact manner that there are no other pos­
sible interpretations than those prevailing today. But such a 
proof might be worded only within a given conceptual or theo­
retical framework, therefore its conclusive nature might al­
ways be called into question. Jánossy realized the programme 
put forward in the context of the theory of relativity in a 
concrete and full-blown theory, and thus his value-choice was 
supported from the side of natural science. Jánossy's inter­
pretation is not free from problems, but the same holds for 
the Einsteinian interpretation either. At those points which 
are connected with empirical reality and at which the two in­
terpretations generate different consequences, we have not yet 
succeeded in gaining empirical data such that would enable us 
to choose between the two interpretations on the base of nat­
ural scientific criteria. The traditions of natural scientific 
thought and materialism speak in favour of Jánossy's interpre­
tation, while what speaks in favour of Einstein's is the sim­
plicity and 'beauty' of his theory, as well as its high heurist­
ic power which manifested itself in the history of physics. As 
for its (theoretical) 'beauty', obviously it cannot be the 
criterion of theory choice in a theory of science that rests 
on the materialistic theory of reflection. But no doubt it re­
mains a fact that this feature of scientific theories, as re­
gards the history of natural scientific thought, is one of the 
traditional criteria of choice - and all this has been some­
what neglected so far by the Marxist theory of reflection. Es-
178
sentially the same might be said about the heuristic power, 
too.
Hence, Jánossy's attempt rests on the tackling of certain 
traditions as values. His choice is in accordance with that 
attitude which Lenin represents in his Materialism and Empirio- 
eritici8m when analyzing the problem of the crisis of physics 
and the 'disappearance of matter'. But in the conceptual frame­
work of materialistic dialectics there is a possibility to 
warrant a decision that runs contrary to his choice, i.e. to 
warrant the acceptance of the statements of modem physics that 
are absurd for our outlook. According to this philosophical 
conception, our cognitive ability and frame of mind have de­
velopment in the course of biological evolution and then socio- 
historical development, during millions of years. In this de­
velopmental process a decisive role was played by the relation 
between the subject and his biological and socio-historical 
surroundings, which, however, have been changing, yet the re­
lation itself has remained continuous. Since this relation was 
connected to the world of metres - mankind got in touch with 
the realm of microphysical and cosmological scales only in the 
natural scientific cognition of the present century - on the 
base of the epistemological conception of materialism it seems 
to be necessary that our outlook has been adapted to the con­
ditions of the world of metres. As on argument might go, in 
accordance with the principles of dialectics, in the world of 
the microphysical and cosmological scales the relations are 
highly different from those of the 'metric' sphere, hence it 
seems natural that our outlook - precisely because it has been 
shaped by the world of metres - is unable to picture or con­
ceive of those relations. Thus, to conclude this line of 
thought, it cannot be regarded as mere chance that in our know­
ledge of the world of microphysical and cosmological measure­
ments picturesquesness has been lost, what is more, this is to 
be considered a necessary process. Hence, the idea or convic­
tion that at some higher level the picturesquesness of the
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physical world picture may be revived again - by the further 
progress of cognition, or as a result of some new interpreta­
tions worked out for the mathematical formulae of theoretical 
physics - seems to be not more than a desire after a simple 
world which is easy to survey, after a harmonic and a pictures­
que natural world picture which characterized the natural sci­
ence of the 19th century.
At first approach, this line of thought is convincing and 
conclusive, but one might raise the objection whether the ex­
istence of different conditions in different spheres may con­
cern such fundamental categories as space and time, determinism 
and unambiguity, and whether e.g. the existence of milliards 
of light years can warrant such conjectures as that of finite 
but boundless three-dimensional space, which is rather absurd 
at least for everyday thinking? Jánossy refutes the physical 
reality of concepts of just this kind - on the grounds that 
here we are dealing with mathematical formulae and concepts 
having only smybolic significance. Hence, even if we accept, on 
the base of the aforementioned line of thought, the disappear­
ance of the picturesquesness of the physical world picture as 
a necessity, there will hang over our decision Jánossy's con­
ception as Damocles' sword, only to disturb us: does dialectics 
not play the same role in our argumentation as, according to 
Marx, it played with Hegel when, as regards the Prussian con­
ditions, he tried to grasp as reasonable the unreasonable 
Prussian reality? Did we not degrade dialectics in this line 
of thought to become such a tool with the help of which we try 
to conceal, even from ourselves, that we have become the Ter- 
tullianuses of the present?
We cannot choose between Jánossy's conception and the 
standpoint put forward in the aforegoing (which tries to ac­
cept and explain the disappearance of the picturesquesness of 
the physical world picture in the framework of materialistic 
dialectics) categorically and conclusively neither on the base 
of natural scientific nor on that of philosophical criteria.
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Even if we manaqed to qain such empirical data which would 
speak in favour of Einstein with reqard to the theory of rel­
ativity, this would not call into question Jánossy's concep­
tion. This would only mean that that very concrete physical 
interpretation which Jánossy worked out has not proved fit for 
the realization of their programme. But this would not still 
mean the in principle impossibility of a picturesque interpre­
tation of modem physics which is acceptable for everyday 
thinking as well, and so Jánossy's programme would remain val­
id. Therefore, our choice may be but a value-choice. What, from 
the point of view of physics, yet speaks against Jánossy and 
in favour of the other alternative is the extraordinary effi­
ciency of the theoretical apparatus of modern physics - i.e., 
of the Einsteinian theory of relativity and quantum mechanics. 
But it is only an instrumental factor. Giving an answer to the 
question whether on the base of the instrumental efficiency to 
what extent the physical world picture may be regarded as cor­
rect amd adequate knowledge in an ontological - and not only in 
an instrumental - sense has not a foundation without choosing 
between the two standpoints. It has not because here the theo­
ries under examination are eventually mathematical apparatuses, 
whose interpretation and possible physical contents are influ­
enced to a considerable extent just by the choice between these 
two standpoints. And at this point there appears a new, serious 
and profound problem that has not been answered so far: how 
much can the theories of modem physics be regarded as the on­
to logically correct grasp or 'mapping' of the spheres of na­
ture under examination - and how much are they mere instru­
ments , which serve for the theoretical handling of physical 
reality and for the manipulation with physical reality?
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